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A New Understanding of Sophistic Rhetoric: A Translation, with Commentary, of 
Mario Untersteiner’s “Le origini sociali della sofistica” 
Elisabeth LoFaro 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation translates an essay by Mario Untersteiner ―Le origini sociali della 
sofistica‖ (―The Social Origins of Sophistry‖) unpublished in English, and explores its 
significance in terms of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory, as well as the 
composition classroom. In the process, I attempt to contribute to reestablishing sophistry 
and rhetoric within our contemporary cultural milieu. More specifically, the dissertation 
is organized into five main parts: The first chapter offers an introduction to and thorough 
background of the sophists in ancient and classical Greece; the second chapter reviews 
the scholarship about the sophists, as well as that on Mario Untersteiner and his ―Le 
origini,‖ exploring the commonly known difficulties of translation. Chapter three 
provides my translation of the complete essay, while chapter four presents my 
interpretation of the most salient issues in the essay and their importance to classical 
rhetorical theory. The concluding chapter presents my conclusions and relates my 
findings to the composition classroom, the university, and society at large, arguing for the 
reintegration of certain sophistical rhetorical theories and practices.
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Science, politics, philosophy, drama, literature, architecture—a great number of Western 
civilization‘s most prized, honored, and respected achievements emerged in classical 
Athens at roughly the same time in which rhetoric and sophistry
1
 developed and 
flourished. The reasons behind this coterminous appearance offer room for speculation, 
yet some educated conjectures materialize more strongly than others. Social, 
philosophical, cultural, and political circumstances not only enabled but also created the 
conditions for the emergence of sophistry, for the sophistic movement responded to a 
new need in a dynamic, evolving social configuration. The sophistic tradition thus 
emerged 2,500 years ago in the Mediterranean at a time of ardent fervor and shifts in the 
organization of human life and Western civilization. This dissertation examines the 
conditions that engendered this tradition, including a review of the literature to date, a 
translation of a germinal essay by Mario Untersteiner ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ 
(―The Social Origins of Sophistry‖) unpublished in English, and discusses Untersteiner‘s 
significance in terms of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory, with implications in 
the composition classroom. I attempt to the continuing reassessment of sophistry and 
                                                          
1
 Although sophistry is now often a pejorative term, as it was in Antiquity, I am using the term 
descriptively rather than evaluatively.   
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rhetoric within our contemporary cultural milieu. More specifically, the dissertation is 
organized into five main parts: the first chapter offers an introduction to and thorough 
background of the sophists by contextualizing them in archaic Greece; the second chapter 
reviews the scholarship about the sophists, as well as that on Mario Untersteiner and his 
―Le origini,‖ exploring the commonly known difficulties of translation. Chapter Three 
provides my translation of the essay in its entirety, while Chapter Four presents my 
interpretation of what I deem the most salient issues in the essay in terms of classical 
rhetorical theory and scholarship. The final chapter presents my conclusions by relating 
my findings to contemporary rhetorical theory, the composition classroom, the university, 
and society at large. 
In order to understand the importance of sophistry, one must recognize the 
circumstances that were in place before and during the time in which sophistry emerged, 
prior to the social conditions that Mario Untersteiner discusses in his essay. These 
circumstances allowed sophistry to flourish and within the scholarly and public 
imagination, even if in a negative manifestation and despite the pejorative perspectives of 
Plato‘s dialogues. I discuss the circumstances leading up to classical Greece, the context 
of Untersteiner‘s essay, in terms of their socio-historical, cultural, and philosophical 
manifestations.  
There is, of course, inevitable overlap between categories, for any sort of 
grouping or classification system will reveal complications, inconsistencies, and overlap. 
Definitional categories are inherently somewhat unstable, and, to a degree, arbitrary.  
However, they are necessary to organize and present opportunities for analysis. In order 
to elaborate upon the context of Untersteiner‘s essay, I divide the contextual background 
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of the sophists into distinct (although constructed categories) that are not flawless and 
may blur in some places. I include political events and the development of rhetoric within 
the socio-historical section, discuss education in the cultural section, and briefly review 
the pre-Socratics in the philosophical one. Without question, these could have been 
arranged differently. Nevertheless, they are necessary for communication and for 
understanding the context of the events discussed in Untersteiner‘s essay, which 
examines the social conditions in the age that followed promoting the appearance of 
sophistry.  
The main events that stimulated radical changes in Greece and created conditions 
favorable to the appearance of sophistry occurred due to a number of ―paradigm shifts,‖ 
to borrow Thomas Kuhn‘s famous expression, which took place around 600 BCE. These 
events and changes are important not only for the birth and flourishing of sophistry but 
also, by extension, of the whole of Western civilization, for the advancements (political 
and social) of this time laid the foundations of Western thought, even if not always for 
the best, and, continue to be aspirational and inspirational for many individuals. By the 
time the sophists appeared, Athens was a cultural cauldron of activity. The arts and 
sciences were thriving, and a previously unseen inquisitiveness and suspicion regarding 
myth, superstition, and custom emerged, as well as a new belief in ―progress‖ and the 
potential of human beings. The literary arts, oratory, and rhetoric flourished in response 
to contemporary needs. These great, unparalleled accomplishments were the fruit of a 
number of shifts from earlier ways of thinking, changes that arose out of the events that 
occurred during the centuries before the Golden Age. Among the most significant socio-
historical, political, and philosophical events leading up to this Golden Age of the 
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Hellenes were the transformations in the social organization of, between, and for the 
historical population.  
 
Socio-Historical Context 
The development of the polis occurred over a long period of time. For thousands of years, 
the Aegean, a small sea in the eastern Mediterranean, hosted many societies—first the 
Aegean civilization in the third millennium BCE, then the Minoan, and finally the 
Mycenaean in the subsequent thousand years. These societies leave records of their 
cultures in the oral myths of Homer. One significant change occurred when the few 
kingdoms that ruled Greece in the second millennium BCE, known as the Mycenaean 
Age, ended suddenly in 1200 BCE. A period of deep economic and cultural cutbacks 
accompanied by a decline in population that lasted for 350 years ensued after this time 
and came to be known as the Dark Ages, from roughly 1200 BCE to 800 BCE. Historians 
argue that, in these conditions, the necessary component of Greek life was the self-
sufficient farming villages, ruled by basileis, a term that approximates the word 
―chieftan‖ more than ―king‖ (Starr 17). From these villages, the new poleis were to 
emerge in the eight century BCE (Nagle & Burstein 2).  
At this time, Greece divided into small communities that shifted from being 
controlled by basileis to being under aristocratic rule by 700 BCE.  Only kings and holy 
seers were allowed to speak in this political landscape. Homer offers an example of this 
trend in Book 2 of the Iliad, when common soldier Thersites attempts to address an 
assembly of the Greek army and asks what would today be considered a plausible and 
excellent question: ―Why must we continue to die here for the greed and lust of you 
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kings?‖ (Qtd. in Robinson 22). Homer shows Thersites as ridiculed and silenced 
(Wooodruff and Gagarin x, Robinson S 22). At this time, only people of higher classes 
were considered competent to speak and make decisions. Hesiod‘s political accounts of 
the time also show a similar situation in a pastoral setting. Kings had all the power, and 
justice remained arbitrary and fragile (Wooodruff and Gagarin xi). 
 
Development of the poleis 
The greatest changes concerning every feature of Greek life took place from the eighth to 
the sixth century BCE, the period immediately preceding the emergence of sophistry and 
the Golden Age of Athens. At this time, a civilization began to emerge whose existence 
was recorded in much greater detail than ever before. From the eighth century forward, 
small independent city states, or poleis, developed out of self-sufficient farming villages 
around the Aegean. Historical data regarding the actual dates of the development of the 
poleis is scarce until sixth-century Athens, which was among the later poleis to develop, 
but the work of political anthropologists investigating the evolution of poleis dates them 
after the Dark Ages. These Aegean states, such as Corinth, Argos, Thebes, Sparta, and 
Athens, were societies of farmers and craftsmen. Many of them were isolated by 
mountains, yet the inhabitants developed abilities as seamen, abilities that enabled trade. 
The trade links they established with each other and with peoples from the Near East, the 
Western Mediterranean, and beyond enabled these poleis or city-states to grow 
prosperous on trade. Although independent and autonomous, the people of these city-
states began to develop a common national identity, and as merchant classes became 
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economically independent. A move away from the government by kings began to 
develop. 
These poleis also brought about the development of constitutions and codification 
of laws. A population boost and a dynamic economic growth that had not been witnessed 
since the second millennium BCE culminated in the creation and spread of currency, a 
development that radically changed economic activity (Nagle and Burstein 43). Further, a 
common language and alphabet came into being around the Aegean. A nation was 
forming, with religion providing the strongest unifying force, and the poleis were the 
center of the entire process. Archeological records note that shrines also began to appear 
around this time. Centers of civic unity, these temples replaced the huts of the earlier part 
of the eighth century (Starr 39). While this development can be overemphasized, festivals 
at these early sanctuaries drew large masses of people together and held economic 
functions as well.   
Polis commonly translates as city-state in English. The numerous contemporary 
definitions of city and state, however, cannot capture the full meaning of polis and even 
the closest contemporary understanding possible cannot come close to the meaning of 
this ancient social organization, as is often the case with ancient Greek terms. The polis 
was quite different from today‘s city and state. D. Brendan Nagle and Stanley Burstein 
point out that the connotations of the two words—city and state—have little to do with 
the poleis of ancient Greece. Rather than political institutions, poleis had politai, that is, 
citizens whose citizenship was passed on by questionable claims of descent and who both 
govern and are governed, as Aristotle would later state. For Gagarin and Woodruff, the 
polis was ―a tightly knit community bound by cultural and religious ties and sharing 
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certain military and economic goals‖ (xi). Therefore, more than its usual translation as 
―city-state,‖ the polis was a ―community of self-governing citizens‖ (Nagle and Burstein 
1). 
Philip Manville offers a particularly pointed exploration of the term. Agreeing 
that the Greek polis meant more than any state or city-state current or historical , 
Manville finds answers in the Politics, the treatise in which Aristotle most closely 
examines the character and qualities of the Greek polis, despite Aristotle‘s common 
blending of the theoretical and the empirical (38). The encouragement of arête, a term 
with a complex meaning which I will explore throughout the dissertation but that loosely 
translates to virtue, emerges most prominently and is among the most interesting 
requisites of the poleis, as well as central to this discussion. For Aristotle, Manville 
elucidates, ―the polis exists by nature [and] developed out of simpler forms of society, 
evolving toward its ultimate goal of ‗the good life‘‖ (43). More than an association or an 
alliance, the polis is a koinōnia, which is a special type of association that ―unites and 
harmonizes the functions of its members for their mutual benefit . . . consisting of rulers 
and ruled whose final common purpose is the encouragement of excellence (arête) 
among all citizens‖ (43—44).  
To ensure this goal, dikē or justice becomes a fundamental element of the polis 
and inextricably linked to arête. Justice, however, cannot be guaranteed exclusively 
through institutions such as the constitution, laws, and courts, but must be a ―spiritual 
commitment of the citizens, a shared belief that the form and processes of the institutions 
will lead to goodness‖ (44). As a result, the polis had to articulate what is just so as not 
only to enable but also to encourage the best human qualities to burgeon. Despite 
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Aristotle‘s quarrels with the sophists regarding nomos, physis, and dikē, one basic belief 
remained regarding the polis: ―it was a special kind of community in which citizens 
benefited by their membership‖ (48). For Werner Jaeger, the development of the poleis 
marked the beginning of classical Greek culture (Paideia, Vol. 1, 77). The benefits 
citizens gained through their membership could and were abetted by the services that the 
sophists provided in Greek poleis, as I will discuss below. 
The Greeks founded hundreds of these totally independent city-states in the 
Mediterranean and Black Sea basins between the mid-eighth and the late sixth century 
BCE. Of 1500 poleis around the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, most did not 
cover areas larger than one hundred square miles and had fewer than one thousand 
citizens. Founding colonies, however, was an arduous and perilous process—what today 
would be considered a speculative venture—that included the risk of death. The impetus 
behind these hazardous undertakings stemmed in part from the possibilities of 
accumulating wealth but perhaps even more so such colonization offered the possibility 
of a fresh start that differed from the conditions and friction of Archaic Greece. Such 
feelings and attitudes of optimism and apprehension of the pioneering Greek explorers 
emerge prominently already in the Odyssey (Nagle and Burstein 21). Herodotus also 
offers accounts of the founding of some poleis, for example, in his account of the case of 
Cyrene. Such colonization obviously promotes a clash between peoples that inevitably 
leads to the encounter and spreading of new ideas. As the Greeks sought new arable land 
and trade prospects, these new ideas entered Greek thought, not always for the best and 
too often with violent outcomes. Nevertheless, the proliferation of these emerging 
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concepts predictably produced fertile ground for change and development, out of which 
the sophists with their inquiring could raise a rich array of questions. 
 
Political Context 
A definite power shift also occurred in Greece after the developments of the tenth and 
ninth centuries BCE. Exact dates are unavailable due to the lack of writing at the time, 
and the reasons for the shift from aristocracy to democracy are too many to explore in 
this brief introduction; nonetheless, an adequate preamble is necessary and aligned with 
the scope of this introduction. Once again, Homer offers the first discussions of political 
thought. 
Worth quoting at length, Kurt Raaflaub posits that Homer discusses political 
problems and as a result educates the people: 
 
[T]he concerns emphasized by the epic poet . . . deal with basic problems of life 
and relationships in a community. The thought devoted to these concerns is 
political thought. It occupies a remarkably prominent place already in these 
earliest works of western literature. In keeping with the literary and poetic nature 
of these works, such thought is fully integrated into the narrative and expressed 
through action and speech. In other words, the poet uses traditional mythical 
narrative to discuss ethical and negative models of social behavior, by 
illuminating the causes and consequences of certain actions and relating those to 
the well-being of the community, the poet raises the level of awareness among his 
listeners, he forces them to think, he educates them. Here then, to say it 
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paradoxically, in non-political poetry in a prepolitical society, lie the roots of 
Greek political thought. (―Homer‖ 33) 
 
Raaflaub argues that, from its earliest records, Greek thought addressed a great number of 
issues: the injurious results of clashes within the leading classes and of reckless actions of 
the nobility; the ways to avoid such clashes and overcoming them should they occur; the 
discrepancy between communal and individual interests; the ways to improve and 
implement justice; the role of the community and nobility for outsiders and the socially 
underprivileged; and the political and moral problems surrounding warfare (34). Such 
issues were of critical importance to the development and success of the community and 
remained within Greek thought for centuries. They also indicate a shift of responsibility 
from the gods to human agents, who now become accountable for actions and mistakes 
within society and must, therefore, cogitate and deliberate upon their own actions. The 
most significant changes within political organization occur when human beings begin to 
question relations between social classes, formerly thought of as ordained by the gods, 
setting the stage for the subsequent appearance of the sophists.  
 
Shift from Tyranny to Aristocracy to Democracy 
The eighth century BCE brings yet another change, one of the earliest events that began 
changing the course of Western civilization. Deference to the dominant elites of past 
times, elites who did not heretofore have to answer to anyone, began crumbling as these 
poleis developed throughout Greece (Robinson S. 21—22). The masses of Greeks rather 
suddenly and consciously rejected absolute authority, a transformation in consciousness 
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that caused a change in power relations (21). This change created a need for rhetorical 
prowess, as I will discuss in more depth below, for the Greek masses now had to be 
persuaded by their leaders even while the aristocracy continued to dominate. Already in 
the worlds represented by Homeric epic poetry, kings and military leaders depended upon 
their rhetorical dexterity to function smoothly; as the often quoted dictum indicates: ―a 
hero must be not only a doer of fine deeds, but a speaker of fine words‖ (Homer, Iliad 
IX). Although the aristocracy had ultimate power over the people, leaders nonetheless 
had to gain consensus from the masses of Greek farmers, who also comprised the 
militias. The causes for this alteration in power relations remain concealed behind a lack 
of written records during the ninth and tenth centuries BCE. However, what records 
remain clearly indicate a modification of power from absolute to consensual in the eight 
century. 
A stir in socioeconomic/political relationships also took place at this time, and 
would turn out to be one of the greatest changes in terms of the developments it set into 
motion. Military service and political privilege were very directly linked until this time, 
as already evident in the earliest classical Greek history and literature such as Homeric 
poems. In the Iliad Homer portrays societies ruled by a ―warrior elite of great 
landowners,‖ referring to them as ―heroes‖ and ―kings‖ who alleged to descend from the 
gods and claimed that their paramount role in battle held the right to govern their 
communities (Nagle and Burstein 28). This connection between military glory and 
community leadership, however, dissolved around the seventh century BCE, when the 
aristocracy, whose members also claimed to be of divine descent, replaced the monarchy. 
Daniele Vignali, dean of the Istituto Paritario Nobel in Rome, states that aristocratic 
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power was primarily economic and only later did the aristocrats claim themselves as 
superior based on the virtue of their birth and the possession of ethical virtues connected 
to their divine descent; he writes that the aristocrats, ―la cui potenza era principalmente 
ed originariamente di carattere economico, si presentarono in un secondo tempo come 
individui superiori rispetto ai propri concittadini in virtù della loro nascita e del 
possesso di virtù etiche legate appunto alla loro presunta discendenza da una stripe 
divina‖ ([the aristocrats] whose power was primarily and originally of an economic 
character, presented themselves at a later time as superior individuals compared to their 
fellow citizens by virtue of their birth and possession of ethical virtues tied to their 
supposed descent from a divine bloodline) (22). This shift in political power soon led to 
yet another development, between the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, one that saw the 
imperious economic ascent of the middling class due to the expansion of mercantile trade 
and radically changing social conditions (22).  
Wealth and welfare, formerly extremely circumscribed, broadened. Even the 
honor of being part of the army and therefore defend the native land, formerly reserved 
exclusively to the nobles, was granted to anyone who could afford arms for combat due 
to mutations in military strategy and especially with the institution of the hoplite phalanx, 
a disciplined heavy infantry (Vignali 22, Nagle and Burstein 29, 43). The development of 
the hoplites slowly dissolved the supremacy of the cavalry and the aristocrats, who held 
most of their power because they had the funds for horses.  Once the middle class could 
afford armor and weapons, a sense of community between the leaders and the middle 
class emerged. While at first these nouveaux riche attempted to integrate with the 
aristocratic elite, the conditions of aristocratic domination were miserably crumbling. 
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Power now hinged on how well a phalanx of hoplites could fight together in the interest 
of the community as a whole. At this stage, the individualism of an Achilles disappeared 
altogether (Wooodruff and Gagarin xi). 
Because of their military commitment and wealth, non-noble citizens began 
demanding both political recognition and a written codification of laws that protected 
them against the arbitrary will of the aristocratic courts and protect the non-nobles from 
the abuse of power of the nobles (Vignali 23). These factors engendered the birth of the 
first written legislations, particularly those of Solon at the beginning of the sixth century 
BCE, which essentially formed a timocracy,
2
 a salient step towards democracy, 
lightening the pressure of aristocracy over the people.  The interests of those who served 
in the army—a middle class of farmers, artisans, and merchants—were of primary 
importance at this stage. Political reform started to occur, and social classes had to find a 
middle ground rather than win one over the other. Solon‘s reforms, however, pleased 
neither the aristocracy nor the middling class, creating a political instability that led to the 
tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons until 510. This tyranny, however, was not able to 
impede the complex political-social process that would bring about the rise of the first 
democratic institutions (Vignali 23).  
The tyranny of Peisistratus was benevolent, for he turned to common Athenians 
for support, thereby further undermining the hierarchy of aristocrats over commoners that 
had endured for centuries. Jaeger argues that tyranny was successful when in the hands of 
a genuinely gifted man such as Peisistratus, who was devoted to the service of the people; 
                                                          
2
 A stage of political development in which political and civil honors are distributed according to wealth  
(Unabridged Webster). 
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for both political and economic motivations (228). Agrarianism accelerated and 
production soared, finding a ready market with other city-states and in the rest of the 
Mediterranean. Although it inhibited individual initiative and upheld every state action, 
the tyranny of Peisistratus nonetheless had considerable weight politically, in his words, 
―by creating, through legislation, an ideal which allowed and even enjoined political 
activity on the part of the citizens‖ (229). While the tyrant did not educate the people 
toward political arête, he stood as a model in another sense, becoming the ―prototype for 
alter centuries‖ as the first to engage in ―real politics‖ (229). From these earliest dabbles 
in democracy which allowed unprecedented freedom, the Athenians had shown their 
remarkable capacity for extraordinary achievement. When Peisistratus‘ son Hippias took 
over and did not share his father‘s fair-minded ruling for very long; the freedoms that 
Athenians had gained under Peisistratus quickly vanished as a the full-blown tyranny of 
Hippias took over when his brother was murdered.  
Cleisthenes overturned him, ushering in a new (democratic) era in which, as 
within the Olympic Games, anyone could seize victory and glory. This new ideology, 
however, made power more unstable, and soon others were conspiring against 
Cleisthenes. Isagoras, another aristocrat, with the help of the Spartans, overturned and 
banished Cleisthenes and hundreds of others households, establishing an oligarchy. This 
arrangement did not last long, and for what many deem the first time in recorded history, 
the ordinary people, after that taste for freedom and self-governing, like their mythical 
heroes, took their destinies into their own hands, turned on their rulers, and seized power 
for themselves by rising up in revolution. The Athenians turned to Cleisthenes, calling 
him back from exile; in a sense, he was to face the remarkable challenge of designing a 
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revolutionary governmental solution for a revolutionary political situation since neither 
putting a group of aristocrats back into power nor making himself tyrant were options at 
this point. 
 At this time, the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes created what many consider 
the first democratic institutions. The challenge that Cleisthenes faced was how to give his 
fellow Athenians the say in their future that he knew they now must have. He therefore 
had a great meeting place carved out from the bare rock where citizens of Athens could 
gather to discuss the future of their state. This place is the ancestor of the British House 
of Commons, the U.S. Congress, and various parliaments across the world. In these 
forums, rich and poor alike could stand and address their fellow citizens. Whereas 
government had once been decided by strength, Cleisthenes instituted the simple vote—a 
white pebble for yes, and a black pebble for no—the rule of the people, a system of 
government now known as democracy. The great Athenian assembly would gather every 
nine days covering the entire administration of the state: from the raising of taxes to the 
building of roads, from the price of olives to the declaration of war.  
The route to democracy went from monarchy, aristocracy, timocracy, tyranny, a 
very brief oligarchy and finally democracy at the end of the sixth century. The ―official‖ 
date usually attributed to the birth of democracy is 507-08 BCE with the reforms of 
Cleisthenes. At that time, Athens, still a tiny city in mainland Greece, saw ordinary 
people turning on their rulers and demanding freedom from centuries of oppression. 
Democracy represented a decisive break from what had preceded it. An originally elitist 
culture was now turned around, and the idea was that even common Greeks who were not 
aristocratic nor rich could be, as it were, heroes in politics. It was a system of government 
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that would transform this tiny state and stimulate one of the greatest flowerings of 
civilization that the world had ever seen. The fifth century saw a rapid growth of 
democracy in Greece, with its climax occurring in fifth-century Periclean Athens. At this 
juncture, Sophistry emerged and flourished in Greece, displaying its connection to 
democratic political thought.  
Several scholars have asserted that the essential qualities of democracy legitimate 
the rise of sophistry. For example, Daniele Vignali argues that democracy accounts for 
the rise of sophistry, stating that this form of government, ―in ragione di alcune sue 
peculiarità giustifica e legittima il sorgere della sofistica‖ (23—24). The doctrines of the 
sophists, he continues, would hardly be comprehensible and explicable if not viewed as a 
rejoinder to the needs of a novel democratic society: in his original words, ―La [sic] 
dottrine dei Sofisti risulterebbero difficilmente comprensibili qualora non fossero 
considerate come una risposta alle peculiari esigenze poste dalla nuova società 
democratica Greca‖ (25). Like other scholars who explore this connection, Vignali 
attributes the correlation between sophistry and democracy to the ―centralità assoluta‖ 
(absolute centrality) of the ―arte della parola‖ (the art of speech), the oratorical ability 
which could move public opinion determining its political vote (25). Rhetorical ability 
and dialectical skill thus became essential abilities of the ruling class. Drawing on Martin 
Heidegger and R. Dherbey Gilbert, he underscores the dedication of the sophists to these 
disciplines, presenting themselves as teachers of rhetoric and dialectic, for these thinkers 
offered their students the competence and knowledge necessary to reach and exercise 
power within a democratic society (25).  
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Thomas Conley also champions this view regarding the connection between 
democracy and sophistry. Conley finds that, due to the political reforms of the time, ―[i]t 
is no accident that the sophists should have been drawn to Athens‖ where they found ―a 
ready market for their wares, particularly in terms of rhetorical instruction‖ (4). More 
specifically, the reforms of Cleisthenes establishing a form of democratic government 
and those of Ephialtes reforming the court system in Athens initiated two basic 
principles: ―that power should reside in the people as a whole, not in an elite few, and . . . 
that high offices should be entrusted by lot to those among the citizens who were 
perceived as best fitted for them‖ (4). The reforms of Cleisthenes created an 
unprecedented social mobility by opening up Athenian politics allowing any citizen to 
―become a member of the assembly, to vote on public issues, and to hold administrative 
offices‖ and ―aspire to a career in politics or civil service,‖ while those of Ephialtes 
instituted the right for every citizen to bring suit against any other and be decided by a 
Heliastic jury (4). Because lawyers such as those of today were nonexistent, every citizen 
involved in a lawsuit had to argue his (not her) own case; furthermore, these juries 
consisted of over two hundred members, making deliberations significantly more public 
than today‘s (4—5). As a result, eloquence became extremely advantageous and therefore 
sought-after. Among the numerous skills that the sophists offered in their teachings, 
adroitness in public speaking was the most in demand.  
The importance of a free, democratic regime cannot be overemphasized, for the 
sophists would have had no market without a society of free individuals. An 
unquestioned tyranny, aristocracy, or monarchy has no use for teachers of persuasion, 
oratory, and other skills useful to free citizen politai. The end of tyranny, in fact, marks 
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the beginning of rhetoric and vice versa; according to Thomas Habinek , ―the ancient 
belief in the mutual exclusivity of tyranny and rhetoric is itself a variation on the wider 
theme of rhetoric‘s role in the foundation of the state‖ (8). Rhetoric, one of the main 
subjects many scholars argue fell into the realm of most sophists‘ curriculum, would not 
be relevant in a society in which truth were undisputed, unchallenged, and certain, 
regardless of the claims that the idealist philosophy of Plato, for example, would like to 
hegemonize. Athens, as the center of the Greek empire, was the perfect and obvious 
choice for the sophists to market the commodity they were offering. Without the 
establishment of democracy in the fifth century BCE, the prodigious success of the 
sophists would be inexplicable—as would the immense hostility and enmity they aroused 
in their most ardent competitors from philosophy. 
An indispensable element for the development of sophistry, then, democracy saw 
the appearance of certain fundamental constitutional innovations starting in 460 BCE that 
allowed even the poorest to hold public office. Power was distributed on relatively equal 
bases on all Athenian citizens, which did not include women, metics, and slaves. Worthy 
of note, only property-owning, male, Athenians-born citizens took part in and benefitted 
from democracy. According to Josiah Ober, the citizen population was ―never much more 
than about 15 to 20 percent of the total population or half the adult male population‖ 
(117). Public decisions were reached in public assemblies in which the different factions 
confronted one another dialectically. The art of rhetoric and debate, as a result, became 
the primary ingredients of political success. As a matter of fact, rhetoric and oratory 
began appearing as human communities systematized into identifiable city-states 
(Habinek 1). When speaking of the socio-historical and political context of sophistry, one 
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cannot but recognize the nexus between democracy, sophistry and rhetoric—or more 
specifically, the systematic study of rhetoric—for these emerged contemporaneously. 
 
Cultural Context 
A cultural shift also occurred from the Dark Ages and Archaic to Classical Greece in the 
paideia. The Greek term paideia denotes culture in a more multifaceted and expansive 
way than today‘s conception of culture, encompassing the ―entire complex of all the ways 
and expressions of life which characterize any one nation,‖ particularly ―a consciously 
pursued ideal‖ (xvii). This Greek ideal of culture differs from any other Pre-Hellenic 
culture; what begins with the Greeks is a ―world in which a cultural ideal was first 
established as a formative principle‖ (xviii). Jaeger identifies a ―new awareness of the 
position of the individual in the community‖ and ―the beginning of a new conception of 
the value of the individual‖ (xix). The Greeks realized that the ―world is governed by 
definite and comprehensible laws‖ (xx). Werner Jaeger defines education as ―the process 
by which a community preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual character‖ 
and sees in the Greeks, the beginning of civilization (xiii—xiv).  The role of Sparta in 
creating the new Greek ideal of man
3
 as citizen remains among the easiest to define than 
the rest of Greece due to its key movement toward this ideal  (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, 
99). Ionia, despite the dearth of reliable information, also played an influential role in the 
development of these innovative Greek ideals. Even though the aristocracy remained in 
power since the political and legal reforms did not eliminate the privileges of status and 
bloodline, the polis was nonetheless a new social ideal.  
                                                          
3
 I use the term ―man‖ for human beings because in effect these new ideals applied more directly to men. 
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Much of what scholars know about early education once again originates in 
Homer (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol 1, 100). Many scholars believe that the works attributed to 
Homer had a strong pedagogical influence on Greek society. Jaeger goes as far as 
considering him ―the first and the greatest creator and shaper of Greek life and the Greek 
character‖ (36). Deemed the earliest and utmost testaments of Greek literature, Homer‘s 
epics had as their purpose not the writing of history but the exploration of human 
capabilities and limitations (Starr 17). Werner Jaeger also claims that neither epic can be 
examined as a ―historical description‖ (Paideia, Vol. 1, 16). What the Iliad can do is tell 
the story of ―an age almost wholly dominated by the ancient hero-spirit of arête‖ and 
show the ―glorification of fighting and heroic prowess‖ (17—18).  While the Iliad offers 
―a largely idealized picture of the aristocracy‖ and of the ―superhuman arête of the 
ancient heroes,‖ the Odyssey displays more human characters, both commoners and 
nobles, who nonetheless bear ―the invariable stamp of decorum and good breeding in all 
situations‖ (19—20). Jaeger believes that Homer had an educational purpose in glorifying 
their culture and high refinement, one that is marked by ―discipline, the deliberate 
formation of human character through wise direction and constant advice‖ (21). Although 
directed toward the aristocracy, this process shows education turning into culture for the 
first time. Once democracy took form, this process extended to the middling class and 
questions of the teachableness of virtue or arête became issues discussed at large in 
classical Greece. Before democracy and the sophists, myth and heroic poetry are the 
nation‘s source of ideals and standards (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, 41). Among their various 
innovations, the sophists questioned the divine will that governs these epics.  
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The Hellenes regarded every part as subsidiary to an ideal whole, the universal, 
the logos, and aimed to utilize that knowledge as a ―formative force in education . . . to 
shape the living man as the potter moulds clay and the sculptor carves stone into 
preconceived form,‖ making the human being into ―the greatest work of art‖ and being 
the ―first to recognize that education means deliberately moulding human character in 
accordance with an ideal‖ (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, xxii). This molding of human 
character directly relates to the social role that the sophists provided. Given this focus on 
the shaping of character, the appearance of the sophists once again emerges prominently 
and unsurprisingly. They aimed to help, for a profit, individuals to compete for their own 
good, as inspired by the polis and encouraged by the paideia. The sophists descanted on 
traditional Greek themes about human nature and society, justice and happiness. In 
general, the sophists agreed with Socrates on several counts, believing that flourishing 
communities and lives necessitate civic virtues like justice and moderation, that moral 
education of some sort promotes these virtues, and that natural talents and practical 
training are necessary components of moral education and verbal instruction (Rawson 
214).  
 
Development of Rhetoric and Sophistry 
The systematic study of rhetoric has uncertain origins but probably originated in Sicily 
after the overthrow of the tyrants. Citizens had to learn how to express their defenses and 
give formal talks in assemblies and law courts so as to recover, for example, property that 
had been usurped by the tyrants (Gagarin 30). More specifically, around 467 B.C.E. in 
Syracuse, a tyrant named Hieron died and quarrels over the formerly seized lands 
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developed (Herrick 32). Corax, a rhetorician, and later his student Tisias responded to 
this need by creating rhetoric, understood as the art of persuasive speech, and teaching it 
for a fee. They trained citizens in judicial pleading to help them argue their claims in 
court and recover their lands. Corax was also instrumental in the development of 
democratic reforms in Syracuse. Corax, Tisias, or both also crafted a written Technē, a 
manual or handbook that covered the ―division of speeches, the argument from 
likelihood, and perhaps other subjects‖ (Gagarin ―Background‖ 30). Either fellow 
Sicilian Gorgias brought their achievements to Athens in 427 or Tisias himself may have 
done so and is said to have taught Lysias and Isocrates among others. Aristotle, if not one 
of his students, knew the book or books and summarized the contents of numerous early 
handbooks in his now lost Synagōgē Technōn, or Collection of Arts, a work that became 
the principal source for later scholars of Corax and Tisias (30).  
Scholars disagree on the validity of this story, and many of whom either do not 
mention it at all or question its legitimacy. For example, Thomas Conley calls it ―old 
story . . . probably just another of those stories about ‗first discoveries‘ Greeks were so 
fond of‖ (4). Others even question the existence of Corax and Tisias, such as Thomas 
Cole, who claims that hard facts about the two figures are lacking (―Who‖ ).  Also, 
Michael Gagarin claims that ―[h]ard facts about Corax and Tisias are almost entirely 
(some would say entirely) lacking‖ (―Background‖ 30). However, Italian authority in 
rhetoric, Bice Mortara Garavelli, calls Corax and his student Tisias as ―i fondatori della 
retorica [the founders of rhetoric]‖ without question (17). Edward Schiappa also refers to 
this story as ―the standard account‖ (4—6, 30—37). 
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Whatever the origin, however, teachers and rhetoricians known as Sophists 
quickly picked up this systematic approach to teaching rhetoric, carrying it to Athens and 
other city-states in Greece where they offered their services for a price (Herrick 32). The 
sophists as they came to be known later traveled around the poleis as intellectuals who 
taught subjects useful to effective citizen orators, including rhetoric.  They fulfilled a 
novel need within Hellene society that needed rhetorical skills in order to work together 
in peace within the new social organization of city-states, poleis. Through rhetoric, then, 
civilization began to form itself in the way that we know it today. Thomas Habinek 
argues that rhetoric and oratory come to life when human communities become 
recognizable states. Each of these communities created a governing system and ―a sense 
of purpose independent of the authority and aspirations of individuals, no matter how 
powerful‖ as it began to record a common history that surpasses the limits of any 
individual human life (1). Rhetoric becomes, then, the specialized speech of the state. 
The sophists answered this call by providing their services for a fee, a fee that elicited 
Plato‘s reproaches that caused the negative connotations thereafter associated with 
sophistry, as I will discuss later on.  
In these years, the democratic regime affirmed itself in the greater part of Greece, 
and Athens became with Pericles the cultural and artistic center of the Greek world.  
Greece‘s success against the Persians triggered a growth of self-belief. Starting in 478 
BCE, a period of approximately half a century, the Pentecontaetia, began and lasted until 
the Peloponnesian war (432 BCE). This period of peace allowed great developments and 
is considered one of the periods of most magnificence of the Greek spirit and culture—
the Golden Age or the Greek Enlightenment. Daniele Vignali argues that the sophists 
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were children of this time and their thought and pedagogical praxis answered the exact 
exigencies of this historical, social, and political moment (25). During this flourishing of 
democracy, the art of rhetoric and oratory become absolutely central to move the masses 
and determine their political vote. Within a democratic regime, only those able to 
persuade listeners and if necessary to dispute interlocutors and opponents in the presence 
of the assembly of gathered citizens could manage the newly distributed power (25). 
Rhetorical and dialectical ability became essential requisites of the ruling class, and the 
sophists dedicated their attention to these skills, presenting themselves as teachers of 
these abilities.  
Full participation in the life of the city-states, therefore, continued to call for the 
mastery of rhetoric because citizens had to be able to resolve issues among themselves 
within the flourishing democracy. As a result, rhetoric comes to replace combative 
resolve of conflict, even if supporting brutal hierarchies, for example in the maintenance 
of a powerful male citizen population (Habinek 6—7). Although rhetoric becomes an 
option to violence in conflict resolution, it also serves as a way to exclude others from 
power (8). The Hellenes were also extremely preoccupied with excluding tyranny. The 
teachings of the sophists had a clear political legitimation and were clearly although not 
exclusively offered to those with political prospects, as many scholars show (Vignali 25).  
While some scholars argue that the contributions of the sophists to philosophical inquiry 
were inconsequential, the philosophical context of their appearance is crucial to our 
understanding of their thinking. Werner Jaeger contends that the relevance of the sophists 
to their age through the ―searching changes which their new intellectual attitude [made] 
in the development of the Greek character‖ significantly contributed to the theories of the 
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great natural philosophers in the advancement of philosophical thought (Paideia, Vol. 1, 
150).  Up until the Presocratics and society, the leader of the people was the poet, as well 
as later the law-giver and statesman (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, 152).  
 
Teaching of Arête 
The teaching of virtue or arête was a central argument between the sophists and 
traditional beliefs or orthodoxa. Plato brought this debate to life in one of his most 
animated Socratic dialogues, in which Socrates argues that arête cannot be taught, 
although Socrates believes that all virtue is a kind of knowledge. Protagoras, on the other 
hand, contends that all kinds of virtues can be taught—and are taught especially well by 
him—but that they are not forms of knowledge.  
The social factors in place when the sophists rose to prominence in Athenian 
culture were unprecedented due to unexpected military victories against the Persians, as 
well as technological innovations that stressed human rather than divine intervention. At 
this time, Athenian democracy, an experiment like no other in direct and participatory 
democracy, came to flourish, offering power to any eligible citizen who could persuade 
crowds to his point of view. Rhetoric at this time became a necessary tool, as it is still 
today, of the right of free speech and a just trial. Being teachers of rhetoric and other 
skills useful for civic status, the sophists visited Athens frequently, even taking part in the 
cultural reform of Pericles. Furthermore, the growing prosperity of Athens generated a 
class of citizens with enough time to devote time to their education, which was largely 
lacking at the time and usually complete by one‘s early teens. The sophists offered a 
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unique service, previously unseen, providing education in an extensive assortment of 
subjects that would have appealed to young men.  
 
Philosophical Context: Presocratics 
The Presocratics had concerned themselves with the nature of reality and its relation to 
sensible phenomena (Guthrie 4). A shift in interest from natural phenomena to human 
affairs occurred around the fifth century BCE.  Jaeger believes that scholars should 
examine the combination of the ethical, political, and religious thought of Solon and the 
Ionian poets and explode the dichotomy between poetry and prose to understand the 
development of philosophy in an accurate manner. Only then can scholars begin to see 
the shift as a process rather than one system leaving another one behind overnight. Jaeger 
maintains that political theory is practical while speculation regarding physis and genesis 
is theoretical: only after studying the external world theoretically did the Greeks think of 
human nature in those terms as well (Paideia, Vol. 1, 152). 
Establishing the precise time in which rational thinking begins in Greece remains 
challenging. In the age of the Presocratics the poet was still the unquestioned leader of his 
people, slowly being joined by the statesman and law-giver. Jaeger identifies the Ionians 
as the first philosophers, a term that, of course, did not gain currency until Plato. Ionian 
poets had already been ―voicing their emotions and opinions on human life and their own 
age,‖ while the philosophers ―applied pure independent logic to the current conception of 
the universe‖ (154—55). Both endeavors centered on the ―growing power of the 
individual‖ (155). Around the sixth century, philosophers started probing the origin of the 
universe—its physis (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, 155). After finding that Egypt and the 
 27 
 
countries in the Near East had disparate creation and divinity myths, the Greeks began 
subjecting their own myths of creation to theoretical and causal inquiry (156). They also 
incorporated their neighbors‘ technical innovations to study the origin and nature of the 
universe, inquiring within nature before human beings. Jaeger marks this moment as the 
―origin of scientific thought‖ (156). However, the mythical thinking of the epic and 
rational thinking ran parallel for quite some time, with logic appearing within mythology, 
as well as Plato and Aristotle still mythologizing (151). The Greeks started thinking of 
human nature theoretically when, by studying the external world through medicine and 
mathematics, they had created a precise method to study the inner world of humans 
(152).  
Philosophers also began writing down their thoughts for the first time. 
Anaximander was the first one, viewing the world as built up by an orderly rather than a 
chaotic system. His, however, was more of a moral than a physical law of nature 
regarding the eternal processes of compensation and power of diké ruling over natural 
phenomena (160). His idea of dike is ―the first stage in the projection of the life of the 
city-state upon the life of the universe‖ (161). The Milesian philosophers used human life 
as an example interpreting physis (161). Similarly, Pythagoras, another Ionian 
philosopher, although he worked in the south of Italy, founded mathemata, which blends 
the science of number, the theory of music, the movement of the stars, known as 
geometry at the time, and Milesian natural philosophy (162). Number, for Pythagoras, is 
the principle of all things, ruling the entire cosmos and human life, making mathematical 
science the new element of Greek culture and connecting mathematics and music with 
far-reaching consequences (162—64). The connection created new laws that governed all 
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aspects of existence, and the new inquiry into the structure of music produced knowledge 
of harmony and rhythm , concepts that affected all spheres of life in a way that resembled 
the doctrine of justice in society of Solon (164—65). Pythagoreans believed that harmony 
was the principle of the cosmos (165). Behind harmony lay the concept of proportion, 
which affected all forms of culture including sculpture, architecture, poetry, rhetoric, 
religion, and morality (165). Like the rule of justice, the Greeks realized that the rules of 
fitness and propriety had to be maintained.  
In the sixth century, the Orphic movement formulated a new doctrine of the soul. 
This doctrine began creating ―a new consciousness of the self and a new feeling for 
human life‖ (166). While with Solon, the idea of responsibility meant that each individual 
held a social responsibility toward the community, in Orphism it meant a moral 
responsibility ―or the religious ideal of the pure life‖ (166). Humans started believing in 
their divine destiny, a central innovation in the development of human consciousness of 
selfhood. Although the soul has no place in the cosmos of the physicists, in the Orphic 
movement, it restores itself within its religious consciousness of selfhood. 
Civilization came to be seen as discovered by human beings rather than a gift of 
the gods, as in the mythical tradition. Although Anaximander and Anaximenes created 
these doctrines of naturalistic explanation of the universe, Xenophanes advocated them 
with ardent conviction. This new truth transformed the life and faith of humankind, 
making it the foundation of a new culture and the ―metaphysical foundation of city-state 
morality‖ (171). Xenophanes also promotes his new conception of arête, holding that 
philosophical truth is the guide to true arête, depicting the conflict between ―the old 
aristocratic culture and the new philosophical ideal of humanity which now sought to 
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eject from its place and power in the social order‖ (173). In the old aristocracy, the 
Olympic victor still represented the highest ideal, but Xenophanes first questioned that 
traditional ideal of manhood, defending philosophical knowledge and showing a new 
conception of arête in the form of intellectual culture. Jaeger identifies Xenophanes‘ 
ideal as the final phase of ―the development of the political conception of arête: first 
came courage, then prudence and justice, and now finally wisdom—the virtues which 
Plato retained as the essence of the citizen‘s highest arête‖ (174). While he may not have 
been an original thinker, Xenophanes was the first to tell the Greeks that philosophy 
could be a cultural force. 
 In addition to Milesian natural philosophy and the arithmetical theories of the 
Pythagoreans, the final element Greek thought to influence human intellectual and 
spiritual life was logic. Parmenides, considered by many as one of the greatest 
philosophers of all times, altered the guiding force behind the speculations of early 
physicists, which were hitherto led by other forms of spiritual activity. His philosophy 
revolves around pure reason, making a distinction between thought and perception, 
between ―the way of the senses and the way of reason‖ (177). Therefore, whatever is not 
known through reason is mere opinion. At this point, religion begins to give way to 
philosophy. Like the Milesians, Parmenides had dehumanized the problem of finding an 
objective conception of the universe, losing track of human life in the in the immense 
design of nature.  
Heraclitus humanized philosophy, placing the human soul at the center of all the 
energies of the cosmos. While earlier philosophers undertook ―logical reasoning or 
intellectually ordered observation of phenomena,‖ Heraclitus showed how a new realm of 
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knowledge could be achieved if the soul were to examine herself (180). He transformed 
logos from the conceptual thinking of Parmenides to a ―form of knowledge, the origin of 
both ‗action and speech‘‖ and viewed life as a griphos, a riddle to be interpreted (180-
81). Just like the city, the universe appears to have laws of its own for the first time in 
human history, and only logos can understand divine law. Logos is the mind that 
perceives the meaning of the cosmos. Thinkers before Heraclitus had discerned a new 
cosmos; Heraclitus gave the human being his/her place as a cosmic being. Furthermore, 
he viewed the process of human existence in an innovative way, seeing both intellectual 
and physical activity as made up of dichotomies incessantly replacing one another. For 
Heraclitus, human beings are part of the cosmos, subject both to its laws and to the laws 
of the city-state; this kind of freedom differs from the freedom of modern individualism 
in that human beings are part both of the universal community and the community to 
which they belong. Heraclitus created a moral law of the entire cosmos.  
 The Presocratics started a revolution by applying a scientific approach to the 
inquiry into nature. While they cannot be lumped together as having had an identical or 
even similar worldview, they do share some commonalities in the form of scientific 
attitudes (Waterfield xix). As ―proto-scientists‖ they were the ―first to make and explore 
assumptions which is absolutely crucial to the development of science, that the human 
rational mind is the correct tool for understanding the world‖ (xix). They endeavored to 
provide an orderly explanation of the whole cosmos and all it main characteristics. 
Although in the history of ideas one cannot identify exact origins, before the Presocratics, 
the world was imbued with sacred meaning, permeated by divinities, gods, goddesses, 
nymphs, and local deities in every natural manifestation. Anthropomorphized to an 
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extreme in Homeric poetry, the deities controlled every aspect of nature including 
humans. The Presocratics found order in the world, an order that can be understood by 
the human mind.  
The Presocratics diverged both from the foregoing weltanschauung and full-
fledged scientism. Although they asked questions similar to those of their predecessors, 
the presocratics based their answers in an unorthodox framework: they replaced the 
function of the gods with natural phenomena, used logic to rationalize observable facts, 
formed general philosophical hypotheses, and held a clear, unrestrained spirit of inquiry. 
They differ from scientism by lacking scientific method, building neat but not 
demonstrable systems (Waterfield xxiv). Although they were not likely the first and only 
ones to base their conclusions on observation and rational argumentation, the way they 
expressed their conclusions was different from Hesiod and other predecessors. They 
started a revolution that took centuries to complete, centuries in which a substrate of 
superstition was still present in the larger part of the population. 
 
Sophists 
The sophists do not at first glance appear as direct successors of the presocratics, given 
the lack of sophistic interest in scientific issues and metaphysics. The sophists directed 
their attention to language and all aspects of logos rather than the origin and nature of the 
cosmos. Nevertheless, the sophists  were indeed the direct successors of the presocratics 
because once the presocratics had opened up the Pandora‘s box making the world at least 
potentially intelligible to the human mind, ―a humanist or anthropocentric emphasis on 
human beings was inevitable‖ (Waterfield xxvii). The sophists were pioneers in 
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broaching questions regarding moral, social, and political philosophy. Further, while 
contemporary science has answered the questions raised by the presocratics, those of the 
sophists remain debated and largely unanswered.  
The term sophist (sophistês) has held varying meanings throughout the millennia 
since its first appearance. Originally, it referred to a person of sophia, usually translated 
as skill or wisdom. The word derives from the adjective sophos, which in its original 
sense applied to people ―skilled in a particular craft, and extended to mean generally 
knowledgeable or wise‖ (McKirahan 372).  The noun sophist means ―‗one who exercises 
wisdom,‘ that is to say, a specialist in wisdom‖ (372). Protagoras was the first to apply 
the term to himself although the word dates further back than the fifth century and had 
been used on poets, musicians, seers, and sages—those who had special knowledge and 
insight, and the gift of communicating it to others,‖ thereby including Homer and Hesiod, 
as even Plato‘s Protagoras notes (373). Nevertheless Jacqueline de Romilly interprets it 
as ―professionals of intelligence [for] they certainly set out to teach people how to use 
their intelligence‖ (1). Unlike sages, sophoi, which indicates a state of being rather than a 
profession, the sophists were masters of thinking and talking who made knowledge their 
area of expertise. Patricia O‘Grady condenses it to ―‖freelance, mostly non-Athenian, 
independent teachers who travelled throughout Ancient Greece from city to city making 
their living out of the new demand for education‖ (12). Due to the breadth of the term 
sophist, it could be applied to anyone who exercised this profession. 
In the strict sense of the word, the sophists were ―itinerant educators who operated 
independently and charged fees [who] taught different ranges of subjects, but all taught 
rhetoric, the art of constructing and delivering public speeches,‖ the ―key to success in 
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public and private life‖ (McKirahan 363). They were also ―professional rivals, competing 
for fame, wealth, and pupils‖ and ―their shared interest in rhetoric and related issues led 
them to develop philosophical theses, and their rivalry led them to challenge each other‘s 
views and formulate competing ones‖ (363). De Romilly notes that the sophists went 
from being ―experts in wisdom‖ to practitioners of ―crafty thinking (xiii). Conceivably, 
she adds, what ruined the reputation of the sophists may have been their ―all too self-
satisfied disciples . . . were the real, perhaps the only, amoralists,‖ such as Callicles, 
Euripides, and Democritus , who may have been influenced by the sophists (xiv).  
In ancient times, the term was applied both to individuals still known as sophists today 
and those who later rejected and contributed to the downfall of the term. Classical texts 
record the term used on people as varied as Prometheus, Homer, Hesiod, Damon, Solon, 
Thales, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Zeno, Plato, Socrates, and Isocrates were 
called sophists (Schiappa, ―Sophistic‖ 682). Many of these would roll in their graves at 
the thought of the term being used on them and some actually contributed to the term‘s 
fall from grace.  
Today, the people most often referred to as sophists include Protagoras, Gorgias, 
Hippias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Critias, and Antiphon, as well as on occasion Polus, 
Euthydemus, Dionysodurus, Callicles, Socrates, Antisthenes, Alcidamas, Lycophron, and 
the authors of Dissoi Logoi, the Anonymus Iamblichi, and the Hippocratic Corpus (682). 
In I sofisti, Untersteiner discusses Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Antiphon, and Hippias 
in depth, as well Thrasymachus and Critias . The meaning of the word sophist changed 
between the time of Protagoras and that of Aristotle (McKirahan 372). Garavelli 
identifies the sophists‘ system of precepts on the following principle: ―il sembrare vero 
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conta più del essere vero; donde la ricerca sistematica delle prove e lo studio delle 
techniche atte a dimostrare la verosimiglianza di una tesi‖ (17). On this basis—that 
seeming real is more important that being real—the sophists became an easy target for 
attacks regarding moral relativism.  
The sophistic tradition as such includes a number of theoretical principles 
sometimes grouped together under the term ―sophistic rhetoric‖ (Schiappa, ―Sophistic‖ 
682). The phrase, however, is an anachronism, for it does not appear in any Greek text, 
Aristotle‘s and Plato‘s included. Edward Schiappa identifies Edward M. Cope as one of 
the pioneers in describing ―‗sophistical‘ rhetoric‖ in the mid-nineteenth century, a 
category thereafter often taken for granted, although the sophists often held different, 
even contrasting positions on numerous subjects; therefore, ―sophistic rhetorics‖ proves a 
more accurate and constructive label for their projects than the monolithic singular term 
(682). The term rhetoric, too, was not coined until the early fourth century BCE, and did 
not appear in any existing texts by the fifth-century sophists. For this reason, Schiappa 
advocates referring to sophistic rhetoric as sophistic theories of discourse or persuasion 
or, alternatively, consider such doctrines as ―implicit or incipient theories of rhetoric‖ 
(684).  
  
 35 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
Despite their virtual disappearance for millennia, the sophists lingered within the 
scholarly imagination throughout their historical exile, if for no other reason as the 
contrast to all that is good, moral and virtuous—the antithesis of idealist philosophy. 
Their reputation ruined by Plato—to the point of engendering the negative word, 
sophistry—they have been viewed as sketchy thinkers and accused of producing specious 
and flawed arguments, a peculiar outcome considering that originally the word sophist 
meant wise person, as its root ζoθία—sophia, the Greek work for knowledge—indicates. 
Nevertheless, during their 2,500-year exile, these figures have come close to without ever 
fully disappearing. Overcoming the negative connotations associated with sophistry has 
not proved a simple task. For centuries after the Hellenic period, the sophists were 
viewed exclusively through the interpretations of Plato. Having become relatively 
irrelevant and over two thousands of years, the sophistic tradition has never the status it 
earned in the fifth and fourth century BCE in Athens, particularly in those circles of 
people who could enjoy—and afford—their services. In the Webster Unabridged 
Dictionary, sophistry denotes ―reasoning that is superficially plausible but actually 
fallacious.‖ According the Oxford English Dictionary, sophistry signifies ―Specious but 
fallacious reasoning; employment of arguments which are intentionally deceptive,‖ since 
 36 
 
the fourteenth century, appearing in 1340, and even ―Cunning, trickery, craft‖ as used by 
Chaucer in 1385. Nevertheless, scholars have been making some progress in 
reestablishing the positive contributions the sophists have made to democratic societies in 
the past and can make in the present. In the nineteenth century, sophistry began assuming 
its meaning as ―The type of learning characteristic of the ancient Sophists; the profession 
of a Sophist,‖ starting in 1837 (OED). The same century witnessed the beginning of the 
sophists‘ resurgence.  
 
Nineteenth-Century Recovery 
The recovery of the sophists has been attributed to different thinkers at various times, but 
starting around the middle of the nineteenth century, when Western civilization took a 
skeptical turn toward a ―hermeneutics of suspicion,‖ to use Paul Ricoeur‘s phrase, 
through the work of Marx, Nietzsche, and subsequently Freud, the sophists came to be 
reconsidered. This resurgence of these controversial thinkers would emerge expectedly at 
this point in human history given that most foundational pillars of knowledge crumbled, 
much in the way that the sophists believed two millennia earlier.  
The recovery of the sophists began in the nineteenth century when the sophists 
were salvaged from the shadows of history by a number of high profile intellectuals. 
Specifically, G. F. Hegel in his Lectures in the History of Philosophy, later published in 
1832, takes sophistic relativism as the antithesis of pre-Socratic naturalism in his well-
known dialectical view of history. Despite its negative representation, Sophistic 
subjectivism, in this view, was a crucial step in the history of philosophy because 
necessary to the movement of thought within Hegel‘s Dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and 
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synthesis. The first stage, for Hegel, spans from Thales to Anaxagoras, when thought 
appeared in sensory determinations that formulated proto-scientific statements about the 
physical world being perceived. Next as the antithesis, the sophists, Socrates, and the 
adherents of Socratic thought, strangely grouped together, through skeptical criticism 
repudiated this view replacing it with an emphasis on the perceiving subject—what today 
would be dubbed subjectivism. From this clash between thesis and antithesis emerged the 
synthesis of Plato and Aristotle. The importance of the sophists, then, was merely as a 
negative but nonetheless important stage in the history of the dominant idealist 
philosophy. 
This revival brought sophistry back into the scholarly conversation, allowing it to 
be revisited by later historians and reopening the argument between Plato and the 
sophists in its various forms, such as the interconnected debate between rhetoric and 
philosophy and the one between knowledge and discourse. Nevertheless, as many 
scholars have shown, Hegel‘s reintegration of the sophists did little in the way of 
improving their reputation as philosophers, for by making them subjectivists and 
assigning them the antithesis subdivision of his scheme to the history of Greek 
philosophy, Hegel appeared to agree with the inimical estimation of Plato and Aristotle, 
and idealist philosophy continued to prevail until the mid-twentieth century, with truth 
and reality still viewed as objective. By being considered opposed to objective truth, 
especially in the moral realm, the sophists held on to their position as the foes of 
philosophy. Despite this far from glorious return, however, the sophists at least reentered 
the conversation and continued to be discussed throughout the nineteenth century. 
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Among the scholars to revisit the sophists are historian Eduard Zeller in Germany, as 
well as George Grote and George Henry Lewes in Britain.  
Although Zeller recognizes that the sophists had been misrepresented throughout 
history, he ultimately considers them lacking in comparison to Platonic idealism. Zeller 
views the sophists as having much in common regardless of individual distinctions, 
viewing them as part of the same educational discipline, a view still debated today as I 
will discuss below. Following in the lines of Hegel, for the most part, he considers the 
sophists as detrimental to the scientific enterprise, holding their rhetoric as dealing with 
appearances and condemning their morals as downright perilous. However, he observes 
some redeeming qualities, acknowledging the philosophical validity of subjectivity for 
the first time. Zeller‘s was the last study to hold an almost completely negative view of 
the sophists and their teachings, his conclusions deeming the sophists as making truth as 
a matter of personal preference and as an instrument to fulfill selfish needs. Further, in 
the sixth edition of Zeller‘s Die Philosophie der Griehes in ihrer geschichtlichen 
Entwicklung published in 1920, Willhelm Nestle denied them the title of philosophers, 
reestablishing philosophy as exclusively traditional. Despite these efforts in the 
nineteenth century, the end of the century had yet to see the rehabilitation of the 
following one, and by the last third of the nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick sums up 
the prevalent estimation of the time as considering the sophists as ―charlatans‖ who 
taught ―fallacious discourse‖ and ―hollow rhetoric‖ to credulous Athenians until Socrates 
overthrew them (Qtd. in Guthrie 11). 
George Grote and George Lewes, on the other hand, were more approving, 
particularly of sophistic philosophical skepticism and the sophists‘ knack for creating 
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consensus. Grote, in particular, viewed them as exponents of intellectual progress though 
not as an organic whole. Further, Grote rejected Plato‘s attacks regarding the sophists‘ 
purported immoral doctrines on the grounds that not even Plato had attacked the principal 
sophists—Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippais, and Gorgias. While defending them against 
dismissal based on the views of any individual sophist, however, Grote‘s view did not 
allow the sophists to be secured as a class of intellectuals, and despite Grote‘s success 
shielding the sophists against the accusations of corrupting the Athenian moral character, 
the lack of cohesion in sophistic thought made them difficult to safeguard. George Lewes 
followed Grote‘s defense of the sophists. 
 
The Twentieth Century 
The sophists have been enjoying increasing and considerable attention in the 
scholarship since their revival in the nineteenth century. Their recovery continued in the 
twentieth century, which, however, begins in a way that would have pleased Plato and his 
followers in the subsequent two millennia. The second half of the twentieth century 
witnessed an actual revitalization of their ideas. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
however, scholars relegated the sophists to the margins by including and by appealing to 
them primarily as predecessors of philosophers proper.  
Discussions of the sophists continued to appear regularly in scholarly works until 
the mid-twentieth century although minimally. They materialized in scholarly works 
under subordinate categories such as presocratic philosophy, humanism, epistemology, 
ethics, pragmatism, and nihilism within minor entries in the work of Jean Bordieau, 
William James, James H. Tufts, John Dewey, and F.C.S. Schiller, rather than receiving 
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expansive treatments of their own. These revaluations of the sophists still relied on Plato, 
reassessing and reappraising his interpretations of the sophists rather than turning to the 
work of the sophists themselves. Nevertheless, the primary contributions of the sophists 
came to be recognized as less than negative in the first quarter of the first century but 
nonetheless remained secondary to other branches of learning. After World War II, a turn 
against Plato occurred due to numerous studies tying Nazism to Platonic ideals of a 
stratified society. 
While not devoted to the sophists as such, Werner Jaeger notes them as making a 
significant contribution to the Greek paideia by devoting an entire chapter to them in his 
masterful work on the ideals of Greek culture. Jaeger towers among classicists, not only 
to the history of the sophists but also to classical paideia in general. A renowned 
Aristotelian, he had and continues to have a colossal influence on his generation of 
classicists and beyond. I draw on Jaeger throughout this dissertation, so for now suffice it 
to say that Jaeger views the sophists as the inventors of intellectual culture, the art of 
education, pedagogy, and rhetoric (297—98).  
This lack of formal and expansive treatments is nevertheless revealing in itself. It 
exposes the absence of an official restoration of the sophists as serious intellectuals and 
even philosophers, as the scholarship of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
scholarship in particular will do. The dearth of comprehensive studies up until the mid-
twentieth century further indicates that the sophists were yet to be considered as worthy 
of intellectual attention in their own right. Up until this stage, the sophists, although 
―recovered,‖ were yet to qualify as making an intellectual contribution worthy of 
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substantial scrutiny and analysis. This academic phenomenon makes the work of Mario 
Untersteiner on the sophists particularly noteworthy.  
I Sofisti (The sophists) by Mario Untersteiner, was and remains an authority on 
the subject despite the number of scholars who followed him. He offers one of the first 
full-scale treatments of the sophists, which was first published in Italy in 1949 and 
translated into English by Kathleen Freeman in 1954. Untersteiner‘s powerful, probing, 
and comprehensive historical and philosophical reinterpretation of the sophists, whom he 
examines primarily as theoretical philosophers more than as rhetoricians. Untersteiner 
veers away from presenting an account of their unfavorable history as assailants of 
traditional values, squabblers, and spurned paid teachers, as, he states in the opening, do 
the textbooks before him. While the conclusions in his study do not diverge greatly from 
earlier studies, Untersteiner proposes that the sophists, each of whom he explores in 
depth within each chapter, contend with the same issue from which emerge disparate 
answers. The issue they deal with is that of humanity. Mario Untersteiner‘s I sofisti 
remains among the most extensive treatments of the primary sophist. 
In a less developed study of the sophists, Eric Havelock attempts to correct the 
history of political theory in his The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics, finding that up 
until then, it had been ―written in modern times exactly as Plato and Aristotle would have 
wished it to be written‖ (18). Havelock, however, views them as leaders of democratic 
and liberal thinking in Greece and seeks to resuscitate the liberal pluralism of the sophists 
as ―an act of historical justice‖ (18—19).  
G.B. Kerferd—whose work I discuss in more detail below—offers a useful 
classification of the defenders of the sophists in the twentieth century, placing them into 
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two groups: those who view the sophists as ―‗positivists of the Enlightenment‘‖ and those 
who were Hegalian (10). While these two classifications are never precise, leanings can 
be easily noticed. The positivist view examines what the sophists did and were rather 
than what they thought. In this view, the sophists  
 
. . . were inspired above all by the educational ideal of rhetoric . . . the 
encyclopoaedists or illuminators of Greece [,] above all teachers of the ideal of 
political virtue (or more simply how to succeed in politics) or of the ideal of 
virtue or success in life in all its aspects . . or . . . humanists in that they put man 
[the human being] and his[/her] values in the central place in the interpretation of 
the universe. (10—11)  
 
In this sense the sophists fully embody the paideia as outlined by Werner Jaeger. On the 
other hand, Hegalians, such as W.C. Guthrie, situate the sophists within the history of 
philosophy. These two camps recreated the ones between the sophists and Plato in 
classical Greece. Classicists and historians of rhetoric, such as W.C. Guthrie, G.B. 
Kerferd himself, John Poulakos, and Richard Enos, fall into the objectivist group, aiming 
to substantiate the sophists as consequential intellectuals. The sophists remained among 
the philosophers in the views of many other scholars. W. K. C. Guthrie, for example, 
continues the Hegelian tradition. Although his own views seem to lean in favor of the 
idealist tradition, he credits the sophists with being an intellectual movement unparalleled 
in the ―permanence of its results‖ (3).  
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From the early 1960s through the 1970s, works on rhetoric presented a very 
limited and negative view of the sophists. George A. Kennedy‘s The Art of Persuasion in 
Greece (1963) and Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition form 
Ancient to Modern Times (1980), James L. Kinneavy‘s Theory of Discourse (1971), 
Corbett‘s first edition of Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (1980) all follow an 
Aristotelian episteme, either ignoring or presenting a very negative view of the sophists. 
This orientation offers a view of rhetoric that favors what George Kennedy calls 
―philosophical rhetoric‖ in his Classical Rhetoric, reinscribing, therefore, the 
philosophy/rhetoric dichotomy (16). However, several exceptions surfaced, with 
numerous studies now being devoted to the sophists in their own right. 
One of the most significant contributions to sophistic scholarship emerged in 
Great Britain within the work of G.B. Kerferd, particularly his The Sophistic Movement. 
Kerferd seeks to establish the sophists as philosophers, opposing the traditional charges 
held against them as unphilosophical and immoral by contending that the sophists not 
only continued the philosophical conversation with the presocratics but also propounding 
that close to every philosophical issue broached by Socrates and Plato was sparked by the 
sophists. The main focus of his germinal study, however, consists of his interpretation of 
the key contributions of the sophists to specific fields of inquiry. Outlining the range of 
problems formulated and addressed by the sophists, Kerferd deems them incredibly 
modern in their scope. The two dominant themes he attributes them are the ―need to 
accept relativism in values and elsewhere without reducing all to subjectivism, and the 
belief that there is no area of human life or of the world as a whole which should be 
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immune from understanding achieved throughout reasoned argument‖ (2). These themes 
resonate today as much as they did then. 
While Kerferd does not claim to make a dent in the subject, he introduces and 
addresses a great number of issues. The philosophical problems in the theory of 
knowledge and perception; the nature of truth; the sociology of knowledge; a belief in 
progress; the questioning of religious deities, the theoretical and practical problems of life 
within society in general and democracy in particular; the meaning of justice; the 
problems of punishment; the nature and purpose of education; and the mindboggling 
suggestion regarding the ―teachability‖ of virtue. Kerferd rejects the contention that the 
sophists were of limited importance and merely served to pave the way for Plato and 
argues that rather ―every point in Plato‘s thought has its starting point in his reflection 
upon problems raised by the sophists‖ (173). He finds that the sophists not only have 
broached all facets of human activity but also did so for the first time. Ultimately, 
Kerferd grants the sophists a place among the great achievements of Periclean Athens, 
not only in their own right, but also, perhaps surprisingly, in the history of philosophy 
(176). While Kerferd makes no attempt to analyze or even survey the fragments left by 
the sophists, his The Sophistic Movement makes a well-rounded contribution to sophistic 
scholarship.  
Susan Jarratt, in Rereading the Sophists, revisits the sophists to explain and offer 
an alternative to the Aristotelian orientation still prevalent in the first two thirds of the 
twentieth century. Jarratt‘s text aims both to add to our historical backgrounds and bring 
new concerns to the field of rhetoric and composition, which in her view discovers its 
history in classical tradition, adding the sophists to the commonly discussed Aristotle, 
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Cicero, and Quintilian. The book investigates the reasons why the sophists reappeared in 
the history of rhetoric and argues for giving them a more prominent role because the 
sophists, as the supposed inventors of rhetoric, offered the first systematic instruction in 
the arts of speaking and writing in the West. Ultimately, Jarratt posits that ―a more 
comprehensive view of ‗the tradition‘ will provide rich antecedents for later rhetorical 
developments‖ (xix). Her primary aim is dislodging implicit control of philosophic 
thought inherited from Aristotle and Plato by discussing the sophists in terms of history 
and historiography, exploring the shift from mythos to logos, adding a feminist 
interpretation to the first sophists, and offering a view of sophistic pedagogy, both in 
classical Greece and current United States.  
Jacqueline de Romilly studies the sophists in relation to the Athenian culture that 
they so deeply influenced. By focusing on the dialogue that occurred between the 
sophists and the Athenian public opinion, de Romilly considers the sophists in their 
myriad roles: teachers, bold thinkers, moral philosophers, and political theorists. A 
similar pattern emerges when looking at the sophists; their audacious discoveries aroused 
outraged responses and acrimonious criticism merely to reappear and be accepted when 
revisited. Despite the harsh criticisms and fragmentary remnants of sophistic writings, the 
degree of their innovations proves undeniable, particularly from a postmodern standpoint. 
De Romilly finds that their impact upon the history and development of Greek thought 
can be assessed ―both by the reactions that they provoked within philosophical circles 
and by their legacy to cultural life in general,‖ for no matter Plato‘s criticism, ―the 
Sophists certainly played a decisive role in the development of Plato‘s own philosophy—
if only by virtue of the responses that they forced out of him‖ (235). For de Romilly, that 
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two completely so utterly contrary forms of thought—―one humanistic and practical, the 
other transcendental and idealistic‖— emerged contemporaneously is nothing short of a 
miracle (235—36). The victory went to philosophy, of course, and de Romilly concludes 
that due to the loss of Athenian independence and the lack of written works left behind, 
the role of the sophists lost its import. 
 Further, their multiple roles, as philosophers, teachers of rhetoric, political 
advisers, logicians, stylists, and scholars, were too much to carry and eventually 
narrowed down to teachers of rhetoric. Nonetheless, the movement they set into motion 
undoubtedly generated novel outlooks in every intellectual field. Basic procedures of 
rhetoric, both involving style and composition, as well as reasoning and a sort of logic; 
the study of grammar; reflections on human nature, psychology, reactions to different 
circumstances, strategy, and politics; comparative studies of different societies; a vast 
array of technai or human sciences, ones that the modern age is revisiting and 
continuing—all emerged from the sophists.  
Much of the recent scholarship takes on individual sophists. Scott Consigny 
characterizes this new stage in the scholarship on sophistic rhetoric in his Gorgias: 
Sophist and Artist (2001). Considering Gorgias the most elusive sophist, he finds that the 
primary issues that scholars have with Gorgias are that 1) his extant texts are far from 
complete, 2) his writing is slippery, and 3) our own impossibility in recreating the 
historical context. Gorgias‘ primary texts, On Not-Being and Helen, are not only possibly 
inaccurately transcribed and paraphrased but also dubiously authored. Even assuming 
their authorship and accuracy, the writing itself proves extremely ambiguous through lack 
of definition and use of sphinx-like tropes (5). Nevertheless, he identifies former 
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scholarship as either ―subjectivist,‖ begun by Hegel and developed by Untersteiner, 
Rosenmeyer, Gronbeck, Miller, and White; or ―empiricist,‖ initiated by Grote, and 
continued by Loenen, MacDowell, Romilly, Enos, and Schiappa.  
His approach to Gorgias differs from these previous studies. Consigny views 
Gorgias as an ―antifoundationalist‖ who rejects the ―entire foundational project of his 
philosophical predecessors and contemporaries‖ (35, 203). Gorgias, rather, understands 
language as ―an array of maneuvers or tropes that people use in various socially 
sanctioned agons or games,‖ portrays ―inquiry as a debate between rival rhetors in 
sanctioned agons of the culture,‖ and sees truth as ―a label of endorsement awarded by a 
community to an account that it finds most persuasive‖ (60). Further rejecting subjectivist 
and empiricist readings, Consigny offers a different reading of Gorgias‘ ethical and 
political views, which he considers as promoting a Pan-Hellenic community of 
individuals who mold themselves and each other by taking part in a variety of agons, and 
Gorgias‘ style, which draws attention to the ―rhetoricity, situatedness, and artificiality of 
all texts‖ by playing with genre conventions (119—49). Consigny contends that Gorgias‘ 
On Not-Being contributes both to pre-Socratic philosophy broadly and to Eleatic 
ontology and epistemology more specifically, as well as anticipating twentieth-century 
views of language, knowledge, and truth of Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, Ayer, 
Rorty, and Fish, while Helen treats a variety of epistemological and ethical issues, 
including the ―nature and power of language; the epistemological status of poetry and 
science; the limits of free choice in the face of chance, fate, and compulsion; the conflict 
between obligations to one‘s family and the pursuit of personal happiness; and the 
struggle between Greeks and barbarians‖ (6). Ultimately, Consigny‘s study is an 
 48 
 
apologia that differs from other rehabilitations of Gorgias by taking the middle road 
between the historical reconstruction and contemporary interpretation approaches to 
Gorgias.  
Consigny aims to show the sophist as one who both rejects and embodies logical 
and mythic thought, replacing the evolutionary narrative of progress from myth to the 
rationality and objectivity of science and logic or of regression with ―an agonal 
narrative‖ that shows Greek culture not as an evolution from unreason to reason but as a 
struggle between models of rationality (205). The agonal narrative coincides with 
contemporary philosophy the likes of Richard Rorty, who views rationality as the faculty 
of drawing from existing resources to handle effectively with one‘s contingent situation, 
accepting opposing points, and employing persuasion over coercion (205—206). This 
view posits the ancient quarrel not as one between ―a mythically minded herd and 
enlightened analytical fifth-century individuals,‖ as commonly held, but as a ―struggle 
between agonists and dogmatists‖ (206). Therefore, Consigny views Gorgias as 
championing neither mythic nor logical thought; rather, Gorgias encourages the 
contingent convention of the agon in which individuals propose competing interpretations 
to persuade particular audiences within a community. Consigny‘s reading thus considers 
Gorgias as an antifoundationalist who plays a considerably more important role than 
previously seen as a precursor of contemporary thought.  
Numerous studies that cover individual sophists further connect them to 
influential modern thinkers. Keith Crome seeks to displace the opposition between 
sophistry and philosophy by examining Jean-François Lyotard‘s interpretation of 
sophistry. His study reveals that Lyotard sought to establish the originality of thought and 
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contribution of the sophists as more than merely contributing to the development of 
philosophy. Crome seeks to restore sophistry by reconstructing its complex role in the 
constitution, institution, life, and destiny of philosophy thus offering a critical perspective 
on its origins and genealogy that can aid in putting the truth of philosophy into question, 
a truth which Crome calls ―constitutive of the West itself‖ (41).After an excellent account 
of the sophists, Hegel and sophistry, and Heidegger and sophistry, Crome finds that in 
Just Gaming Lyotard views intelligences as regulated by diversity and difference of 
opinion (121). Therefore, Lyotard considers sophistry as an ―attempt to retrieve or restore 
a type of political intelligence that is sophistical, a manner of acting or judging politically 
without criteria, and case by case, preserving the heterogeneity of the social‖ (160—61). 
Lyotard‘s response intensifies in The Differend, further and more radically redeeming 
sophistry, by connecting the sophistic notion of truth to his notion of differend.  
The differend, as opposed to litigation, is ―‗a case of conflict between two parties 
(at least) that cannot be decided equitably for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to 
both arguments‘‖ (Qtd. Crome 123). Crome explains that in such cases, both parties have 
equally valid and necessary grounds, giving rise to an antithetic, for neither party has a 
justifiable basis for superiority (123). Lyotard casts his account of the differend with 
respect to Kant‘s antinomies of pure reason into soul, the world, and God, which Crome 
addresses as psychology, cosmology, and theology, all of which can indicate apparent, 
unmistakable, overpowering, valid proofs, which Kant calls dogmatic; thus Lyotard 
points beyond Kant and toward sophistry (124—25). Lyotard, in this view, is arguing that 
―the very possibility of philosophy is itself engaged from out of sophistry and in itself 
implies—even if it does not acknowledge it—the idea of the differend‖ (129). In his 
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account of Lyotard‘s work, Crome seeks to establish a relation between philosophy and 
sophistry different from Plato‘s, one that does not exclude the sophist from truth, by 
arguing that Lyotard reveals that sophistry ―comprehends philosophy‖ and is ―the very 
condition of philosophy itself‖ (130). Crome‘s reading of On Nature or On Not-Being, 
already within the title of Gorgias‘ work, illustrates the concept, for nature or physis and 
not-being are opposites.  
In the last decade of the twentieth century, scholars have shifted the recovery of 
the sophists to Friedrich Nietzsche, in addition to the other major German scholars 
recognized as having regenerated a positive interest in the sophists, such as G.W.F. 
Hegel. Untersteiner is among the first scholars to take this turn in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and in the 1990s Eric White, Victor Vitanza, David Roochnik, E. R. 
Dodds, Daniel Shaw, John Poulakos, Joel Mann, and several other scholars follow this 
drift, publishing numerous articles regarding the connection between Nietzsche and the 
sophists. The last decade of the twentieth century saw a definite trend exploring this 
connection. 
Contemporary rhetorical theorists draw upon the sophists‘ texts for a variety of 
insights that are relevant to current theories of discourse and composition. Scholars 
continue to show great interest in the epistemological doctrines of the sophists based on 
Protagoras famous dictum that ‗humanity is the measure of all things‘ rather than the 
gods, and thus he has been characterized as an early humanist. The twenty-first century 
continues to witness the production of studies on the on individual sophists. Protagorean 
studies in particular appear in contemporary scholarship. One such study, Edward 
Schiappa‘s Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric (2003) 
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treats Protagoras‘ contributions to rhetorical theory. Schiappa finds that although 
Protagoras did not author a techné about rhetoric, he conceived the scope and function of 
logos that laid the groundwork for the development of rhetoric. Although a unified 
sophistic rhetoric cannot be ascertained due to the sophists‘ varied ideas and practices, 
the sophists shared an inclination toward oral prose over poetry, as well as humanistic 
logos over mythos. Therefore, Schiappa calls for individual studies of sophists to generate 
a recovery of embryonic sophistic theories of rhetoric. Furthermore, this study grants 
Protagoras the position as the first professional sophist to examine and critique epic 
poetry and identifies Protagoras‘ teaching methods, namely a formal expository style, 
dialogic interaction in small groups, and antithetical articulation of public positions. 
Schiappa also concedes that Protagorean theory and practice of logos aimed at improving 
individuals, thus departing from the traditional view of arête as a matter of noble birth or 
wealth. Furthermore, the teachings of Protagoras held the ideological function of 
advancing Periclean democracy and disputing aristocratic monism, as well as defending 
consensual decision-making and providing a system to assist organized debate. 
Nevertheless, Schiappa distinguishes between a theory of rhetoric proper and that of 
logos, as evidenced by the title of his work, believing that they are not entirely the same.   
 Gorgias continues to be discussed. A particularly interesting contribution comes 
from Bruce McComiskey‘s Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric (2002). The first part 
of the work takes on the task of correcting Platonic misrepresentations of Gorgias and 
offers a thorough reading of Gorgias‘ texts. The rest of the work covers ―neosophistic 
appropriation,‖ identifying sophistic doctrines of use for contemporary issues in rhetoric 
and composition. In the process, he considers the theory of rhetoric‘s epistemic relativism 
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as a way to analyze the function of language in shaping of human knowledge. Further, he 
identifies similarities in ―sophistic rhetorical traditions and modern philosophical 
traditions‖ such as pragmatism, poststructuralism, and public discourse (66). Identifying 
a third sophistic, he presents the feminist rhetoric of Susan Jarratt and the ―postmodern 
sophistic critical attitude‖ of Victor Vitanza (73—75). McComiskey concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of sophistic rhetoric and multiculturalism in the global 
village.  
 Other studies on the sophists in general also continue to be published.  
Patricia O‘Grady‘s The Sophists(2008) offers an excellent introduction to sophistry in a 
collection of essays that treat the main sophists, as well as the theoretical issues and 
historical context surrounding them. One of the contributors, Steven Robinson adds an 
interesting take on the historical development of the sophists. Robinson offers an 
example directly related to the most common origin story of rhetoric. He quotes Pindar, 
who in the second of his Olympian Odes writes the following verses: ―Many swift arrows 
have I crooked beneath my elbow in the quiver for speaking to those who understand; but 
for the masses interpreters are required. Wise is the man with much inborn knowledge; 
while those who learn by study, like a pair of greedy crows, spout indiscriminate chatter 
compared to the divine bird of Zeus‖ (qtd. in S. Robinson 23). Robinson glosses Pindar 
as claiming for himself ―a kinship in wisdom with his ‗target‘ audience, those who 
understand his words (i.e., his ‗arrows‘) by means of their own inborn knowledge‖ (23). 
Opposite these voices with ―inborn knowledge‖ we find ―lesser, competing voices,‖ who 
should be ignored for they ―acquire their intelligence not by birth but by study (i.e., social 
climbers)‖ (23). Compared to Pindar‘s self-appointed status as a ―‗divine‘ eagle,‖ the 
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competitors are ―greedy, ugly and chattering . . . ‗crows,‘‖ a direct reference to Corax and 
Tisias.  
 
 
Mario Untersteiner and “Le origini sociali della sofistica” 
Mario Untersteiner, a prolific and renowned Italian scholar of literature and history of 
philosophy, spent his career publishing on a number of subjects for decades. Along with 
Augusto Rostagni and Doro Levi, he ranks among the most authoritative voices of 
international rhetoric in general and Italian rhetoric in particular. Although Untersteiner‘s 
interests were wide-ranging, varying from religious to literary history and from philology 
to philosophy, which became his predominant concern in the last years of his life, his 
entire activity as a scholar rotates around a great central theme that constitutes its object 
and instrument: reason, intelligence, or, to use the term in his classics, logos (Caizzi 39). 
Furthermore, in his studies, the profound connection between myth and philosophy 
emerge clearly (41). Despite the almost thirty years since Untersteiner‘s death in 1981, 
his name remains cited regularly throughout the last two decades of the twentieth century 
and still today. Most significant, his work on the Sophists plays a major role in the 
scholarship devoted to this harangued group of individuals, and he ranks among the 
authorities in regards to the sophists.   
 Untersteiner taught and studied the Greek world as a professor and scholar. His 
first published interest was Parmenides in 1925. His attention in the 1930s and 1940s 
then shifts to the history of literature, particularly Greek tragedy and religion. His studies 
on Sophocles, Aeschylus, Pindar, and Plato culminate this phase with two volumes on the 
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origins of tragedy and physiology of myth titled Le origini della tragedia (The Origins of 
Tragedy, 1942) and La fisiologia del mito (The Physiology of Myth, 1946). In the 1940s, 
Untersteiner became interested in the sophists. The first edition of I sofisti appeared in 
1949, while the second was published in 1967. In the 50s and 60s, he published two 
volumes collecting the fragments of Xenophanes and Paremenides; then his interest 
shifted to Aristotle and returns to Plato. Influenced by German neo-humanism, 
Untersteiner exulted classical ethics over Christian ones and the incitement to classical 
studies as the antidote to every sort of spiritual deadening (Parente 36—37).  Within his 
own scholarship, I sofisti completes the path begun with La nascita della tragedia (The 
Birth of Tragedy) and La fisiologia del mito , three autonomous but homogenous 
moments of the progressive establishing of the rationality of logos and the 
correspondence of this development with the explanation of the problems faced by the 
Greeks in the apprehension of reality (Brancacci 100).  
When the first Italian edition of I sofisti appeared in 1949, it did not include ―Le 
origini sociali della sofistica,‖ which was added later. Aldo Brancacci explains in his ―I 
sofisti di Mario Untersteiner‖ that ―Le origini‖ was conceived as the third and final part 
of the work begun with La fisiologia del mito. Scholars agree that I sofisti is most likely 
the most influential and famous among Untersteiner‘s works. To this day, it remains 
among the most thorough and expansive treatments of the sophists. At the time of its 
publication, I sofisti was the first full-scale treatment of the subject; despite the forty or so 
years since its second publication, it remains extremely valuable to scholars and 
laypeople. The English edition first appeared in 1954, translated by Kathleen Freeman. 
To the best of my knowledge, the second Italian edition has never been translated. 
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 Aldo Brancacci delves into both The Sophists and the ―Le origini sociaili della 
sofistica‖ in his ―I sofisti,‖ finding that the latter completes the oeuvre of Untersteiner‘s 
scholarly work. Brancacci argues that La fisiologia del mito, published in 1946 confirms 
the nexus that, already from these years, connects the studies on tragedy and myth to 
sophistry (99). More specifically, the re-elaboration of the notion of myth in the poetry of 
Pindar, the tragedy of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and the historiography of Herodotus is 
succeeded by the epoch of solutions, realized by sophistry, which reinterprets the 
mythical forms in light of the rationality of thought and language, bringing the implicit 
tensions to bear (99). Brancacci argues that the three stops, La nascita della tragedia, La 
fisiologia del mito, and I sofisti, constitute three autonomous but homogenous moments 
of a single path turned towards reconstructing the successive stages in the progressive 
establishment of the rationality of logos and to indicate, more precisely, the 
corresponding of this development to the different modes of explanation of the problems 
that the Greek (hu)man poses himself in the apprehension of the reality in front of 
him/her (100). 
In ―Mario Untersteiner: la fiducia nella ragione‖ (Mario Untersteiner: Faith in 
Reason‖), Fernanda Caizzi explains Untersteiner‘s main interest in logos. Logos, one of 
the most multifaceted and nuanced terms that contemporary rhetorical studies has 
inherited from classical Greek thinking , has shifted in meaning throughout the millennia 
since its first appearance. Drawing on the words of Untersteiner himself, Caizzi states 
that his interest in the Greek world emerged from the Greek‘s merit in having made the 
greatest attempt to justify to themselves and for themselves their own existence in the 
world, an attempt that could best be understood by reconstructing the history of the 
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emergence of logos in ancient thought (40). This attempt, however, should not be 
understood primarily or exclusively as a history of the process of rationalization, even 
though it occupies an important role; the studies that Untersteiner dedicates to the ancient 
world propose to make evident the various and diverse moments of the exegesis of the 
problems that the relation of humans with their reality generates (40). Never adopting a 
materialistic interpretation in his explanations of the ancients, the formulation of his 
research did not prevent any direction in his inquiries, particularly social and political, as 
his essay ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ clearly demonstrates (40). 
 ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ (―The Social Origins of Sophistry‖) was 
originally a lecture presented in Brussels on April 29
th
, 1949, and later at the Sorbonne, 
on May 5
th
 of the same year. The piece was subsequently added to the second edition of 
The Sophists, which was also considerably revised from its previous release. As the title 
explains, ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ explores those social events that brought 
about and facilitated the appearance of sophistry. This supplementary treatment of a 
subject Untersteiner explored in such depth adds a social element to rhetoric, the primary 
subject taught by the sophists.  
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Chapter 3 
Translation: “The Social Origins of Sophistry.” 
 
[A well-known Italian maxim reminds translators, ―Il traduttore è un traditore‖ (―A 
translator is a traitor‖). Because of the complications and problematic nature of 
translation, I face the dilemma of any translator: fidelity to word translation or fidelity to 
capturing the ―spirit‖ of the original. As Peter France clarifies, what matters is ―to 
become aware of the way in which the translator, like the orator, negotiates between a 
subject and an audience, seeking out a rhetoric adequate to the situation . . . 
Communication is inescapably rhetorical; this is as true of translation as it is of public 
speaking or letter-writing‖ (267—268). I preserve the original terminology wherever 
possible. Nevertheless, certain nuances and connotations, with the aggravating 
circumstance of time, will inevitably be lost in translation. ] 
 
1. The Pentecontaetia as the Age of the Problems Posed by Social Life. 
With the present research, one [the author] does not want to penetrate within the mystery 
of the creative genius of all of the sophists. Their originality can be interpreted but never 
completely relived in its mysterious development in anticipation of the insight that 
created individual philosophical systems. Nevertheless, in the case of sophistry, it is 
legitimate more than other [forms of] philosophy to attempt the discovery of a vision of 
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particular movements not even specifically philosophical, but rather social that, which 
appearing over the course of a very specific age, have brought forth a grouping of 
problems and a wave of spiritual moments, / destined to inevitably lead to speculative 
thought. Drawn by an irresistible attraction, the sophists throw a penetrating glance on 
the turmoil of complex and various human ―experiences,‖ aiming to grasp the profound 
sense of their role in the logical coherence of reality.
1
 
 As philosophers of ―experience,‖ the Sophists depend on social phenomena that, 
in moments of crisis, impose persistent issues, and they seek out well-defined 
resolutionary paradigms, without dismissing opposite interpretations from time to time. 
That such a condition may have taken place is understood clearly when one remembers 
the manner in which sophistry, more than any other philosophical school, must be 
understood as the natural expression of a new consciousness that is ready to inform how 
contradictory, and therefore tragic, reality is. One may very well claim that the formation 
of sophistry was the consequence, in the speculative domain, also of an historical and 
social situation that defined itself as a tangle of crises culminating during the 
pentecontaetia and, in part, in the decades that preceded this period. Later, when the 
Peloponnesian war erupted, the sense of all these crises became even clearer [538] within 
its own terms and, therefore, became exacerbated toward a problematic situation that 
might have seemed, and perhaps was, unsolvable. 
 Hellenic social life—especially the Attic one in which sophistic thought was able 
to crystallize—was subjected, from the beginning of the fifth century BCE and with an 
                                                          
1
 For the sophists as philosophers of ―experiences,‖ see my present treatment I Sofisti, which will be cited 
as Sofisti. 
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accelerated movement after the Persian wars, to / continuous subversions due to new 
events. If it is true that the Hellenes did not know the modern concept of society, wrapped 
up as they were in the constraints of the limitations of a relational contrast between the 
―many‖ and the individual,2 and if it is true that, unaware of the idea of history as 
evolution, they saw ―within current affairs a social awareness in contrast with the social 
state similar to nature,‖3 we must nonetheless recognize that social life, not yet translated 
into scientific awareness, precisely in the fifth century began to form as an operating 
reality. In fact, the physical barriers between separate tribes and people come to fall 
definitely, and more or less directly into the relationships [as they] began forming 
between these social entities.
4
 
 Imagine: the closed circles of the impenetrable and autonomous unity of the noble 
families, whose fracture in Attica had begun with Draco and with Solon, are definitely 
torn apart only immediately after the age of the thirty tyrants, when collective 
responsibility in terms of penal law is condemned, so as to recognize instead the full 
freedom of the individual, who within the new deeper and more human
5
 social kinship is 
united with every other equal citizen.
6
 However, evidently, over the course of the 
century, at the benefit of the critical spirit, the war had continued between the political 
solidarity, by now triumphant, and that of the noble families, hard to perish.
7
 / One must 
also think of the commerce that, in this century, ―contributed to overcoming the isolation 
                                                          
2
 Cp. M. POHLENZ, Der hellenische Mensch, Göttingen, 1947, p. 107. 
3
 CHIAPPELLI, Sof., pp. 18—19. 
4
 Cp. L. T. HOBHOUSE, Sociology, in J. Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, XI, p. 654 b, 
which considers these factors as essential for the study of society. 
5
 Therefore, the Athenians insistently prided themselves of their θιλανθπωπία: cp. A. CROISET, Les 
démocraties antiques, Paris, 1920, p. 133. 
6
 G. GLOTZ, Histoire grecque, II (1931), pp. 136 ff.; II (1936), p. 72. 
7
 L. GERNET et A. BOULANGER, Les genie grec dans la religion, Paris, 1932, pp. 289—290. 
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of the poleis opening the way to the formation of more ample economic unities,‖8 apt to  
establish, due to their own depth of relationships, the rise of an attitude of inquiry and 
judgment
9
; furthermore, all this movement, with the enabling of an always greater influx 
of Metics, expanded and universalized, through the rich spiritual contribution that they 
brought,
10
 the horizon of culture, even if the Hellenics, more due [538] to national 
prejudice than for sentimental repugnance against different origins,
11
 ended up stalling, 
for the most part, in the face of the decisive step of internationalism, too dominated as 
they were by the pride of their own spiritual superiority. Also, this limitation established 
an ulterior deficiency in the sociology of the Hellenics.
12
 However, those bastions that in 
the political domain were meant to be conserved crumbled rather rapidly due to the 
problems of thought. 
 A political event that occurred over the course of the fifth century had a 
determining importance within social life and wielded, as will be clarified later on, a 
decisive influence on the laying out of the problems confronted by sophistry. The 
aristocracy, as a specific political phenomenon, ends in many areas even though it does 
not perish intestate, since it will renew itself / in the oligarchies. However, right around 
the middle of the century, the breakdown of the Boeotian independence, at least until 
Chaeronea, causes a crisis that sweeps the entire aristocracy and that is particularly 
significant because it was suffered by Pindar,
13
 so that a political event became a spiritual 
                                                          
8
 G. DE SANCTIS, Storia dei Greci, Florence, 1939, II, p. 162.  
9
 Cp. MÜHL, Mensch., 1928, p. 12; GOMPERZ, Pens., II, pp. 167. 
10
 Cp. GLOTZ, Hist. gr., note, II, p. 256. 
11
 A. DILLER, Race, Mixture among the Greeks before Alexander, University of Illinois, 1937, p. 157.  
12 Op. cit., p. 18. 
13
 Cp. SCHMID, Lit., I, pp. 573—574, and H. GUNDERT, Pindar und sein Dichterberuf, Frankfurt a. M., 
1935, p. 48. It is good to keep in mind that, if the crumbling of the aristocracy in Boeotia has a 
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problem.
14
 The Homeric ideal is no longer current if not through a critical and dramatic 
transformation that, glimpsed by Pindar, inclined to interpret the past profoundly, and is 
driven to extreme consequences by the open-mindedness of the sophists, whose glance 
wants to comprehend in a primary way the present turmoil.  
 When one world sets and another one rises, souls are lost not only in thought but 
also in action. The spiritual unity of a Solon or a Peisistratus is over forever. One need 
only recall the Thucydidean representation of the pentecontaetia, during the development 
of which, with respect to society, two moments mark themselves as decisive: the problem 
of the human character and that of constitutions, a sign of a typical attitude of 
correspondent people. 
 In the first place, the two figures of Pausanias and of Themistocles fill the scene 
of the pentecontaetia much more than what Thucydides materially renders. To Pausanias 
[539], the historian informs us, ―it was by now insufferable to adapt his life to the brakes 
of tradition,‖15 / so he plotted to accomplish something that had to surpass the normal 
political categories of the Hellenics.
16
 Therefore, his collusion with Persia became 
without a doubt a fault, although it corresponded to a political plan later carried out by 
Lysander,
17
 and analogously Themistocles, who went to Persia to the new king Ardashir 
I, [and] was tried, evidently for anti-Spartan politics that had to be carried out later by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
paradigmatic value for us, the political phenomenon is not isolated since, even earlier, it had manifested 
itself in the western Greece and in the Peloponnesian, especially in Argos and Ilia: cp. GLOTZ, Hist. gr, 
cit., II, p. 123, and H. SCHAEFER, Staatsform und Politik, Leipzig, 1932, p. 152. 
14
 Cp. JAEGER, Paid., I, pp. 291—294, 317—318.  
15
 THUC., I, 130 (transl. Sgroi). 
16
 THUC., I, 130, 2: …ά ηη γνώμη μειζόνωρ ερ έπειηα έμελλε παξειν. For the interpretation of μειζόνωρ, see 
THUKYDIDES erkl. Von J. Classen, I. Bd. Bearb. Von J. Steup, Berlin, 1919, ad. L. 
17
 G. DE SANCTIS, St. gr. Cit., II, pp. 54—55. 
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Conon.
18
 Thucydides, despite not being able to defend Themistocles, nonetheless 
foresees this in full clarity: ―by natural intuition . . . with very brief reflection penetrated 
deeply the contemporary events, and commendably divined the consequence of the 
distant future.‖19 However, from the entire narration of Thucydides we feel, more than an 
exhaustive historical judgment, the agonizing and astonished impression that the 
Hellenics felt in the face of those two so enigmatic characters. After all, even though 
Thucydides does not confront the problem, the figure of Cimon must not have appeared 
less complex, even according to those who admired him.
20
 One might say that in this 
epoch all the great characters had to have appeared as hardly understandable as they 
submitted themselves to the judgment of the crowd, because in the new age the human 
spirit took on much more complex attitudes than in the past.
21
 / This was the effect none 
other than of a social life so rich of elements that had to have repercussions upon the 
inner being of the single individuals. 
 The two opposing speeches—that pronounced by the Corinthians on the occasion 
of the Congress of Sparta, held immediately preceding the Peloponnesian War, and that 
of the Athenians unfolding before the Spartans
22— meant especially that, by this point, 
the constitution and social impact of a people, mutually influencing each other, resolve 
                                                          
18
 G. DE SANCTIS, ΑΣΘΙ΢, Storia della republica ateniese, Turin, 1912, pp. 396—397. 
19
 THUC., I, 138. 3. 
20
 Critias DK 88 B 8 and 52 
21
 This can be said, for example, also of Aristides (cp. DE SANCTIS, ΑΣΘΙ΢, cit., p. 390 and previous 
pages) and especially Pericles: recall the contrasting judgments that his contemporaries formulated of him. 
To have an overall view, apt to feel the problematic of the great figures of the pentecontaetia, one can see 
in Plato‘s Gorgias, where they presented themselves in their hardly resolvable complexity, which transpires 
also within the words of Plato, who, though condemning these men of the past, appears to be almost 
obsessed by them: cp. PLAT., Gorg., 503 C, 515 C, 519 C. 
22
 THUC., I, 67—71; 72—78. An interesting passage should be recalled from the VIII letter of Plato (355 
D), which states that having saved Hellas from the barbarians brought, as a result, to the possibility of 
constitutional discussions. 
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themselves in spiritual unity. But, in addition, the socio-political organism turns out to be 
the fruit of complex encounters brought about by a more lively dramatic existence of the 
Hellenic ―city‖ so that it [the socio-political organism], taken in itself, forms an 
unsolvable problem in view of every other. [540] 
 One must, therefore, recognize in the age of the pentecontaetia a perennially 
renovated encounter of social events that, already because often for the first time they 
become apparent with such decisiveness, they soon transform themselves into problems 
that bring about the formulation of new ideas, new political and philosophical systems 
with the aim of suggesting possible solutions simultaneously.
23
  
 
2. The Crisis of the Aristocracy Determines a New Spirituality in the Hellenic 
World.
24
 
A. The Idea of Community and its Gnoseological Consequences. 
Even the Hellenic aristocracy, as all the great human manifestations, fixed their thought 
in the most systematic and durable way, when the time of its decline had already been 
marked. The same would happen, one century later, for the polis that found in Plato and 
Demosthenes its most comprehensive interpreters.  
 The commemoration of certain ideas, that have established the eternal power of 
the aristocracy, will turn out to be particularly important in light of determining the main 
                                                          
23
 Regarding the fifth century as an epoch that poses problems, and having posed them, resolves them, see 
also what I had occasion to clarify in Mito, pp. 240—242; 300. 
24
 CORBATO, Sof. pol., p.3: ―a confirmation to what we have believed to find regarding the relationship 
between Sophists and the aristocracy, we believe can be found in the . . . ―Social origins of sophistry‖ by 
Untesteiner, which seems exactly of great importance for the clarification of these connections and to 
highlight the genesis of some ideas of the sophists.‖ Corbato has, moreover, had the credit of confirming 
my thesis, observing, with rich documentation, how there had been a close and continuous relationship 
between oligarchs and sophists: these were often the teachers of those (cp. op. cit., pp. 4, 15—16; 20, 36—
37). 
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causes for the formation of that social substrate, from which came a necessary orientation 
for sophistry. 
 In the figure of the aristocratic person and in his relationship with \ the 
community one establishes a completely unusual gnoseological situation. In fact, one can 
say that, on the one hand, the aristocrat requires the envy expressed from those below 
him to highlight his autonomous happiness,
25
 while on the other, bound as he is to the 
judgment of his fellow citizens, he finds difficulty to ―transcend too extensively the 
normal limits of existence.‖26 This fluctuation of man between creative autonomy and 
submission to a collective entity is truly decisive: the regulated life, the by now firmly 
definite customs establish the limits on desire / and, therefore, to the free self-actualizing 
of individuals.
27
 When the aristocracy began to lose energy and finally crumble, man as 
gnoseological and ethical entity became a problem. Sappho, when she sings: [541] ―some 
say a army of horsemen / some say a host of foot-soldiers on the black / earth, is the most 
beautiful thing, I say / whatever one loves,‖28 displays how a type of loss had pervaded, 
in Mytilene, the aristocratic world, when it felt the vanishment of the ―ancient social 
order, that was based on solid values, free from any doubt,‖ so that man found himself 
swept away by a kind of relativism,
29
 in nearly a renunciation of proudly dominating  the 
whole world, according to a sound principle. When the noble truths of aristocratic ethics, 
which imposed a course of action, vanish, then, in front of the possibility of setting out to 
attain and attaining any goal, the will goes wild, free by now of restraints: so Solon, 
                                                          
25
 Cp. PIND., Ol., VI, 6—7; Phyth., I, 85, VII, 19 ff. Ecc., AESCH., Ag., 937—939.  
26
 MAX WUNDT, Geschichte der griechischen Ethik, Leipzig, 1908, I, p. 82. Cp. EUR., Ion, 602—604.  
27
 Op. cit., I, p. 86. 
28
 Fr. 27 a, 1—4 D (transl. Romagnoli). 
29
 Cp. HERMANN FRÄNKEL, Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentum, München 1962, pp. 
211—213. 
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Pindar, and Aeschylus create the theodicies,
30
 so that, as in the case of public opinion, 
individual liberty contrasted the barrier of a universal concept. This problem of the 
constructive will presents itself as hardly solvable: so states implicitly the aristocratic 
Theognis when he cites this epigram from Delos making it his own: ―The loveliest thing 
is justice. Of everything health is most valuable, / the happiest is to win one‘s love.‖31 
Against the barrier of the justice, which / the aristocracy attempts to elevate to give unity 
to the manifold manifestations of existence, the author of these verses uncovers, without 
stating it explicitly, the power of the will that comes to be arranged on the same level of 
the absolute, normative principle. Man, therefore, during the crisis of the aristocratic age 
vacillates between the seduction of the individual impulse and the ambition towards a 
universal ethical principle, so that the conquest of personal originality represents a 
slippery problem within a conscious achievement. 
 For the aristocratic world, especially at the time of the decline, the most 
immediate ambition vibrates in the awareness of efficacy that emanates from eternal 
ideas.
32
 First of all, the two fundamental political principles, αιδώρ [aidos, 
reverence/respect] and δικη, [dike, justice/theodicy], generic concepts more than 
anything, constitute the basis of aristocratic society,
33
 as appears clearly from Theognis 
that opposes them to the laws, to the νόμοι, [nomoi, laws/customs],34 both of which had 
                                                          
30
 Cp. SCHMID, Lit., IV, p. 458. 
31
 This Δηλιακόν έπίγπαμμα, cited by ARIST., Eth. N., 1, 9, 1099 to 25, is in THEOGN., 255—256 (transl. 
Romagnoli). 
32
 Recall D. M. ROBINSON, Pindar a Poet of Eternal Ideas, Baltimore, 1936. 
33
 Cp. SCHMID, Lit., IV, pp. 524, 531, 557, 559, 560, note 2. For αίδώρ, cp. also G. GLTOZ, Études 
socials et juridiques sur l’antiquité grecque, Paris, 1906, p. 21. 
34
 THEOGN., 291-292; cp. vv. 937—938. Citing Theognis, one disregards, in the present research, the 
matter of authenticity, importing only the testimony of a certain current of thought. After all, it was 
observed, almost all the elegies of the anthology ―date back to a rather ancient age, that is to say none 
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become the password of the common people.
35
 [542] Far richer is the concept of 
―harmony,‖ insistently proclaimed in the aristocratic society, which abhors war,36 to rise 
towards the Pan-Hellenic idea, that Pindar heard from his earliest years, as appears in the 
tenth Pythian Ode of 498 BCE, and / that he continually affirmed,
37
 in conformity, after 
all, with the spirit of Hellenic aristocratic families, that—still at the time of Thucydides—
felt so connected to one other, in order to exceed the limits of the polis.
38
 Not 
surprisingly, then, in the domain of aristocratic ideas one encounters the spiritual 
motivation and attitude of the θιλανθπωπία [philanthropia, philanthropy/love of honor], 
destined to hold great importance in the Attic world.
39
 In the legislation of Charondas 
(around the middle of the sixth century), that was of aristocratic character,
40
 one notices 
the imprinted disposition of θιλανθπωπία, as noted in ancient sources.41 One must, then, 
recognize a certain value to the Theognidean testimonies, which exhort to forgive the 
errors of others,
42
 according to the spirit of θιλανθπωπία. 
 The social foundation of these ideas can be considered their distinguishing note 
insofar as they implant themselves on the premise of a collective experience that becomes 
an abstract concept. The constitution of Charondas seems to offer ulterior proof with 
established law so that all the citizens would learn to read and write with paid teachers of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
appears very much earlier than the fifth century‖ (THÉOGNIS, Poèmes élégiaques, texte établi et traduit 
par Jean Carrière, Paris, 1948, p. 13). 
35
 V. EHRENBERG, Recht., p. 117.  
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 Cp. THEOGN., 761 ff., 755 ff.; PIND., frr. 109-110 = 120 Turyn. 
37
 G. CURTIUS, Storia greca (Italian transl.), II, p. 53; cp. GUNDERT, op. cit., pp. 77, 85. 
38
 Cp. H. BERVE, Thukydides, Frankfurt a. M., pp. 3—4, 41, 53; cp. U. WILAMOWITZ, Glaube, II, p. 
129.  
39
 Cp. G. GLOTZ, Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminal en Grèce, Paris, 1904, p. 423.  
40
 E. CIACERI, Storia della Magna Grecia, Milano ecc., Vol. II, 1927, p. 42. 
41
 DIOD., XII, 16, 1—2. For the historicity of the norm within the cited passage, cp. G. BUSOLT, 
Griechische Geschichte, Gota, 1893, I, p. 428.  
42
 THEOGN., 323—328.  
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the city.
43
 The measure corresponds perfectly to that of Lycurgus, / who had wanted an 
education of the state and not that of privates
44: it was ―an education for the state and by 
the state; it was a principle into agreement with the general tendency of aristocratic 
society‖ and, undoubtedly, in opposition to individualism.45 
 The recognition seems granted, then, namely that in the aristocratic society there 
was a spiritual structuring that brought to the definition of a collective entity, expressing 
the eternal—and therefore ideal—essence of man. 
 Such a ―collective entity‖ that, as a positive act, belongs, certainly, to all the 
epochs and all the locations, for the Hellenics of this age, makes up an element of great 
significance, [543] because it subsists as a creative force and, at a time, as limit: it is a 
point of inspiration for the thought that perceives the possibility of transferring it [the 
collective entity] in the domain of the universal; it [the collective entity] is nonetheless a 
restraint to the freedom of the individual, who wants to establish himself in absolute 
autonomy and originality of the person. The community appears, then, as a spiritual fact 
that awaits interpretation.  
                                                          
43
 DIOD., XII, 112, 5; for the interpretation of the passage and for the plausibility of the information, see 
Ciaceri, op. cit., II, pp. 42—44.  
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 XEN, Resp. Lac., II, 2; PLUT., Lyc,. 17. 
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 J. LUCCIONI, Les idées politiques et socials dé Xénophon, Ophrys s. a. (ma 1948), p. 145. The character 
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fact that the Greek gives immense value to theoretical knowledge: that which was recognized as just, the 
form, in which the representation found a satisfactory expression, is conserved, and subsequently does not 
concern itself as much with new creations as with reproductions certainly surely perfected by an already 
conquered type.‖ 
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 After all, one can observe that the aristocracy provided a decisive contribution, as 
evidenced by its religiosity, to the consciousness of the community, although it is a 
phenomenon, as will be shown later, / not limited to the aristocracy. Well-known is that  
the god particularly close to Pindar was the Delphic oracle,
46
 the god who, for the period 
under study—the end of the sixth century and beginning of the fifth—, becomes the 
representative, through its oracle, of the conservative and antidemocratic currents.
47
 One 
comprehends how the Theban poet, interpreter of the political and ethical ideal of the 
aristocracy, was persuaded to impress the seal of Apollonism upon its entire thought.
48
 
The god of Delphi always operated with an eye on peace among men and gods, attainable 
when the former act according to justice,
49
 so that the latter become ethical powers.
50
 
However, next to this universalistic conception of religion, according to which the single 
gods have a tendency to become ethical concepts of all-encompassing validity, one must 
note the Delphic idea of the hero
51
 directed in the same sense. The interpretation that 
Pindar gives of it corresponds to the clarification of a religious idea, particularly 
widespread among Hellenics. The poet, proclaiming that the gods and men draw life and 
breath from the same mother (Ne., VI, 1 ff.), does not signify anything other than that the 
gods are the archetypes of men, although different. In the consciousness of the separation 
that intercedes between the ideal world and its reflection in the perceivable kind, man 
comes to comprehend how ―the crowning of life, that even the mortal / being can earn, is 
the memory of his virtues. Not his person, but, what is more, the spirit of his perfections 
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 Cp. L. R. FARNELL, The Works of Pindar, London, 1932, II, p. 462. 
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 Op. cit., p. 38. 
49
 MARTIN P. NILSSON., Griech. Rel., pp. 617—618.  
50
 M. POHLENZ, Der hellenische Mensh, Göttingen, 1947, pp. 54—55.  
51
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and creations wins death and from generation to generation flies eternally young in [544] 
singing, since only form belongs to the reign of the eternal.‖52 The figures of the winners 
in the agons celebrated by Pindar end up being, in reality, no longer persons but ―types‖ 
that would represent a particular aspect of human life;
53
 so from this Apollonian 
religiosity, emanation of aristocratic society, that very ―type‖ that ―is at one time a 
universal beyond the individual and a detail among other types‖54comes to be exalted as 
an eternal value. That which counts for the men of the age of the poet, still enlightened by 
the aristocratic ideal, is true also for the heroes of myth.
55
 This perpetuity of the idea, by 
which the individual can perfect himself in the universality of the type, since his 
immortal being will actualize in the eternal glory of the surname and, therefore, in his 
descendents,
56
 corresponds, precisely, ―to the faith of society, for which Pindar wrote his 
poems and to which he belongs, and of the families that we can say detain the power in 
all the Doric cities and even in Athens really govern public matters, at the time in which 
he spent the period of his studies.‖57 That universal that is the aristocratic parentage 
(γένορ, bloodline/patronage) / reveals itself as an idea, in which, moreover, hums the 
dichotomy—felt in the Theognidian verses quoted above—of the individual and of that 
community seen as a general entity. But, in the spirituality of the political life of the 
aristocracy, the latter prevailed, for its nature brought to break every barrier and embrace 
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 WALTER F. OTTO, Die Götter Griechenlands, Bonn, 1929, p. 100; cp. GUNDERT, op. cit., p. 59. 
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multiplicity into unity,
58
 as is evident even by the inclination that this society 
demonstrated toward pan-Hellenism.  
However, Pindar—despite the universality of this ―type,‖ despite the absolute 
ideas that circulated at his time such as αιδώρ (aidos, reverence), δίκη (dike, justice), 
θιλανθπωπια (philanthropia, philanthropy), and ομονια (omonia, harmony of mind/one-
mindedness) and others, with which one sought to hamper, by means of ideas, the 
indomitable natural complexity of experiences
59—perceives notwithstanding something 
crucial in the essence of human personality. Man, according to his Pindar‘s thought, must 
perform the ability not exactly of seeming good, but of knowing how to impose being 
good with undisputed vividness: that which matters for man is πειπα (peira or 
experience) (cp., for example, Ne., III, 70, etc), and πόνορ (ponos or effort) (for example, 
Ol., XI, 4; Pyth., [545] VIII, 73), so that he can, up against anything and depending on 
the various occasions, enact his own dominion (μέηπον [measure, due measure, 
proportion]: cp. Ol., XIII, 47—48; Pyth., II, 24; Isth., VI, 71) .60 Therefore, one could 
say, and with good reason, that [the] ―arête,‖ according to this conception of the poet, 
could not be enacted until it remained within the confines of the aristocratic world, since 
the individual, / to be, must act on his own, ―even without the support of a community.‖61  
 This structuring of a huge social problem, which had formulated itself as the 
antithesis community-individual, whose terms interfere among each other with reciprocal 
critical aggressiveness, manifests itself truly definitively throughout the entire fifth 
                                                          
58
 Rightly, S. MAZZARINO, Or. Occ., Florence, 1947, p. 220, speaks of the ―anxiety of a collective life, to 
be celebrated in the composite religious beauty of the polis‖ as one of the ―aristocratic ideals.‖ 
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 Cp. A. LABRIOLA, La concezione materialistic della storia, Bari, 1947, pp. 135 ff. 
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 For the interpretation of μέηπον, cp. Sofisti, Excursus al cap. III.  
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 GUNDERT, op. cit., p. 79. 
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century, during which, the two moments, in the process of clarifying themselves to 
maintain their supremacy at the end of the dialectic scale of the real, struggle with 
evermore intense drama. 
 Perhaps one may be surprised that the aristocratic world starts the dominant note 
of a civilization—that of the fifth century—which in Athens, where it must converge and 
centralize itself, takes on the character of a democratic light that often projects itself 
beyond the narrow confines of Attica. However, this appears completely logical. Only 
beginning in the age of Marathon a new civilization slowly begins to form,
62
 one that has 
to create its own values and interpret the already existing ones. One cannot, of course, 
imagine that a world of original imprint can develop out of nothing, especially in Greece, 
that reached its most daring accomplishments rising above tradition. After all, through 
representatives such as Theognis and Pindar, it has been possible to ascertain the power 
of thought within a politically won social milieu. However, this is the typical way of 
defeat: to prompt violent reactionary comebacks, as occurred in Greece, there where the 
aristocracy managed to conserve itself,
63
 or to stir up fertile reflection. Not surprisingly, 
despite the innovative currents, the population was inclined to loyalty toward ancient 
traditions and to recognize the superiority and the ability of the aristocracy as guides for 
the people.
64
 The idea of equality, despite its seductiveness, did not appear commensurate 
to reality; the power [546] of capital, though significant, did not have the same value as 
the ancient classes. For this reason, ―the aristocracy conserved its influence for a long 
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 V. EHRENBERG, Ost und West [―Schriften der philos. Faultät der deutschen Universität in Prag‖ Bd. 
15]; Brünn etc., 1935, p. 122.  
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time, even when its rights had been eliminated.‖65 One reached, then, a paradoxical 
situation, so that the aristocrats on one side became the heads of the democracy,
66
 while 
on the other they continued to operate as an official party and in secret societies.
67
 The 
observation seems accurate, then, that the rising democracy ―does not democratize an 
ousted aristocracy, but rather, on the contrary, feudalizes itself; that is to say that with its 
political advent it identifies itself with the full mindset and in all the forms of life of the 
ousted aristocracy.  The new society is . . . aristocratic with an expanded circle of 
privileged individuals.‖68 
 The concept of ―community,‖ with all the gnoseological consequences, conserves 
and expands itself from the aristocratic spirituality, in the experience of the democratic 
epoch. 
 The conception of unity, in blood, of all the members of a lineage (γένορ [genos, 
bloodline/patronage]) persists, despite the political decline of the aristocracy, but 
undergoes a transformation: the relationship of man with his γένορ extends to the entire 
population, in which one blood lives: ―the community to which one belongs / by birth, 
gives the content of life. One is what one is by birth‖; the physis is the primal essence of 
man. ―The conception of aristocratic ethics survives, even if birth, as the origin of a 
certain γένορ, loses its significance.‖69 The universal condition replaces the universal 
Delphic and aristocratic ethics.
70
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 The upper classes and the political privileges, even under the influence of the 
Peloponnesian war, gradually disappear in favor of the vaster unity of the polis.
71
 The 
Athenian population feels that it constitutes a homogenous and—therefore—universal 
entity: it preoccupies itself with making prevail that which corresponds to the common 
utility
72: all together the citizens ―have a fair amount of common sense; and, men of 
judgment being among these, under their influence act well and benefit thus to the city . . 
. But the individuals, taken each for himself, are not [547] able to judge righteously.‖73 
To an historian, such as Aristotle, both the universal value of community and the problem 
of the individual possibilities appear clearly in the polis. During the pentecontaetia—and 
especially in the period in which Athens prepares to conquer its empire—―one could say 
that only one will animates Athens foreign policy . . . The collective ambition of the 
population is sufficiently vast so as not to be surpassed by any individual conception‖74; 
in the age Pericles ―neither the state will have / to fear individual selfishness nor the 
individual protected by the constitution will have to fear the will of the state.‖75 The law 
is an expression of the collective reason,
76
 which gives it [the law] validity,
77
 and—then 
again—from it receives the mark of universality.78 For this reason, Thucydides often cites 
speeches of a community—the Corinthians, the Corcyrians, the Athenians, the Melians, 
etc—that are certainly not among the least important of his history.79 For Thucydides the 
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community is a physis
80
 that suggests to its own activity a purpose with logic as much 
subjective as objective,
81
 and in which it finds exactly the guarantee of its own 
universality. 
 Less vast collective entities establish themselves, such as are the activities of 
those who exercise a trade, the common voice of the many, and many judges of the Elis, 
or Eleia, etc., within this community, fastened by a lively sense of universal religiosity
82
 
that no longer distinguishes between national gods and those of foreigners, as 
demonstrated also by the attitude of the Delphic oracle.
83
 
  In exchange for this preeminence of the ―common interest,‖ one perceives that it 
ends up toning down individualism.
84
 But the bitterness of the political struggles and the 
violence of the passions once again pose / the difficult problem of individualism that, by 
another way, found a difficulty, a shadow laid by a universal idea to impede every 
autonomous gesture.
85
 The antithesis community-individual represents itself in all of its 
urgency in the age of democracy.  
 The war—a particularly effective social phenomenon as stimulus of ideas (more 
on this later)—at [548] the time of the Persian battles, presented the problem of the 
responsibility of the individual toward his / her people, without coming to an open 
contrast between state and individual; this [the individual], even though truly odd, was 
rejected once again the universality of that [the state].
86
 Nevertheless the individual 
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existed in all of its original autonomy: I have already mentioned how all those men 
characteristic of the medical wars were problematic.
87
 One feels the complexity of being 
human and, in the past, influenced by that universal which is the community of the polis, 
one preferred submerging the individual in an intimate versatility but an almost 
anonymous one; a versatility that would be a general attribute of man. Aeschylus, for 
example, completely dominated by the idea of the polis, is not interested in knowing and 
enabling others to know the name of the Hellenic hero or heroes that were glorious at 
Salamis, while he worries about emphasizing the power of human astuteness (Pers., 355 
ff.), the figure of the πολύηποπορ, [polutropos, broadly a cunning person or one who 
knows many ways of expressing the same thing], that, immediately after Homer, was felt 
as something specifically Hellenic, as the essence of this ―type.‖88 Therefore, / that which 
the social phenomenon ―war‖ allows to break in within life, comes to be dominated and 
diminished by the socio-political phenomenon which blocks the individual impulse 
stretched out toward a constructive freedom in order to absorb it in its own generic 
universality. In this way the individual stops himself at the limitation of the ―type.‖ Even 
in the second half of the fifth century, Athenian democracy, in defense of the principle of 
equality, suspects prominent people,
89
 whose marked individualism comes to be aimed at 
by comic poets, such as Phrynichus and Aristophanes.
90
 If one then fixes his/her gaze on 
a few decisive moments of the Peloponnesian war, s/he will see that these [moments], for 
their universal aspect, had to bring in the masses, absorbed by the monotony of a 
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problem, to the creation of collective states of mind that ended up concretizing 
themselves in typical characters. The plague of Athens raises from the mystery of 
consciousness the amoral selfish type; the facts of Corcyra identify the ambitious and 
unbridled passionate type; the episode of the vandalizing of the hermai delineates the 
superstitious type. In general, the game of personal interests, of [549] partisan or class 
grudges, breaks the moral unity of the homeland, which had been enacted at the time of 
the Persian wars,
91
 and creates those typical characters that, venting in impulses, halt the 
free conquest of the character. 
 It has been said that the ―type‖ corresponds to one of the essential manifestations 
of the aristocratic spirituality. We can specify and complete this historical element noting 
the way in which the more intense and exasperated the turmoil of the political conflict, 
the more easily it ends up in the creation of certain typical and characteristic figures. One 
can say that this corresponds to a necessary social law. If, in fact, it was observed, 
sociology suggests friendship and cooperation, which in effect take place in relationships 
between men; in reality, then, these ―are mixed with hostile or indifferent processes and 
feelings.‖ Even these are social facts. Therefore, ―envy, enmity, spite, and every lack of 
good will—the social and antisocial elements in the strict sense of the word— 
unfortunately pertain to the study of social facts in the broadest sense.‖92 Social life 
attracts, therefore, all the interest on human typology because through its aspects, the 
principal forces that act in the complex world of humanity define themselves. And, 
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specifically, these forces are dominated by the conflicting polarity of good and evil, 
which manifested itself particularly effectively in the Greece of the end of the century.
93
 
 In this way, from the social typology of the aristocratic environment,
94
 which 
formed out of the crash between good and evil (recall the contrast between κακοί [kakoi, 
lowborn] and αγαθοί [agathoi, aristocrat] right in the political thought of Theognis and 
his fellow party-members), one moves on to an analogous typology that had to define 
itself within the turmoil of the political struggles of the second half of the fifth century, 
without substantial / psychological and gnoseological differences, even if the historical 
terms had transformed themselves or even reversed compared to what had occurred 
during the course of the age of Theognis. The intrusiveness of the social fact with its 
natural laws at the expense of the unrepeatable originality of the individual reflects itself 
remarkably precisely on the literary manifestations that place individuals as themes of 
their own representation. Therefore, one [550] has been able to see a ―virtual identity of 
every will‖ as characteristic in the characters of Herodotus95; an idea or a type in those of 
Sophocles;
96
 and something analogous for those in Euripides
97
 so in this age the overall 
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concept of ‗character‖ does not seem to have been reached, even if the elements that 
constitute it are identified.
98
  
 To philosophy ―the infinite variety of beings and of individual phenomena, 
coexistent in space and succeeding one another in time,‖ the ―live awareness . . . of the 
indomitableness of every single being and of every single conclusion to any other‖ had 
appeared so certain that they had to draw out of this statement ―the concept of the infinite 
number,‖ the idea ―of the infinite quantities of the differentiations.‖99 However, the social 
experience, so urgent in such an age of wars and internal contrasts, did not grant the 
possibility of a corresponding and constructive close examination. The universal and the 
individual both misfire, so as to / have to truly conclude that the issues of spirituality 
according the aristocratic world are, yes, clarified, but still not surpassed. 
 
B. Community and Individual in the Theories of the Sophists. 
The philosophy of the sophists can be considered as the speculative mirror of these social 
forms of the human spirit, for which it demonstrates a particular historical sensibility and 
in front of which it creates a philosophic and systematic interpretation. 
 One should take a look at the doctrine of Protagoras
100
: for this sophist the 
persistent experience of the contradictions between type and individual, between 
universal man and particular man correspond to a fact which constitutes a problem that 
needs to be resolved urgently. He, always so sensitive to the social and political 
phenomenon, as is evidenced in his relations with Pericles, by his activity as legislator, 
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by the particular accent given to the πολιηική απεηή [politike arête, political virtue], 
intended as virtue par excellence, ends up establishing a dialectic of human gnoseology 
[551] according to the terms laid down by social reality. Man, he says, insofar as ―ruler of 
all experience‖ πάνηων σπημάηων μέηπον [measure of all things] (80 B 1), manages to 
gain for himself individually the knowableness of the real, which can also be 
contradictory. This rift, which is always possible in the entanglement of phenomena and 
brings about immense differences between one individual and another, can be placated, 
by means of a release of the relativistic phenomenalism of the individual. This occurs 
when the wise person succeeds in transforming experiences lacking in / value for the 
individual into others that result and are endowed with value,
101
 since he knows how to 
―reduce the minor opportunity of knowledge into a major opportunity of knowledge.‖102 
This wise person who, depending on the case, can be a physician, farmer, orator, sophist, 
etc., because he provokes such a gnoseological process, becomes the representative of 
that interest of the community,
103
 sum of individuals of a certain category, that finds itself 
unified, gnoseologically speaking, by a coincidence of relative knowableness of a 
determinate experience. Therefore, only collective man, man in general—the ―type‖—is 
able to perfect the knowableness of the experiences in the interest of the single 
individual. Hence, in the evolution of civilization, the condition of perfection is reached 
when the life of the polis is held up by δίκη [dike, justice] and αιδώρ [aidos, respect] 
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mine around it are independent of each other. I note only that, to be useful to the ends of my present 
research, which Dupréel, by other way and with a different critical method than mine, reaches an identical 
representation of the sociological—collectivist of the gnoseology of Protagoras: see what Dupréel says 
especially pp. 23, 27, 28, 35, 38, 43, 53, 56, 57. 
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(ethical motivations also of the aristocratic spirituality!),
104
 which consists of the 
universal πολιηική ήπεηή [politke arête, political virtue] and that reduces to unity the 
single individuals. Therefore, all the manifestations of life, for Protagoras, are 
constrained in the pattern of a universal leveling concept. 
 As for the aristocratic situation, transformed by the contemporary socio-political 
activity, Protagoras innovates because he reduces to an organic system that which was 
earlier a compound of scattered and instinctive experiences,
105
 translating into a 
philosophic concept defined as ―major possibility for knowledge‖ ([κπείηηων λόγορ 
Regarding or About Loss]) that which /was a social phenomenon: the annihilation of the 
individual interest into the collective one.
106
 
 One can say that the philosophic and rationalistic idea of community constitutes 
the fundamental problem also for many [552] other sophists: here we find ομόνοια 
[omonoia, like-mindedness], the ―concord‖ of Antiphon; the cosmopolitanism of the very 
Antiphon and that of Hippias, even more profound in the theorizing of the unity of 
individuals, whose concrete actions resolve themselves in the universality of κοινοί νόμοι 
[koinoi nomoi, common traditions/laws]
107
; the conception of the laws as universal fact 
and, therefore, identical for everyone, evident in the moment in which the individual 
physis recognizes itself an essential and a universal physis,
108
 according to the author of 
                                                          
104
 PLAT, Prot., 320 C – 322 D = DK 80 C 1. 
105
 The coherence, dialectically constructed, of the Protagorean system may more fully emerge from the 
whole chapter regarding Protagoras more than from the present ideas. 
106
 Cp. PARETO, op. cit., § 572, p. 241; see also § 253, p. 119.  
107
 An. Iambl., 7, 15 (= DK 89). The Anonymus Iamblichi is to be identified with Hippias; see MARIO 
UNTERSTEINER, An. I. Accepting my interpretation C. DEL GRANDE Hybris, Naples 1947, p. 524.   
108
 For all this, see Sophists, ch. XVIII, § 5. 
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the anonymous treatise Περί νόμων [About Traditions/Laws/Customs].109 This 
rationalistic solution, naturally, had to have been in conflict with all the difficulties that 
universal concepts entail and, given its origin, against the reality that did let itself be 
reduced to such a conceptual uniformity: this is perceived particularly by Lycophron, 
who had to have reliably critiqued the idea so as to disown every possible ethics; 
therefore the collective unity of men is an ideal, more than a reality.
110
  
 Similarly, for sophistry the individual appears as a type rather than an individual / 
passable to infinite differentiations: therefore sophistry deals with typical characterology 
that, in reality, is always a manifestation of the universal: the ambitious,
111
 the envious,
112
 
the slanderer,
113
 etc. And particularly noteworthy is the fact that Hippias, who seems to 
have deliberately confronted the problem of character,
114
 has been able to disentangle it 
from the constant and dialectical polarity of good and evil,
115
 as after all does Prodicus, 
whose Heracles forms himself spiritually between the contrast of the opposite tendencies 
of good and evil.
116
 Of particular importance, the circumstance that the genetic process of 
the character-type according to the two sophists is provoked precisely by that antithesis 
good and evil, from whose turmoil, even if under a distinctly political type, had sprouted 
the typology of the aristocratic spirituality. 
                                                          
109
 This treatise was recovered in [Dem.] XXV, by POHLENZ, An.; the text, now, in Sof. T. F., III, 11, pp. 
192—207.  
110
 ARIST., fr. 91 Rose (STOB., Flor., IV, 29, p. 710 h.) = DK 83, 4. For the interpretation, see: Sophists, 
ch. XVIII, § 3. 
111
 Remember the Πεπί θλοηιμίαρ of Protagoras (DK 80 A 1, 55): cp. UNTERSTEINER, Sophists, ch. II, § 
2 C. 
112
 In Hippias: STOB., III, 38, 32 (= DK 86 B 16). 
113
 In Hippias: STOB., III, 42, 10 (= DK 86 B 17). 
114
 Cp. UNTERSTEINER, Teofr. E Ipp., B 19a, pp. 92—97.  
115
 Cp. PLAT., Hipp. Mag., 295 B C; 295 E; 296 D and [Theophr.] Proem. Ad Char., 2—3 (for the 
belonging to Hippias of this preface, cp. the article cited in the previous note). The text, now, in Sof. T. F., 
III.  
116
 Cp. CHIAPPELLI, Sof., pp. 241—242.  
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 Nevertheless, one can say, for all sophists it is the will factor that determines the 
character of the individual. Of course, this [will factor] happens in the most disparate 
ways: according to Protagoras the greater possibility for knowledge, the κπείηηων λόγορ 
[kreitton logos, stronger/better argument], shapes, with an act of universal will, the 
ethical values for human community; for Gorgias the moment of decision confirms the 
[553] culminating point of individual action; the same is to be said for Prodicus; Critias, 
then, characterizes the individual who, / with an overturn of Protagoras‘ position, 
imposes social ethicality upon the universality of the law, which conforms to its will. In 
the clash between the most contrasting solutions one is the presence of the will, of which 
political life had sensed the effectiveness, but it is also an arduous and insoluble problem: 
necessary for the setting up of the universal, both in the name of a community and in the 
name of the individual, it is nevertheless problematic. Gorgias gave rigorous proof of it. 
 A fundamental attitude of aristocratic thought—which hinges on the problem of a 
fluctuating community-individual alternative and, therefore, upon the typical 
characterology of the individual, owing to his persistence in the social and political 
praxis—had to dominate speculative thought. Sophistry welcomed it and created a 
universal concept, whose abstraction is not transcendent—as Platonic idealism will 
become, for example—but inspired by a social and political experience; and, moreover, 
represented those single human attitudes, valid as typical and immutable paradigms for 
individuals who, in order to operate in social life, have to define themselves according to 
characteristics that are readily recognizable and, therefore, schematic.  
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C. The Relativistic Experience of Aristocratic Society in the Effort for the 
Reconstruction of Proper Ideals 
 Other characteristic influences have been established by the complex experience 
of the aristocratic society on the formation of sophistry, which derived singular aspects 
from them.  
It is well known that one of the attitudes of thought that gives a tone of uniformity 
to sophistry can be recognized in the relativistic dissolution of values. The age of 
Hellenic humanism arrived at such a conclusion following many routes: not last among 
these was the experience of travelers who, comparing / Hellenic folk customs  and laws 
with those of Barbarians (the most sensational and significant is the one narrated by 
Herodotus III 38), could not infer anything other than that which had been believed 
eternal, indestructible due to the power of a safe tradition, in reality lost value in any 
other environment: Herodotus and the logographers present numerous facts that bring us 
to this necessary observation. But such an influence, though crucial, interests us less 
because it is a prevalent cultural fact, imposed from above, rather than sprung from the 
immediate power of a social phenomenon. 
 The tragedy of the aristocracy, which, at the time of its decline, does not give up 
believing and proclaiming its ideals, makes clear, for an internal impetus, that relativism 
which, at first glance, seems so contradictory with the persistent traditionalism of this 
society. 
 The social events resulted in catastrophes, felt to be serious in the judgment of the 
interested interpreter, had to have appeared even to Pindar, representative of the 
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aristocracy, as something ―suprarational,‖ that is as the manifestation of a tremendum.117 
The concept is explained in clear political terms by Theognis: ―that you will learn good 
things from the good: mixing with sad people | you will remain bereft of judgment that 
you have of your own (ηον εόνηα νόον [ton eonta noon, the true/existing mind, the 
wisdom one has].‖118 The νοςρ [nous, mind/intent], that is reason,119 becomes 
problematic under the pressure of political contrasts: the νοςρ will no longer be εών [eon, 
existing/real/true], consistent and absolute: the advent of the new democratic order will 
cause one to notice / that ―between good and evil no difference exists‖ (ούηε κακων 
γνώμαρ120 ειδοηερ ούη αγαθων [oute kakon gnomas eidotes out agathon, knowing neither 
the opinions of neither evil nor good men])
121
: we no longer have a rational possibility of 
determining the truth of things in the domain of political experience, as Pindar also 
states
122: one will see a subversion of the very concept of the ―just,‖ a κακωρ ηα δίκαια 
νομίζειν [kakos ta dikaia nomisdein, to think about just things faultily] .123 The positive 
law does not have, therefore, any value: this is the desperate but not completely 
disinterested conclusion of the aristocratic world. 
                                                          
117
 G. RUDBERG, Zu Pindaros Religion, ―Eranos,‖ 43, 1945, pp. 334 ff., that cites Pindar, Pae., IX, 15 (fr. 
51 Turyn). 
118
 THEOGN., 35—36 (transl. Romagnoli). 
119
 For this sense of νοςρ, cp. R. SCHOTTLAENDER, Nus als Terminus, ―Hermes,‖ 64, 1929, p. 231. 
120
 ―Criteria, normative judgments‖ (JAEGER, Paid., I, p. 309) and ibid., note 1); cp., also B. SNELL, Die 
Ausdrüche für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1934, p. 34; cp. 
THEOGN. p, 319. However, more exactly understood by NESTLE, Kr., p. 179 (= Griechische Studien, p. 
291), who identifies, for Critias (an aristocrat) 88 B 39 DK γνώμη with ηγεμονικόν, and by SCHMID, Lit., 
III, p. 160, and, ibid., note 1, which sees in γνώμη, also for Theognis, the higher degree of knowledge 
compared to the inferior one obtained by way of the senses. 
121
 THEOGN., 60 (transl. Romagnoli). 
122
 Cp. W. SCHADEWALDT, Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikioin, ―Schriften der Königsb. Gel. 
Gesellsch.‖ 5, 1928, 3, p. 311. 
123
 THEOGN., 279. 
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 The consequences of this theoretical position developed in two ways. One should 
remember that law, that inflexible and unitary νόμορ [nomos, law/custom/tradition], on 
whose power the democratic war against the Persians had hinged, that met the proudest 
[555] oppositions of the aristocratic world. So, this very world casts doubt in regards to 
the validity of the new law rising from the ruins of its class. Thus expressing its thinking, 
the aristocracy, in order to devalue the democratic nomos, was preparing the way to 
renewed possible attacks, which actually, by a return of an oligarchic flame, exploded in 
Athens in 411 and at the time of the thirty tyrants. The aristocrats had made the law under 
their will, because / from time to time, under the pressure of circumstances, they had 
molded it according to their immediate and selfish necessities,
124
 though claiming that it 
was the expression of divine will.
125
 Now, complying in its own way to every reactionary 
movement, the aristocracy tend to use the arms of the adversary for their own aims: the 
law, mutable by approval of the popular assembly had to actually favor the notorious 
pluralism of Attic law.
126
 But this, in reality, could coincide, because its sanction was 
different, with pluralism—arbitrary as it was—of the aristocratic regimes. Those who had 
belonged or still belonged to it waited for nothing other than the propitious occasion  to 
be able to impose, even in the new era, now one law then another. Within the passion of 
this spiritual turmoil the famous verses of Pindar take on a very definite sense, in my 
opinion: ―(νόμορ127 [nomos, law/custom/tradition]), | the king of all |of mortals and 
                                                          
124
 Cp. G. GLOTZ, La cité grecque, Paris, 1928, pp. 108 ff. 
125
 GLOTZ, op. cit., p. 123. 
126
 Cp. U. E. PAOLI, Studî sul processo attico, Padua, 1933, pp. 15 ff., 19 ff. See also R. HIRZEL, Nomos, 
pp. 42—44.  
127
 Everyone knows that a meaning of nomos approved by everyone has not been reached at this point. 
Usually, one sees in this νόμορ ―the currently existent reign of Zeus,‖ ―form of appearance of Zeus himself 
in the universe‖ since in the nomos next to justice, the power also manifests itself: cp. HES., Opp., 276 ff., 
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immortals | carries everything with a sovereign | hand, justifying the extreme 
violence.‖128 The relativism of the customs129 and, therefore, of the laws inherent within 
them, can be accepted, Pindar seems to say, since contemporary revolutions confirm it,
130
 
on the condition that, under this instability, one always recognizes the divine
131
: Pindar 
transfers that relativism of the laws, which Theognis had denounced, in vexation , within 
the new democratic order, to the aristocratic spirituality, without full awareness of the use 
that would have been made of it, in the second half of the century. But in the meantime 
that aristocracy that had suffered the damage of the new concept of the law contributes to 
deepening the criticism of the law in abstract, independently of its aristocratic or 
democratic foundation. It will not seem [556] odd then, that, exactly in the aristocratic 
Critias, one can encounter a felt sensitivity for the rifts of the law.
132
  
 The discovery of the relativism of the law, so acutely sensed and accentuated by 
the aristocratic, brought an ulterior consequence. In fact, if a law is mutable within a 
population and variable from population to population, a / foundation of that ethics, 
which human conscience postulates as immutable, became elusive.
133
 So, to fulfill this 
requirement, the concept of ―the unwritten laws‖ came to be elaborated; these can be the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
SOLO fr. 24, 16 ff. D. (K. KERÉNYI, La religion antica nelle sue line fondamentali, Bologna, 1940, pp. 
69—70; analogously, EHRENBERG, Recht., p. 120; GUNDERT, op. cit, pp. 49—50; STIER, Nomos, pp. 
229—230, 238 etc.). In reality, the exact interpretation is the recent one of M. POHLENZ, Nomos, 
―Philologus‖ 97, 1948, p. 139 ―conventional opinion.‖ Cp. Sophists, ch. XV, § 3, note 30. 
128
 PIND., fr. 169 Schroeder = 187 Turyn (transl. Romagnoli).  
129
 Cp. PIND., fr. 215 = 188 T. Bear in mind that, probably, in this fr. Pindar does not actually relate to the 
consequences referred to by the ―periegeti‖ logographers, but wants to recognize the social and political 
fact of the reaction, after the Persian wars, on the part of the smallest cities that demanded their autonomy 
against the large hegemonies, Athens and Sparta (cp. also THUC., V, 18) (HIRZEL, Nomos, p. 54). So 
another social motivation, concomitant with the aristocratic one, gives origin to the relativism of the laws. 
130
 U. WILAMOWITZ, Pindaros, Berlin, 1922, p. 462.  
131
 This appears clearly in PIND., Pyth., II, 86 ff. (cp. HEINIMANN, N. u. Ph., p. 71) and especially 
comparing fr. 169 (187) with fr. 81 (= 88 T.): see MENZEL, Hell., pp. 116—118. 
132
 Cp. Sophists, ch. XVIII, § 4. 
133
 Cp. NILSSON, Gr. Rel., I, p. 391. 
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sacred aristocratic laws
134
 as much as—with an extension, favored by the 
cosmopolitanism of the aristocracy—those laws that are valid for all the people, founded 
on the universality of nature. Once again, the refuge of the aristocracy against the written 
laws transforms itself from the start for a revolutionary interpretation of these unwritten 
laws, to which conservatism attaches itself, as appears clearly in Spartan activity.
135
 The 
problem formulated according to the aristocratic need for salvation, by necessity had to 
be often recovered, with variously nuanced interpretations, by sophistry itself, as attest 
the doctrines of Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and Antiphon.
136
 Among the ways in which 
the ―unwritten laws‖ in the age of sophistry had the chance to materialize, one should not 
forget that anxiety of a return to the ―constitution of the fathers‖ (πάηπιορ πολιηεία 
[patrios politeia, inherited/ancestral polity or constitution]), that is welcomed by 
Thrasymachus 
137
 and that is proclaimed as absolutely valid, by virtue of that divine 
nature guaranteed by the goodness demonstrated over the course of time.
138
 With this 
recent constitutional formula, the Sophistic age, in its moments of spiritual return / to the 
aristocratic world translates, according an antidemocratic politico-social plan,
139
 the 
ancient idea of the unwritten law. 
                                                          
134
 [LYS] or. 6, 10; cp. THUC., II, 37, 2. 
135
 The elements of these notations are drawn from HIRZEL, Nomos, passim, but especially pp. 21, 23, 28, 
43—44, 48, 71—72; I notice that the particular tone in the interpretation of this material is mine. Cp. also 
A. BANFI, Socrate, Milan, 1944, p. 7. 
136
 For more details, see the Sophists. 
137
 DION. HAL., Dem., 3, p. 134, 9 (= DK 85 B 1). 
138
 HIRZEL, Th., pp. 361—362, and Nomos, p. 75.  
139
 For the aristocratic character of the πάηπιορ πολιηεία, cp. WUNDT, op. cit., I, p. 324; NESTLE, 
Weltansh., p. 99; GLOTZ, Cité cit., p. 73 and Hist. gr. cit., II, p. 718. After all, also the Attic comedians, as 
conservative as they are, aspire to this very ideal: cp. SCHMID, Lit., IV, pp. 19, 29, 30, note 8, 33 
 88 
 
 The relativism and the attempts to resolve it in a spiritual manifestation, free of 
disagreements, find their primordial patterns in the anguish of readjustment of the 
aristocratic conscience and ideals.
140
 [557] 
 
D. The Aporias of the Aristocrats in the Problem of the Teachability of Virtue.  
Among the most demanding problems of the sophistic age one should remember that of 
the possibility of teaching virtue. One can say that such a question had also been posed 
by the aristocracy in the moment of its crisis. Of course, the possibility of teaching virtue 
opposes itself anti-ethically to the aristocratic idea that it be ―by nature,‖ as Pindar141 
more than once proclaims: an explicit polemic against this conception becomes 
noticeable in Hippias.
142
 However, despite the profound conviction that natural 
endowments constitute that which is decisive in the teachings of virtue, nevertheless 
under the blow of reality, on one hand one recognizes that the company of wicked people 
may bring the moral ruin,
143
 on the other that education does not manage to render people 
wise
144
: the aristocratic, viewing the dispersion of the educational values that / were dear 
to him, ends up noticing that good natures easily becomes evil as much as that it is not 
                                                          
140
 Now MAZZARINO, Pens. st., pp. 324—325, reaches, by other means, the same conclusions: ―the 
contradictions of Greek historical thought. . . ., in one way, . . . are truly the most consistent and innate 
characteristic of the aristocratic intellectualism of the Greeks. If there are two contrasted Dikai (as 
Aeschylus also thought: Choeph., 461), there are also double ―ways of reasoning.‖ The sense of the 
aristocratic Hellenism is somewhat in these aporias of pure reason, which made a miracle possible: that the 
aristocratic culture elaborated, that is, the same doctrine of democracy and progress—but also made 
possible the crisis of Greek thought in its entirety.‖ 
141
 PIND., Ol., IX, 100, Pyth., I, 41 ff., ne., III, 40 etc. 
142
 An. Iambl., I, 1 ff. (DK 89) to be identified with Hippias; cp. UNTERSTEINER, An. I. 
143
 THEOGN., 35—36; cp. 305—308.  
144
 THEOGN., 429 ff. For the interpretation of the passage cp. W. NESTLE, Euripides, Stuttgart, 1901, p. 
175. See PIND. Ol., VII, 30 ff.   
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possible to educate those who lack strong and natural ethical bases
145
: so one can see, in 
terms of education, the most contradictory results.
146
 The undermining in the assessment 
of the social classes is such that the aristocratic feels dragged into doubting the bases of 
the απεηή [arête, excellence/virtue], placing in this way an authentic dramatic agony the 
problem of its teachability, even if then one does not want to admit its possibility, since, 
in the case of its occurring—imposed after all by the new history to the reluctant 
aristocrats— the aristocracy would have had to renounce its own conception of it.147  
 The political drama of an entire society becomes a tough gnoseological problem 
in the mind of the sophists.
148
 But one should not forget that, nevertheless, this sophistic 
education presupposes the development of individual qualities rather than those inherited 
from one‘s lineage,149 applied to the leaders above all, rather than the population at large, 
since the old aristocratic problem returns under new guise,
150
 as in general the type of 
education in vogue in the fifth century was directed ―towards the life of the nobles.‖151 
 The social rather than cultural urgency of the educational [558] problem naturally 
determined a conflict between / an aristocratic education and a political-democratic 
conception, which was one of the determining causes of the contrast between nomos and 
physis,
152
 whose theoretical roots had already been perceived by Pindar.
153
 
 
                                                          
145
 THEOGN., 577—578. 
146
 .THEOGN., 161—164.  
147
 Cp. THIMME, op. cit., p. 74; cp. p. 117. 
148
 For the respective doctrines of the sophists, Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, cp. Sophists, ch. III, § 3, 
3; ch. XI; ch. XV, § 7; ch. XVI, § 2 (end). For the opposite thesis of Gorgias, cp. ch. VII, § 5. 
149
 Cp. CHIAPPELLI, Sof., pp. 362 ff. and LOENEN, Prot., p. 47. 
150
 JAEGER, Paid., I, pp. 430—431; also cp. E. MAIER, Socrate (Ital. transl.), Florence, 1943, I, p. 257.  
151
 Cp. MARROU, Éd., 70—71.  
152
 JAEGER, Paid., I, pp. 452. 
153
 E. SCHWARTZ, in FRIEDLÄNDER, Pl. I, p. 330, note 2, p. 101, note 1. 
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E. Influence of the Aristocratic Crisis on the Constitutional Conceptions of 
Sophistry. 
Seemingly surprising, the numerous ideas of the social drama of the aristocracy placed 
before the speculative thought, which, almost without noticing, is under the stimulus of a 
world that is politically overcome
154
 and that, however, forms itself according to original 
and necessarily ambivalent shapes. In fact it draws its meaning from a problematic given 
by the loss of a disintegration that does not want to crystallize as it is forced to travel 
many roads for the regeneration. 
The aristocracy gave sophistry not only the themes that its own social drama 
postulated but also the themes of thought already elaborated by a particular social, 
political, and philosophical experience at one time. Numerous influences come from 
Pythagoreanism,
155
 whose politics was definitely aristocratic.
156
 One will more easily 
comprehend the reasons for these relationships between Pythagoreanism and sophistry, to 
which Augusto Rostagni has already called attention in a decisive study.
157
 
Therefore, the anomaly that had troubled—due to the contradictory presence of sophists 
with oligarchic tendencies right next to those flatly democratic, so that a considerable 
confusion and entanglement of ideas came to be, with the further aggravating 
circumstances that one can encounter conservative oligarchs and enlightened oligarchs, 
                                                          
154
 The sophists‘ interest in the value of speech and in the very art of speech that is gracefully expressed has 
been determined, at least in part, by an aristocratic influence: see how Theognis (305—308) perceives the 
power that speech has of seizing what is relative in good and evil. Pindar feels the effectiveness of speech 
dominated by the fascination of art, which never fails and that, therefore, has a superior value to that of 
action (Ne., IV, 71), sophistic επίδειξιρ seems to draw its origins also (cp. GUNDERT, op. cit., p. 110, note 
20) from αναθαινεζθαι νίκαν (PIND., Isth., IV, 71), αποδεικνςρθαι απεηάρ (PIND., Ne., VI, 47) proper of 
the aristocratic world.  
155
 Cp. UNTERSTEINER, Sophists, passim (cp. Index s.v.: Pythagoreanism).  
156
 Cp. ZELL.-MOND., I, pp. 413-414 (note). See also WUNDT, op. cit., pp. 142 ff.  
157
 A. ROSTAGNI, N. C., pp. 148—201.  
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capable, overall, to demonstrate a truly effective freedom of spirit and a rationalistic 
attitude—will lose all its strangeness.158 If sophistic speculation exercises its precise 
influence on the oligarchic-aristocratic constitution of 411
159
 and on the thirty tyrants, 
one must, in the opposite direction, remember just how driven the enlightenment of the 
same aristocrats must have been [559], as evidenced by the attitude of an Aristophanes
160
 
or a Critias vis-à-vis religion. 
All the constitutional drama of the second half of the fifth century is dictated by 
the very power of the political aristocratic ethos,
161
 so sophistry, in the ambivalence of 
values that it more or less proclaims through its representatives, suffers an enigmatic 
agony of the polarities tyranny (or aristocracy)-democracy
162
; therefore, especially the 
more recent sophists fluctuate between one and the other of these two political 
conceptions.
163
 The attack of a democratic Cleon against the minds, which govern the 
state less well compared to bunglers, 
164
 was launched, in reality, against sophistry and is 
entirely understandable if one bears in mind the complex and solid substance that this 
current of thought found itself placed opposite the aristocratic civilization almost 
naturally. 
 
 
 
                                                          
158
 MEYER, op. cit., p. 416. 
159
 WILAMOWITZ, A. u. A., II, p. 116; cp. NESTLE, Weltansh., p. 118, and FRISCH, ps. Xen., pp. 127 ff.  
160
 NESTLE, Weltansh., p. 116. 
161
 Cp. JOHANNA SCHMIDT, Ethos, Borna-Leipzig, 1941, pp. 109 ff. 
162
 Cp. JOËL, Gesch. Phil., pp. 699—700.  
163
 SCHMID, Lit., III, p. 211. 
164
 THUC., III, 37: cp. also SCHMID, Lit., V, p. 84. 
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3. Origins of Sophistic Problems in the Political Wars of the Fifth Century. 
The themes of the political and social life can be said to have been founded by the drama 
of the aristocracy, insofar as it has to set certain goals for itself in regards to the problem 
of a law to recognize the citizens, one that did not always flow logically from the 
traditions of that society.
165
 Naturally, original possibilities remain influenced by the new 
forms that constitute themselves from past turmoil.  
 The problem of the individual was urgent in an era of political struggles and 
revolutions, that offer a clear path to the ingeniousness ready for a complete 
development, also because the choice of a party requires an analysis of reasons that 
justify an autonomous decision
166: the democratic constitution favors θςμόρ [thumos, 
emotional impulses], that is the drive to independence, as recognize by Hippocrates in the 
De aere acquis et logicis.
167
 /  
 The individual element, even if constrained in the limits already clarified, takes 
part with a constructive awareness [560] (one should remember, rather, the resigned 
disdain of Hesiod) in the face of a problem of the state: the favored form of constitution 
is that which most benefits, and the criterion of the useful may lead even to the 
indifference toward the subject
168
: one can, therefore, foresee, through these current ideas 
in Athens in the last ten years of the fifth century and the first few years of the century 
that followed, the beginning of law conceived as ―defense . . . of a certain self-interest,‖ 
                                                          
165
 On the problem of the crisis of the aristocracy, see the important pages of S. MAZZARINO, Or. occ., 
pp. 233 ff. 
166
 Cp. MEYER, op. cit., pp. 399 ff 415, 522.  
167
 Ch. XVI—XVII: cp. M. POHLENZ, Hippokrates, Berlin, 1938, pp. 17—18; 23—24. 
168
 Cp. Lys., 25, 8; 31, 7. 
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in a way that it appears reduced to economy.
169
 Therefore the constitutional problem is an 
outcome of social life; the interest of everyone, consequently, turns to this for the 
practical repercussions that concern the individual citizens.  
The practical and theoretical sensibility for the value of the constitutions had been 
aroused following a compound of concomitant phenomena. Notably, especially in the 
aristocratic environment, which needs to position itself within the political renewal, the 
constitutional problem stands out, almost under the scourge of an irritating agony: one 
might think of Pindar, a convinced aristocrat but who, at one time, was judged by the 
public opinion of his fellow citizens as a friend of the tyrants, while next to Hieron was 
accused of conflicting with them [the tyrants].
170
 The episode goes beyond the person of 
the poet: it especially means that clear ideas are still missing regarding the constitutional 
problem.  
Only at the dawn of the democracy of Cleisthenes, which settled once and for all 
the principle of ιζονομία [isonomia, equal application of customs/law],171 the notion / of 
constitution began to define itself in its possible varieties,
172
 when from the appeased 
contradictions one reached the transition toward new forms.
173
 But these constitutional 
forms, finally defined, did not immediately pose the specific problem of political 
programs and parties.
174
 In fact, immediately following the ordeal of the Persian wars, 
which functioned as a barrier against every centrifugal force, the Athenian democracy, 
only once that the already problematic but nevertheless dominant figures of Themistocles 
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and Cimon had been eliminated, was shaken by ―that turbulent, unequal, unstable trend‖ 
that was ―characteristic until the middle of the fourth century.‖175 This situation, that 
went maturing and provoked upheavals [561] or concerns in the social environment, had 
to set, in peremptory terms, the problem of the relativism of government forms: what is 
each type of constitution worth? Should one return to the idealized constitution of the 
father or build one conforming to the postulates of reason? 
The political struggles intensified: the contrast of factions causes the necessity for 
political doctrines and, in the conflict between the two, the practical insolubility 
concerning the problem of the best form of government
176
 ends up being felt: the concept 
of profit dispels every theoretical essentialness inherent in any constitution.
177
 
All the controversies that, starting at the time of the Peloponnesian War, were raised 
around the / problem of the forms of constitution,
178
 both in terms of their essence and in 
relation to their genesis, have always been imposed by a condition of social life, that the 
serious external events had rendered particularly delicate. If the sophists place the study 
of the political fact, of the validity of laws, of the significance of constitutions, as 
unavoidable, this is due to the constitutional drama of Athens that, after the victory over 
Persia, had broadened the play of forces that moved its destiny. The incursion of new 
exigencies—for example, maritime politics179—seems to contribute in constituting, 
almost as though it were a natural organization, a particular type of government. The 
author of Constitution of Athenians, when, despite hating democracy, discovers its 
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coherence, founded on effective reality, resolves a political event in a phenomenon of 
social origin. Sociality, then, insofar as it becomes a decisive factor that is pressing on the 
consciousnesses, even though they did not have, at the time, full awareness, became a 
political fact, that solicits a practice as much as a theory. 
If, then, the sophists not only theorize upon the forms of government, in keeping 
with the demands of the social turmoil but also give answers in contrast among 
themselves, this creates an implicit proof that reality is contradictory: otherwise an 
identical intention would not have reached opposite conclusions. The [562] play of 
political factions relativizes , in time and space, the concept of truth and error
180
; so the 
struggle between Hellenics and Hellenics is seen in the dazzling light of its absurdity in 
the Lysistrata of Aristophanes and in the The Phoenician Women (also known by the 
Greek title, Phoenissae) of Euripedes (cp. vs. 535 ff.). / 
 
4. The War. 
The problem of utility determines clearly by now the meaning of the war,
181
 so with good 
reason one could say that, for the first time, during the Peloponnesian War, the economy 
constituted the generative power for this social phenomenon
182
 and, we can add, from this 
was reduced to an acute state: it became a matter suffered by all and, therefore, to 
interpret. Sophistry that, for the most part, carried out its activity during this dramatic 
historical period, could not fail to notice the influence caused by the social life in its 
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pathologic event of an armed conflict. And the problem attracted the attention of the 
sophists even more insofar as, for the most part, they were opposed to wars.
183
 
 When human conduct must feel determined by profit, then sooner or later it will 
become aware of becoming problematic, due to the relativism that the concept easily 
entails, and this occurs every time that it is of an economic sort. But utility is not the only 
origin for the dissolution of value caused by wars.  
That justice, which, before the Persian wars, was founded on control over oneself 
and, therefore, was the ―consequence of the individual temperament of each,‖ so that its 
violation ―does not avoid the formidable measures on the part of the gods,‖184 begins to 
lose that / foundation which resulted from the political spirituality of the aristocrats
185
 
after the great national ordeal. I have already re-evoked, at the beginning of this inquiry, 
the problematic nature of the great political figures of the era, who operate according to 
criteria fleeting the traditional norms of right and wrong: this means that the war had 
[563] cast the premises for a reversal of values, so the ancient principles found 
themselves destined to the unavoidable doubts of a courageous discussion. The struggles 
of the parties had become a power that acted harshly in the internal politics and 
international relations, entailing that play of interests, which ended up coming to the 
formulation of new ideas. A little at a time these contrasts became more acute and, during 
the new war of the Peloponnesian, reached a spasm. This [circumstance] occurred 
especially in the Attica where the events of the military operations, as appears even in 
Aristophanes, created the clash between the inhabitants of the countryside, particularly 
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damaged by the war, and the inhabitants of the city: the former being conservatives while 
the latter progressives, were equally pushed by the bitterness of the war to radical 
positions: therefore the war can be considered responsible for that spirit of class and of 
party
186
 that had to lead to necessary opposite political theories, of which the sophists 
made themselves representatives. The most immediate almost abstract contrast between 
laws and laws, uses and uses, dramatized itself in a social reality where the antithesis 
appears as the fundamental norm of everything and is brought to an exacerbated evidence 
of the narrow space of the polis,
187
 favorable terrain to pinpoint opposites and indicate 
their incompatibility. / This class war that had inevitably exploded within the aristocratic 
regimes
188
 had brought, with Pericles, to the triumph of the proletariat,
189
 which had to 
provoke even the most paradoxical reactions within the adversaries.
190
 In these conditions 
of high social tension that stirred itself on the axis of an unstable equilibrium, the theory 
presented itself spontaneously until reaching the ideal of Antiphon, who wanted the class 
wars to be appeased and abolished and also the clash between lineages to be eliminated, 
as the fatal one between the Hellenics and the barbarians.
191
 
Therefore this anxiety of the universal, that reaches cosmopolitanism, seems to 
flow from the dramatic anguish of the war of the Peloponnesian. 
The cosmopolitanism, which is in the very nature of sophistic mindset and that 
was theorized especially by Hippias and Antiphon, illustrates, due to the social demands 
of the Hellenics, a [564] very complex moment, to the point that not all the sophists could 
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comprehend its greatness.
192
 The antithesis Hellenics-Barbarians, which emerged with 
the founding of the empire of Darius,
193
 had materialized with the Persian wars (490—
479), definitely not earlier,
194
 and a political problem had come with it, that is the 
opposition of tyranny, subjugated by Persia, and Hellenic democracy.
195
 One can see, 
then, / how in Antiphon, under examination of the law that did not respond to the 
demands of a consequent ιζονομία [isonomia, equality before the law] where the 
contrasts were overcome without any remainder, the problem of cosmopolitanism had to 
insert itself: the sophist seems to say that exactly the ιζονομία in its absolute value, 
instead of causing the opposition Hellenics-Barbarians, as had actually occurred, had the 
contrary duty of appeasing it. The ιζονομία has become the elimination of all the laws in 
order to recreate the spontaneous physis that, in human terms and universal sociality, is 
actually called cosmopolitanism. 
A particular situation that had matured in the conscience of the Hellenic people, even 
with the contention of other social facts—such as ―mercenarismo,‖ the mimicry of the 
Hellenics especially in foreign lands,
196
 the society of the Metics, who caused a lively 
exchange of ideas,
197
 the internationalism and the lack of concern for class differences, in 
the Eleusina religion,
198
 the Delphic tolerance in front of foreign cults
199—had to raise a 
social problem that reconnected to that κοινή [koine, common/shared/general] cultural 
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micrasiatic owed to the collaboration of Greeks and non-Greeks in the age of Aoidoi and 
in that which followed until Darius.
200
 This κοινή [koine, common/general/shared], 
relived now as a new problem put forth by the social conditions caused by the 
Peloponnesian war which, exacerbating the class war, strives for the internal pacification 
and, consequently, the external one (one might think of the relationships which, during 
the war, on both sides were tied with the / Persia itself), sets itself up as a great idea that 
found its practical implementation as a consequence to the feat of Alexander.
201
 
 However, the problem of the Hellenic–Barbarian antithesis is to be thought [565] 
as dramatic in the cultural and social world of the whole fifth century, even if the 
demands of patriotism have lifted an uproar that rendered scarcely audible contrary 
voices. Nevertheless, when one re-listens to The Persians of Aeschylus, that from the 
clash have also offered an exact political and not racial interpretation, one will obtain the 
certainty that for an enlightened Greek such as Aeschylus, precursor of the sophistic 
διζζορ λόγορ [dissoi logos, double argument/double logic],202 Europe and Asia are a unit 
established by nature. But this union, in order to become true, requires the renunciation of 
the freedom of the individual.
203
 One may, then, say that the cosmopolitanism that 
became a theoretical fact in the age of the sophists, who were determined by the social 
imperative of the class war, answered a problem that extended back to the time of the 
Persian wars. While the Hellenic patriotism celebrated its triumph, so much that in The 
Persians one can still hear the clear ring, in the same tragedy and before the Athenian 
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public, the insoluble difficulties of patriotism and cosmopolitanism,
204
 of the individual 
and the universal, are discovered within the tragic consciousness of Xerxes. 
But, even under another facet, the class war entailed, as its consequence, 
cosmopolitanism: the aristocrats, desiring not to participate in public / life, where the 
δήμορ [demos, the people] prevailed, abstained themselves from attending the 
assembly,
205
 so with this abstaining they contributed in preparing cosmopolitanism.
206
 
Once more we encounter the aristocratic turmoil, which adds its particular mark to a 
complex social pattern. 
The problems, which the war expresses with its agony and that sophistry picks up, 
entail a critical disintegration of values, from which, among others, visions of universal 
social experiences form themselves. Sophistry, despite its orderly relativism, as a rule 
flows into an empirical universal, which Protagoras had fixed in his καινή δόξαν [kaine 
doxan, common opinion/general or commonly accepted opinion).  
 
5. Problems Posed by the Social Elements of Religion. 
The Persian wars unsettled traditional religiosity and as a result made it totally 
problematic. The sacred organization of the polis
207
 faded when the wars saw that 
―religion and the gods had to subordinate themselves to the ideas of the human spirit‖ so 
as to favor ―the freedom of the human spirit‖ and to completely fix the attention of the 
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people on the physical world
208
: religion became, then, a political event,
209
 so that, for 
example, the Athenians made use of it on their Pan-Hellenic plan
210
: religiosity, under a 
political / point of view, colored itself then of rationalism
211
 and started the process of its 
own disintegration.
212
 
The denial of the transcendent was the material result of this critical movement in 
the area of religiosity that does not concern itself with the afterlife; which, according to 
the thought of Pericles, in a profane way conceives divine forms under aesthetic type
213
; 
which does not see, in the course of things, a secure stance of divine action in the face of 
sudden shifts of historical events (one might recall the doubts that Theognis already 
had)
214
; which no longer responds to the new needs and demands placed by the collapse 
of the ancient social and political order,
215
 so as to not coincide with the postulates of an 
autonomous ethics.
216
 During the pentecontaetia a true desecration of the sacred and, 
therefore, its resolution in the world of relativism, spreads. 
However, even in an internal way, the religious phenomenon contradicts and 
dissolves itself. Be it sufficient to think about the double value of the sacred, which as a 
power can indeed operate for good as well as evil, without, moreover, having this 
duplicitous determination be at the root of the religious phenomenon
217
: this indifference 
of value, precisely in the religious phenomenon in its becoming, involved a peculiar 
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tragic moment of human knowledge that, in the face of such ambivalence, will never be 
able to decide. The dramatic Gorgian critique of knowledge takes off precisely from the 
anti-ethical ambiguity of reasons / that are also [567] sacred but transported in the 
atmosphere of analytic thought.
218
 
The reason of an inextricable antithesis is, then, characteristic of the sacred and 
can be pursued in a yet more significant domain. The law is recognized as duplicitous in 
appearance: on one hand it is proclaimed as ―holy and immutable,‖ while on the other as 
―a human work—secular, one could say—and consequently subject to change,‖ and the 
two opposites in practice appeared more or less confused.
219
 This ambivalence, which 
constitutes the basis from which the relativism of the concepts lights up, draws one of its 
origins also from the double sense that θεζμόρ [thesmos, institution] as much as νόμορ 
[nomos, law] can take of sacred law and secular law.
220
 One can say that Greek 
experiences, in general, are always sacred and profane at one time: think of physis, a 
philosophical concept so important also in the sophistic age: and here, according to the 
testimony of Hellanicus,
221
 Physis is identified with Adrasteia, the ancient pre-Hellenic 
goddess mother, determinant of the inflexible laws of existence.
222
 The problematics of 
nomos and physis, in the mystery of the social conscience of the religious man, fluctuate 
vibrating towards those opposite poles, that sophistry had to make its own in the 
alternating inclinations, now in one sense, now in another. 
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However, especially in the second half of the fifth century, / another religious fact 
contributed in positing urgent problems to thought. Greek religion now absorbs foreign 
religions that penetrate it starting in the age immediately following that of the Persian 
wars
223
 and that are welcomed by the masses, while ―the cultured social classes tend 
towards a rationalization and an elaboration of more universal concepts.‖ Both thus 
demonstrate ―an unease and dissatisfaction for the old forms,‖ a ―search for new 
arrangements.‖224 But, in the meantime, traditional values, even for this comparison of 
two forms of religiosity, undergo decisive blows, since the concepts of right, of true, etc., 
turn out to be, once again, problematic. The most direct resonance of such a religious 
movement, which could easily slide in aberrant forms of superstition, comes together in 
the Interpretation of Dreams by Antiphon [568] which is an expression of relativistic and 
rationalist mentality, at one time, in opposition with every aphilosophical way of 
thinking. We, however, care to point out how Antiphon, even in this case, feels the 
imperiousness of a problem posed by a social experience.  
After all, the individualistic attitude of sophistry, which detached man from his 
ties to the polis, concurred with a social need to the point that, exactly 
contemporaneously, in Greek society the cult of Asclepius and that of Zeus Philios arise, 
so timely to satisfy the demands of the single individual isolated and indifferent to the 
gods of the polis.
225
 / In general, one can say that Hellenic religion, in many ways, posed 
the problem of the individual: already the Homeric man ―similar to a god‖ rises high 
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above with his admirable creation in a free society
226
: personal initiative is crucial in the 
mysterious beliefs
227
 so these, on Greek land, convert themselves in exaltations of man 
and in expression of intellectualism.
228
 
The forms of religiosity in which the passionate stimulus constitutes that essence 
which is antiethical to reason have to say the least favored the elaboration of rhetoric and 
sophistic gnoseology. Rhetoric, in fact, owes a great deal, for the clarification of its 
stylistic forms (figures), to sacred poetry,
229
 which had transformed them in the hands of 
the Hellenic religious society, ready, therefore, to transfer them in the sovereign domain 
of art. Analogously the pathetic impetus of the eloquence of some sophists may depend 
on the ecstatic passion of orgiastic cults.
230
 
The above is as far as rhetoric goes. In addition, Hellenic religion implied a 
gnoseological theme. Already for the Hellenics and especially in the more ancient age 
―every word, once expressed, could become divinity.‖231 In fact language, ―as the only 
mediator between god and men,‖ entails that ―immediacy, which is worth as a premise of 
a genuine revelation. Language . . .is nothing other than the primordial / discovery by 
means of logos, which ―has revealed the divine to humanity, since it gave the possibility 
of divinely [569] expressing the divine.‖ But for the Hellenics, ―not the logos became 
meat, but the logoi,‖ and the gods were manifold.232 The significance of logos was 
therefore given and developed in two senses: in the rationalistic way, which caused the 
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contrast between unity and plurality that the logos implied to spring up to the speculative 
conscience of the Hellenics, so that it established itself in its own ambivalence; and in the 
naturalistic and metaphysical way, which made logos the gathering place of the most 
radical reality of things, and here the philosophical-religious etymology of the Greeks, 
who considering the word θύζει [phusei, by nature] believe that it expresses something 
on the essence, of which it pretends to be the name, as appears especially in Heraclitus 
and Aeschylus.
233
 From the refractions of the many possibilities embedded in the nature 
of logos, what fixes itself in the speculation of the sophists is, on one hand, the Gorgian 
doctrine of logos, in its ambivalence, according to the developments of the Helen and the 
treaty On Nature or On Non-Being, that had to determine its persuasive effectiveness, 
conformant to the irrational way proper even of religious experience
234
; and on the other, 
the logical in-depth study of the word that, starting with its physis (etymology), resolves 
itself in the nomos, which should be recognized within it in its every single manifestation 
(synonymy): this the oeuvre of Prodicus.
235
 / 
The contradictory nature of words, under the gnoseological respect, was 
conquered also in the intensity of the political wars, which reversed the current sense that 
they demanded: this is lamented by Theognis (305—308) and, then, by Thucydides (III, 
82, 4), who refers to the facts of Korkyra, that had reached a frenzy in that very year 427, 
during which Gorgias came to Athens for the first time. The political fact coincides, then, 
with the religious one to confirm the natural antitheses of logos. 
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Hellenic religiosity wielded its influence on sophistry also following the decisive 
intermediary way of the tragedy, a social phenomenon
236
 in its origins as much as in its 
expressions of the high Attic poetry. The Dionysian character of the tragedy, already in 
its most ancient form, had to ensure that its climax brought to the feeling of the [570] 
tragic and insoluble dissension inherent in the very gods and in men, since Dionysian 
religion reveals exactly the knowledge of the contradictions of the world.
237
 From tragedy 
and from its religious-popular origins, the sense of the tragedy, typical of existence, had 
infiltrated itself in the awareness of the Hellenics: a problem, this one, essentially 
sophistic, to the point that the treatise of Gorgias On Nature or On Not-Being is to be 
considered and felt as the social experience of tragedy and of its poets, translated in 
ontological and gnoseological terms.
238
 / 
Another social phenomenon with a religious backdrop that had a noteworthy 
repercussion for sophistry is to be caught precisely in religion, insofar as it is the 
interpreter of the principle of authority that aims to obtain obedience and discipline from 
the people. Therefore, according to this system of thought, the state, which has to have 
had a genesis, represents itself as established by the Gods and demigods or heroes, 
representatives of the very first social revolutions, carried out in reality by men.
239
 Thus 
are explained the different myths: of Protagoras, who in the genesis of the society sees 
the intervention of heroes and gods (even though, in the final analysis, his construction is 
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substantially anthropological
240
) and of Critias, who gives an unscrupulously explicit 
view if the phenomenon, understood as resulting from a human intervention, with the 
most contradictory consequences.
241
 While accepting the religious idea of a civilized life 
established by a superior being, in reality sophistry resolves it in an act of the human 
mind. 
Sophistry has, therefore, been able to give a secular interpretation of certain 
religious phenomena, that draw their raison d’être from social life. 
 
6. The Problem of Techné. 
I believe it appropriate to keep in mind yet another social fact that exercises considerable 
influences on the theoretical thought of sophistry. I want to allude to that widespread and 
certain establishment of the technai, that had had its beginning already in the sixth [571] 
century,
242
 but that belongs exactly to the age of sophistry: in it workers are valued to the 
point that, precisely in this environment, in defiance of an aristocrat as Aristophanes, 
political men such as Cleon and Hyperbolus, who originate precisely from the world of 
the δημιοςπγοί [demiourgoi, craftsmen], can come forward and assert themselves.. 
This fact, sign of a tacit social revolution, had to create a gnoseological problem 
perceived by the sensitivity of those who stood amazed before this unprecedented event. 
In the mind of the aristocrat, a popular assembly composed of shoemakers, carpenters, 
                                                          
240
 Cp. Sophists, ch. III, part III, § 2 b.  
241
 Cp. Sophists, ch XVIII, § 4.  
242
 Cp. HASEBROEK, Soc., p. 240. 
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farmers, etc. had to appear as absolutely inept in judging political questions, if not even 
misunderstood.
243
 
Thus was posed the problem of the gnoseological value of the arts: which one? 
How would their representatives be judged? 
Even in this domain the answers of sophistry are anti-ethical. On one hand the 
devaluation of the arts is insinuated, as occurs in Protagoras, who demolishes its 
theoretical foundation, at least in the area of the individual experience.
244
 Similarly, in / 
Antiphon, techne represent the human world of the relative vis-à-vis the absolute 
physis.
245
  
But, on the other hand, the arts could have appeared so connected by a rational 
orderliness that they were judged the directive norm of all of life
246
 and mark of progress, 
dependent upon their becoming: for this reason, Prodicus renders the history of 
civilization as founded on the steady discovery of the arts,
247
 Hippias is the corypheus 
[chorus lead] of such an exaltation of them and, finally, Critias takes care of knowing the 
origin of the inventions.
248
 
This social fact fully sweeps over the speculative zeal of the sophists, who foresee 
a theoretical problem in it, differently outlined for a solution. And in the contrast between 
those who glorified the arts and those who raised the aporias against them to limit their 
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 Cp. Xen., Mem., III, 7, 6—7; PLAT., Prot., 319 CD. 
244
 Cp. Sophists, ch. III, part I, § 2D; cp. part III, § 3, 5, and Prot. Ant., 34—44.  
245
 Cp. UNTERSTEINER, Sophists, ch. III, § 5. 
246
 Cp. HIRZEL, Th., p. 382. 
247
 DK 84 B 5. 
248
 DK 88 B 2. 
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absoluteness, the thoughtful and disconcerted voice of Sophocles rises unable to judge 
them.
249
 
 
7. Conclusion 
The search of an exterior, not philosophical genesis of sophistry has been able to 
demonstrate that this current of thought truly marks the expression of a specific historical 
climate, the character of which is determined precisely by social facts. By this, one does 
not intend to deny the existence of relationships with former and contemporaneous 
philosophical schools: we know, for example, that the treatise of Gorgias On Nature or 
On Not-Being is completely a fabric of argumentations aimed at reducing ad absurdum 
the principles of the most significant pre-sophistic schools. / 
However the rigorously philosophical reasons often correspond to aspects of 
social life. And this is felt as much in the negative, relativistic part of sophistic thought as 
in the constructive, theoretical, and practical results. If one cannot talk of a systematic 
unity, that brings together the sophists, because, in reality, they are often in antithesis, or 
even in polemic among themselves, it is nevertheless natural to think of them as an 
emanation of a particular historical moment that was in crisis and, consequently, 
fragmentary in its complexity.  
It has seemed that one of the exceptionally fruitful seeds of this crisis was to be 
discovered in the birth of the spirit of the Hellenic aristocracy, precisely in the moment in 
which its material splendor faded or, depending on the locations, extinguished itself 
forever. However, this contrast between reality and ideal dramatized aristocratic thought, 
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 SOPH., Ant., 332 ff.  
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making it multifaceted and sensitive to all the exigencies of social man. When suffering, 
man learns and comes to know himself; thinks and rises at times to a metaphysic, devoid 
of abstraction, because it proceeds parallel to particular and concrete human experiences. 
Humanism has prevented sophistry from abstracting itself into pure dialectic. Even the 
most universal forms of sophistic thought, even the most keen critical analyses always 
find themselves face to face with a specific social event, from which the sophists, 
however differently, have inferred an idea or an argumentation or have proceeded at the 
same time as this event.  
The sophists, without meaning to be, were philosophers of [573] the history of 
their age, which they interpreted with a perfect accuracy.  
 
 I have not suggested to be carrying out an exhaustive investigation relative to 
every detail of the question. There are problems that I left out because their 
treatment would have excessively enlarged the present essay. My only intent was 
to pose the question in all its validity and track, particularly, the relationship 
between the social life of the aristocracy and the problematic of sophistry. The 
nucleus of this essay is constituted by a conference held at the ―Institute des 
Hautes Etudes‖ of Brussels, and repeated at the Sorbonne respectively on April 
29
th
 and May 5
th
 1949. The present study was published for the first time in the 
Studi di filosofia antica in onore di Rodolfo Mondolfo, by V. E. Alfieri and M. 
Untersteiner, Bari, Laterza, 1950, pp. 121—180. Now it is republished by kind 
and cordial concession of the Laterza Editors. 
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Chapter Four 
Analysis of Translation 
 
In ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ Untersteiner considers the social events in fifth-
century Athens and the ways in which these enabled sophistry to develop. Although he 
briefly mentions some sophistic responses to the issues, the main thrust of his essay is the 
social component of the events that aroused sophistic speculation and answers. 
Untersteiner identifies six main social issues—as evidenced by his detailed headings and 
subheadings—that contributed to the development of sophistry although the first serves 
more as an introduction and overview. The remaining five parts identify the crisis of the 
aristocracy, which receives the most expansive treatment in the essay, the war, religion, 
political struggles, and the problem of techné as the main issues sparking sophistic 
interpretation. First, I introduce each one in a brief summary of the thread running 
through his overall argument, allowing the reader a broader view of his discussion before 
delving into each part separately. Second, I review and contextualize the main facets of 
each section separately as it occurs. Third, I discuss the contribution that each of 
Untertersteiner‘s points makes, as well as their relevance, significance, and contribution 
to classical rhetorical theory. I also address key terms as they emerge.  
Untersteiner begins the essay with ―La pentecontaetia come età dei problemi posti 
dalla vita sociale‖ by pondering the pentecontaetia, Greek for ―the period of fifty years,‖ 
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as the age that in which Hellenic social life presented the social issues that the sophists 
will undertake. The pentecontaetia refers to a phase within the Classical Period that 
spanned between the second Persian invasion of Greece in 480 and the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War in 433 BCE. Although the designation is not common in English, 
Thucydides first used it to describe this age in which Athens dominated the 
Mediterranean and democracy flourished. I remain faithful to Untersteiner‘s use of the 
term. This opening part sets up his discussion by briefly touching on the events prior to 
the pentecontaetia and premises the core of his argument: namely, the events of the 
pentecontaetia were unprecedented and powerful to the point of requiring new ideas and 
solutions within politics and philosophy.  
The crisis of the aristocracy appears as the most substantial component of 
Untersteiner‘s argument regarding the origins of sophistry. ―La crisi dell’aristocrazia 
determina una nuova spiritualità nel mondo ellenico‖ markedly appears as the largest 
section of the essay, receiving more attention than any other by being further subdivided 
into five parts and discusses the crisis of the aristocracy as a leading factor in establishing 
a new sensibility in the Hellenic world. In this part, Untersteiner argues that this crisis 
was at the core of the changes that stimulated the emergence of sophistry. The issue of 
community plays a major role in this part of his argument, taking up the first two sections 
of this part. The first, ―Idea di collettività e sue conseguenze gnoseologiche,‖ expounds 
on the idea of community and the gnoseological consequences that emerged from it. In 
the second section, ―Colletivitvà e individuo nelle teorie dei sofisti,‖ he explores the 
concepts of community and the individual within the theories of the sophists. In 
―L’esperienza relativistica della società aristocratica, nel travaglio per la ricostruzione 
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dei propri ideali” Untersteiner looks at the relativistic experience of aristocratic societies 
as they seek to reconstruct their ideals. The fourth section, ―Le aporie degli aristocratici 
nel problema dell’insegnabilità della virtú‖ examines the difficulties faced by the 
aristocratic when the teachableness of virtue came into question. Untersteiner concludes 
the second part of the essay by analyzing the influence of these aristocratic crises on the 
constitutional conception of sophistry in ―Influsso della crisi aristocratica sulle 
concezioni costituzionali della sofistica.‖ 
The next two main sections discuss the various conflicts that occurred during the 
pentecontaetia and their significance to the development of sophistry. ―Spunti di problemi 
sofistici nelle lotte politiche del V secolo,‖ examines the political struggles of the time as 
stimuli for sophistic concerns, while the next part looks at the more violent struggles of 
war in general, ―La guerra.‖ The fifth part ―I problemi posti dagli aspetti della religione‖ 
examines the issues that emerged from the social elements of religion, Finally, in Part 
Six, ―Il problema della tecnica‖ deliberates on the issue of techné. This question is at the 
heart of discussions at the time, and can be seen as an intellectual struggle to which I will 
devote substantial room in my analysis below. The seventh and final part of the essay, 
―Conclusione,‖ offers a brief conclusion, as its title indicates. These issues comprise what 
Untersteiner views as instigating the rise and expansion of sophistry. I now turn to 
analyzing them in depth and discussing their implications for classical rhetorical theory.  
Untersteiner begins his essay by positing that the work of the sophists was 
sparked by a number of social and historical events that occurred before and culminated 
during the pentecontaetia. The crises before, during, and after the fifth century BCE 
continually destabilized Hellenic social life. Untersteiner argues that these predicaments 
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imposed by social life were so numerous and momentous that they had an incredible 
influence on the Hellenes. These events prompted the poignant realization that reality is 
contradictory in a world that was formerly stable under the guises of tradition and myth. 
The variety of these crises vexed the Hellenes and had to be explained in order to be 
surpassed. These social shifts in the organization of Hellenic life altered the social 
dynamics in such a way as to have actively promoted the emergence of the sophists who 
answered the social needs of the Hellenes. 
Untersteiner bases his argument on certain premises in place at the time. The 
Hellenics had a different view than the current concept of society. For one, they were 
deeply involved within the relational play between the ―many‖ and the individual, an 
aspect that he discusses in depth in Sections A and B of Part Two. Also, the Hellenes, 
who had not viewed history as evolutionary, now saw the current affairs in contrast with 
social conventions as being next to nature.  
Here Untersteiner addresses the very frequently discussed topic of nomos versus 
physis, although he does not refer to it as such and mentions it only in passing. The 
question of these two contrasting terms and their relationship did not originate with the 
sophists but receives persistent intellectual interest from the beginning of philosophic 
inquiry. Physis rather safely translates to nature, while nomos has no single English 
corresponding term and refers to laws, customs, and conventions. Related to the verb 
nomizo, which can mean to think, believe, or practice, nomos originally meant ―what 
people (or a people) believe or practice—their customs, which, especially in early times, 
had the force of laws. . . . Nomos has a prescriptive force: it is not simply what is 
believed, but what is believed to be right, not just the ways of life a people practices, but 
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what it practices as the right way of life‖ (McKirahan 391). Before the existence of 
written law codes, custom and law were hardly distinct. The meaning of the word then 
broadened to cover official laws that were enforced by the state, retaining its prescriptive 
force (391). W.K.C. Guthrie devotes considerable attention to sophistic conceptions of 
nomos and physis, observing that ―[n]aturally . . . different people had different nomoi, 
but, so long as religion remained an effective force, the devising mind could be the god‘s, 
and so there could be nomoi that were applicable to all mankind‖ (55). Untersteiner 
touches on this issue because, around this time, law, customs, and conventions ceased to 
be considered as part of the fixed order of things. At this point in Hellenic history, 
―people wanted to know what made the law legitimate‖ (Shortridge 198). The sophists 
fulfilled this need. 
Untersteiner continues his introductory premises by remarking that society also 
began to establish itself as an operating reality, though still lacking a scientific awareness. 
The crumbling of physical barriers among tribes, in addition, enables relationships of 
various types between social groups, relationships that make possible the sharing of new 
ideas. At this time, the unity of noble families weakened, and the full responsibility of 
individuals, as well as the struggle between political solidarity and the nobility and the 
expansion of commerce, produced economic unities and an inclination towards inquiry 
and judgment. The influx of metics further broadens this already rich cultural milieu. 
These basic premises created fertile ground for the appearance and flourishing of the 
sophists, who supplied answers for the myriad queries that appeared thereof. The 
fracturing of the noble families, introduced in this first part, is among the most decisive 
events of the issues which the sophists tackled. 
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Untersteiner argues that, while not perishing altogether, the aristocracy as a socio-
political phenomenon ends in its former manifestation. After the collapse of Boeotian 
independence, a crisis sweeps over the aristocracy at least until the Battle of Chaeronea in 
338BCE. What made this crisis particularly significant was the treatment it received from 
Pindar, who made it a spiritual matter by addressing the superseding of the Homeric idea. 
Werner Jaeger discusses this issue in depth, positing that Pindar, or the ―voice of 
aristocracy,‖ tackles the ―difficult problem‖ of deciding ―how it sometimes happens that 
after a long succession of famous men the areta of a family disappears‖ (Paideia, Vol I, 
215). While still set in the world of myth, the heroes of Pindar ―lived and struggled in the 
immediate present‖ (216). The importance of this poet‘s queries lies in the opening up of 
the new question of whether ―the true virtue of man can be learnt, or only inherited by 
blood . . . thrust on him by the conflict of the aristocratic educational tradition with the 
new rational spirit‖ (218). His answer is that ―[e]ducation cannot act unless there is 
inborn areta for it to act upon,‖ demonstrating ―the deliberate resolve of the aristocracy 
to preserve its position at a time of crisis‖ (218—19). Untersteiner underscores this view 
by conceiving of it as a social foundation for the development of sophistry. I discuss the 
subject in more depth below, when Untersteiner addresses the issue in detail. Suffice here 
to say that Pindar expresses the ―last agony of the aristocratic culture of Greece‖ (222). 
Untersteiner emphasizes this position. 
Untersteiner continues Part One of his essay by addressing two decisive social 
issues in particular as having a bearing on the appearance of sophistry: the problem of 
human personality and that of constitutions, as he finds explained by Thucydides. 
Untersteiner suggests that two figures, in particular, demonstrate the issue of human 
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character: that of Pausinias, who was crucial during the Battle of Platea and the Greek 
victory over the Persians, as well as the head of the Hellenic League, and that of 
Themistocles, a new type of Athenian politician and general who distinguished himself 
during the initial years of Athenian democracy and was a populist supported by the 
Athenian lower classes, as well as conflicting with the nobility. He was not an aristocrat 
but an outsider who prided himself with his lack of polish and was instrumental in the 
second defeat of the Persians by anticipating their return and preparing the Athenians by 
building an unprecedented navy and strategizing the decisive victory in the straits of 
Salamis, without which, Greek civilization and values would unlikely have been reached. 
Jaeger identifies him as being the first to use the term foreign politics (390).  
By calling attention to these two figures, Untersteiner mounts his case for the 
importance of the development of human character, for these two figures rose above the 
traditional roles permitted to individuals who were not of noble birth. Furthermore, he 
calls attention to two speeches: a speech given at the Congress of Sparta by the 
Corinthians and delegates of Athens in Sparta for other purposes that though speaking of 
Corinth with the outward purpose of dissuading Sparta from declaring war causes turmoil 
among her allies. Peter John Rhodes argues that this speech ―stresses the Athenians‘ 
ambition and contrasts their energy with Sparta‘s slowness‖ (85). These two speeches 
had the effect of sparking the Peloponnesian War.  
Untersteiner focuses on these two speeches to support his contention that they 
enabled the constitution and the social impact of a people influencing each other. This 
shift has an indelible distinguishing effect on the social intercourse of individuals, 
affecting the way they associate with one another and form social groups. Thus 
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individuals began to stipulate their social conditions, deciding them in a spiritual unity. 
This steady renewal of social affairs, many of which appeared for the first time, created 
problems that originated new ideas, political systems, and philosophical methods that 
stimulate new solutions.  
The power of oratory and rhetoric thus becomes evident, for it provides the only 
way for individuals to manage the social experience they share and that affects them. One 
can clearly see, then, that the predicaments produced by the new organization of social 
existence necessitate novel methods of handling the necessities demanded in this period. 
This new need called for new measures provided by the sophists.   
 
Crisis of the Aristocracy. 
Divided into five parts, the largest section of Untersteiner‘s essay presents the crisis of 
the aristocracy as providing a definite direction toward a new awareness in the Hellenic 
world. This section opens up one of the main points that Untersteiner formulates 
regarding the community-individual dichotomy. Here Untersteiner focuses in particular 
on the gnoseological consequences of community on the aristocracy. The term 
gnoseology, not common in English parlance, must be clarified in order to explicate this 
part of Untersteiner‘s argument. 
More common in Italian rhetoric than in its English counterpart, gnoseology 
appears in place of epistemology. The definitions of both concepts as found in two 
leading dictionaries offer a good starting point for the discussion of the differences 
between the two terms. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as ―philosophy of 
cognition or the cognitive faculties.‖ The Unabridged Merriam-Webster ―the philosophic 
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theory of knowledge: inquiry into the basis, nature, validity, and limits of knowledge.‖ 
By contrast, the OED defines epistemology as ―The theory or science of the method or 
grounds of knowledge,‖ while the Unabridged Merriam-Webster had it as ―the study of 
the method and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity; 
broadly :the theory of knowledge.‖ In Italian, according to DeMauro Paravia dictionary, 
gnoseologia denotes ―parte della filosofia che si occupa della natura e dei limiti della 
conoscenza umana | dottrina, teoria della conoscenza enunciata da un dato filosofo o da 
una determinata corrente di pensiero: g. empiristica, g. kantiana,‖ meaning the part of 
philosophy that deals with nature and the limits of human knowledge, as well as the 
doctrine or theory of knowledge as stated by a particular current of thought, for example 
empiristic gnoseology, Kantian gnoseology. These definitions identify the basic shades of 
meaning between the two words.  
Although both concepts denote philosophical theories of knowledge, the terms 
differ in the scope of their meaning. The basic distinction, I believe, lies in the grounds of 
knowledge covered by each term: epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge that 
deals with episteme, 
1
 which, according to the OED denotes ―Scientific knowledge, a 
system of understanding,‖ and to The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and 
Cultural Criticism, indicates ―scientific or philosophical knowledge—wisdom‖ (Childers 
(97). Gnosis, on the other hand, means knowledge in a more general sense, and that is the 
area of gnoseology. Therefore, gnoseology includes epistemology under its broader 
definition, much like romanticism includes transcendentalism and Gothicism, so that not 
                                                          
1
 In contemporary critical theory, particularly structuralist and poststructuralist, episteme has acquired a 
more expansive and complex meaning, which I do not explore because it is not relevant to the context 
being discussed here.  
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all gnoseology is epistemology in the same way that not all Romanticism is 
transcendentalism or Gothicism. This difference shows the realm of analysis of sophistry 
versus that of philosophy. However, although arguably for philosophy in traditional 
terms, epistemology is a kind of gnoseology. Another way of looking at this gradation is 
to think of it in these terms: gnoseology is to epistemology as enthymeme is to syllogism. 
While the premises of the syllogism are certain, those of the enthymeme, a rhetorical 
syllogism popularized by Aristotle, are not. Ultimately, the distinction lies specifically in 
Italy, where epistemology refers exclusively to that branch of gnoseology that addresses 
scientific knowledge, or even more distinctively, the philosophy of science. This 
differentiation also calls attention to the subtle nuances not only of different languages 
but also of the theories of knowledge of various cultures; I believe that the English 
speaking world would benefit from such a distinction and will develop this notion in 
Chapter Five.  
In terms of the use that Untersteiner makes of the word, the relationship between 
the aristocratic man and his relationship with the community creates an idiosyncratic 
gnoseological situation. A regulated life with firm customs delimits the desires of 
individuals and, therefore, to the their self-actualization; however, individuals began to 
question tradition based on the social events that saw those of noble birth as fluctuating 
between innovatory self-determination and a yielding to community traditional roles. As 
the aristocrats lost their place as the sole members of the community, the role of the 
individual as a gnoseological and ethical entity became a problem. Werner Jaeger 
explains,  
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The Athenian state . . . made every free-born citizen of Athenian descent consider 
himself a member of the Attic community, and qualified him to serve it. This was 
simply an extension of the idea of kinship through blood, but now the community 
was composed of the members of one city, not the members of a few noble 
families. That was the only possible basis for the city-state . . . [placing] a new 
emphasis on individual personality. (287) 
 
Because it comes into question, the social condition of individuals in this period can more 
accurately be described, or perhaps more accurately in Italy, as falling within the realm of 
gnoseology, occurring within the cognition of the individuals involved, who began 
questioning the aristocratic position as divinely ordained through lineage.  
This challenging of tradition proves crucial to Untersteiner‘s argument because 
compliance with community beliefs gave way to a pioneering autonomy during this time. 
Relativism inevitably unleashed itself over the Hellenic world, for beliefs held onto for 
centuries were now being disputed, opening up a space for individual will, a space that 
proved threatening to and accelerated the degeneration of the aristocracy, as individual 
freedom diverged from the confines set by a universal concept.  
As a result of the pervasive relativism, the aristocracy latched on to eternal ideas 
in a desperate attempt to retain its power. The values that the aristocracy recovered and 
exhorted do not translate easily in modern terms. Two fundamental political principles 
are the concepts of αιδώρ, or aidos, and δίκη or dike. Αιδώρ translates as reverence or 
respect for others; its meaning emerges from the personification of the goddess of shame, 
modesty, and humility. Albrecht Dihle explains that it can be defined as ―a collective or 
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prospective conscience which persuades [hu]man to apply the moral standards of 
his[/her] society to a situation where he [or she] has to act‖ (23). This function can make 
it ―the principal obstacle for any action whatsoever, since it makes a [hu]man aware and, 
perhaps, afraid of the ensuing reactions to his[/her] deed and of other discomforts that 
may possibly result from it‖ (23—24). Therefore, αιδώρ may prevent individuals from 
acting at all, despite their being obliged to do so, for it offers appealing justifications to 
remain inactive, supporting the ―indolence and timidity of human nature‖ (24). Δίκη or 
dike loosely translated as justice, is usually considered the leading Greek virtue. Again, 
expressing the full worth of the concept proves beyond the scope of this dissertation and 
has been the subject of many studies in itself, among which Eric Havelock‘s The Greek 
Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in Plato. These concepts, 
nevertheless, represent the basis of aristocratic society in opposition to νόμοι (nomoi), 
which can translate as law but that the Greeks used for ―traditional customs‖ (Woodruff 
114). The concept of νόμοι became the codeword for the common people. Broader still, 
the concepts of harmony and philanthropy were attitudes and motivations of great 
importance in aristocratic thought. Untersteiner assumes knowledge of these terms in his 
audience so he does not define them nor transliterate them. Harmonia expresses ―the 
principle of natural division into ruling and ruled‖ (Wood and Wood 163). Untersteiner 
points out that these concepts share a social foundation based on a collective experience 
that evolves into an abstraction.  
By expressing an eternal and therefore ideal essence of the human being, the 
aristocratic society generates a collective entity that serves as a creative force and a limit, 
both an inspiration and a constraint. Jaeger again explains,  
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Only at this stage of spiritual development are such problems as those of freedom 
and authority, or education for citizenship and education for leadership, conceived 
and answered, and only at this stage do they acquire their full urgency as 
moulders of men‘s destiny. They do not arise in primitive societies, in herd-
communities, or family-communities where there is no conception of the power of 
the human mind. (288) 
 
The community, therefore, is a social phenomenon in need of interpretation, an 
interpretation that the sophists alone would offer. The aristocracy latched on to anything 
at this point as a desperate attempt to retain its power.  
Religiosity is one of the ways in which the aristocracy contributes to the 
consciousness of the community. Untersteiner points to Pindar once again, who as the 
champion of the political and ethical ideals of the aristocracy, was apt to imbue his work 
with Apollonism. This uncommon term refers to a one of two instincts, the other being 
Dyonisism, and denotes a ―state of the human mind,‖ as Maximillian Mügge explains, on 
which the development of art, a ―pure and direct [state] of Art,‖ depends: ―The 
Apollonian instinct is a sort of dream of beauty‖ (105). Michael Haar explains that it 
appeared in the ―Greek post-Socratic decadence after Homer‖ (168). Haar develops this 
concept further and explains that in these states, art takes hold of the individual ―as a 
force of nature,‖ further adding that ―the idea that Apollonism as ‗will to measure, to 
simplicity, to submission to rule and concept‘ imposed itself on the Greeks after a long 
struggle: it had to be conquered and secured by them ‗in the struggle against their own 
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Asiaticism,‘ against the ‗taste for the measureless, for the complex, for the uncertain, for 
the horrible‖ (163). This notion fits naturally with Untersteiner‘s contention that gods and 
heroes become ethical concepts of universal validity to which individuals should aspire 
and with which the aristocrats are naturally endowed. The individual can perfect himself 
within the universality of a type, yet Pindar proclaims that the universal is the aristocratic 
γένορ (genos), the bloodline. This universal aristocratic γένορ subsumed the many within 
unity, despite the dichotomy of the individual versus the community. However, under this 
conception, arête could not be carried out for it remained within the limits of the 
aristocratic world since the individual would have to act even without the support of the 
community. 
The shift took time, for, as Untersteiner argues, the decline of the aristocracy was 
merely apparent. In fact, despite these innovative currents, the population was inclined 
towards ancient traditions that granted the aristocracy superiority and competence as the 
leaders of the people. The idea of equality, though alluring, did not seem to fall within the 
realm of the possible. Therefore, the aristocrats, by grasping onto certain eternal ideas, 
retained their power, reaching a paradoxical situation in which they effectively became 
the leaders of democracy on one hand while continuing to operate both as the official 
party and in secret societies on the other. Ian Worthington supports this view, stating that 
―[a]ristocratic families continued to use their family ties and friendships to gain 
influence, and thus continued to dominate politics‖ (256). The aristocracy, then, 
assimilates democracy in a new society that has a broadened circle of privileged 
individuals. However, the concept of community remains and expands from the 
aristocratic spirituality within the democratic epoch.  
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This notion of unity in the bloodline of a γένορ survives notwithstanding the 
decline of the aristocracy due to a transformation. The relationship between human 
beings and their γένορ extended to all people within a community, and the universal state 
replaces the Delphic and aristocratic universal. Physis becomes the primordial essence of 
human beings. The universal value of the community and the problem of individual 
abilities remain apparent to historians, such as Aristotle, but the collective ambition is 
wide enough not to be surpassed by any individual conception. The collective, then, ends 
up dimming individualism, although political struggles and the intensity of passions 
revive the issue which is hindered by the universal idea.  
Untersteiner then touches on the role of war, to which he will devote an entire 
section later on in the essay, in presenting the problem of individual responsibility before 
the people, yet no open controversy emerged, for the individual remained within the 
universality of the community. Still in the second half of the fifth century, the aristocracy 
is suspicious of prominent characters, whose individualism is targeted by poets such as 
Phrynichus and Aristophanes and who are still conceived as ―types.‖ Jaeger explains,  
 
Greek reflection on the nature of education lays great stress on the concepts of 
ηςπορ [tupos, type] and ηςποςν [tupoun, types], even when the spontaneous 
individual factor in this process is strongly felt, as by the sophists or by Plato. 
This concept is the heritage of the early aristocratic ideal of education. Needless 
to say, the content of the later Platonic ideal type of human personality differed 
greatly from that of the early aristocratic world; but the education process as such 
was still visualized in the same terms of moulding. (422)  
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Social life, then, for Untersteiner, fuels an interest in human typology, for features of this 
typology define the main forces that act in the complex world of humanity. Therefore, 
this age does not reach the overall concept of ―character‖ although it identifies the 
elements that constitute it. The universal and the individual flounder, and aristocratic 
spirituality remains to be surpassed.  
 Untersteiner‘s argument then points toward the shaping of individual autonomy 
that occurs at the origins of democratic thinking and, by extension, sophistry. This novel 
and explicitly political conception of the social order raised doubts and questions. 
Cynthia Farrar elaborates on this point, arguing that, ―All personal qualities and aims 
were politicized and converted into properties of—or seen in relation to—the community 
as a whole. Aristocratic influence and values were expressed in democratic terms‖ (28). 
This gradual shift calls to mind the mythological types of human character that were 
being left behind at this point but that continued to live on in a more humanistic 
interpretation of social life. Untersteiner argues that sophistry developed because the 
sophists had to explain to the people what was happening, so this process played a huge 
role in the formation of the social foundation from which the sophistic movement 
emerged. Nevertheless, despite the apparent changes in historical terms, Untersteiner 
does not find significant psychological and gnoseological differences in the typology of 
Greek human existence.    
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Sophistical Theories Regarding Community and Individual 
Untersteiner explores the theories of the sophists regarding community and individual in 
the second section of his discussion of the crisis of the aristocracy. In this view, 
Protagoras tackles the contradictory between type and individual, between universal and 
particular human being, as a problem that needs to be resolved urgently by constructing a 
dialectic of human gnoseology based on the terms posed by social reality. As ―the 
measure of all things,‖ the human being masters for him/herself the knowableness of 
reality contradictory as it may be. This gap can be closed through a relativistic 
phenomenalism of the individual when the knower transforms experiences free of value 
into experiences with value. Therefore, the individual knower becomes the representative 
of the interest of the community, which is the total sum of individuals of certain 
category—doctors, farmers, orators, sophists, and others—united, gnoseologically 
speaking, by the coherence of relative knowableness of a definite experience. This 
revolutionary view posits that only the collective human being, the human being in 
general, the type is able to perfect the experiences of individual welfare. 
 As a result, in the evolution of civilization, the state of perfection is achieved 
when the life of the polis is held up by δίκη (dike, justice) and αιδώρ (aidos, mutual 
respect), ethical motivations that also make up the πολιηική απεηή (politke arête, political 
virtue) of the aristocracy, that bring individuals to unity. For Protagoras, then, all the 
expressions of life are contained within the paradigm of a universalizing leveling 
concept. Compared to the aristocratic position that had renewed the socio-political 
practice, Protagoras innovates because he transposes a compound of scattered and 
instinctive experiences into a coherent system, translating the social phenomenon of the 
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annihilation of individual for collective interest into a philosophical concept defined as 
the ―major possibility for knowledge.‖  
The philosophical and rationalistic idea of community is a fundamental issue for 
other sophists such as Antiphon and Hippias. They theorize that the concrete actions of 
individuals become the universality of κοινοί νόμοι (koinoi nomoi, common laws). This 
conception of universal laws, identical for everyone, is clear when the individual physis 
recognizes a universal and essential physis above itself, according to an anonymous 
treatise Περι νόμωι (About Laws). Such a rationalistic solution had to clash with all the 
difficulties of universal concepts and with reality that could not be reduced to conceptual 
uniformity, as felt by Lycophron in particular who must have critiqued the idea to deny it 
any possible ethics. As a result, the collective unity of individuals is an ideal more than a 
reality.  
Sophistry concerns itself with typical characterology, which is always an 
expression of the universal. The OED defines characterology as ―The science of 
character, esp. of its development, types, and individual differences.‖ Hippias, who took 
on the problem of character, extricates it from the good/evil antithesis, as does Prodicus 
with Heracles, which illustrates the education of Heracles (Ramelli 62). According to 
these two sophists, the character-type is created by that very antithesis, from which 
emerges the distinctly political typology of aristocratic spirituality.  
For the sophists, however, the will determines the character of the individual, 
though in different ways. Albrecht Dihle examines the ideas that the Greeks held about 
human action, explaining that according to the Greeks,  
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. . . moral freedom is guaranteed by the free intellectual activity of the human 
mind, which leads, however, to a proper insight into the immutable laws that 
determine the whole of reality. On the other hand, awareness of one‘s own 
intellectual deficiency as well as of one‘s inescapable duty towards human affairs 
seems to be essential in free and responsible human activities. Apparently, man 
has to rely on the rational order of being and on his intellect, which is supposed to 
be able to evaluate, according to that order, the means and end of action. On the 
other hand, man has to be fully conscious of his own intellectual deficiencies, for 
he is doomed to become a part of that order through his action despite his inability 
to perceive the whole of reality. This universal dilemma was particularly strongly 
felt in Greece. (47) 
 
Untersteiner points to Protagoras for an elaboration of this concept. For Protagoras, the 
stronger logos constructs, through an act of will, the ethical values of human community.  
This view appears in a recent treatment of this sophist. In Protagoras and the 
Challenge of Relativism, Ugo Zilioli, fellow of the University of Parma, underscores the 
autonomy of the individual in the ethical life of the polis, arguing that ―In the light of the 
understanding of Protagoras‘ perceptual relativism . . . the individual should be taken to 
be fully autonomous in his own relativistic knowledge‖ (103). Nevertheless, ultimately 
Protagoras views ethical rules as being ―the mediated expression (through a communal 
discussion)‖ of the reaction of a group of people taking part in the debating process of an 
ethical matter (105). The will, to continue with Untersteiner, in the moment of decision, 
bolsters the high point of individual action for Gorgias, as well as Prodicus. Finally, 
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Critias renders the individual, according to his will, as imposing social ethics upon the 
universality of law. Therefore, despite their mixed solutions, the bearing of the will factor 
is common to all the sophists, political life having perceived its effectiveness, but it is 
also a difficult problem, necessary for the dictation of the universal both in the name of 
the community and of the individual. 
Untersteiner concludes this section by stating that the fundamental attitude of 
aristocratic thought hinged on the community-individual alternative and therefore on its 
typical characterology. Due to its persistence within social and political practice, this 
attitude had to force itself on the speculative thought of the sophists, who created a 
universal concept of socio-political experience and rendered individual human attitudes 
effective as typical paradigms for individuals to function within social life.  
 
Relativistic Experience of an Aristocratic Society Seeking to Reconstruct Its Ideals. 
One of the primary areas of congruity within sophistic thought lies within the relativistic 
dissolution of values. Hellenic humanism reached this conclusion in different ways. 
Untersteiner touches on the relations of travelers who comparing Hellenic with barbarian 
laws and customs could not but reach the conclusion that what were once considered 
eternal and indestructible traditions held no value in any other place. Nevertheless, he 
considers this crucial influence to be a predominantly cultural rather than social 
phenomenon.  
 Untersteiner considers the social events, which caused great upheaval, to have 
been overwhelming, even to Pindar. Reason or the νοςρ (nous) becomes a problem under 
the thrust of political contrasts, ceasing to be absolute. With the advent of the democratic 
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order, the rational possibility of determining the truth of things within the realm of 
political experience disappears. As a result, positive law has no value.  
 The consequences of this theoretical position developed in two ways. The 
inflexible and unitary νόμορ (nomos), on which the democratic struggle against the 
Persians had hinged and had met the fiercest opposition from the aristocracy, raised the 
doubt regarding the validity of aristocratic laws. According to Josiah Ober in his Mass 
and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People, this 
event promoted the development of democracy. While no single cause can be provided, 
he asserts that experience of the Persian Wars ―helped to hasten the evolution of the 
democratic order‖ (83). Furthermore, Untersteiner continues, the aristocrats were altering 
laws arbitrarily, molding them according to necessity yet claiming these laws as 
expressions of divine will. The relativism of customs and, by extension, the laws inherent 
within them, can be accepted, according to Pindar, since the revolutions of the time 
confirm it, as long as the divine continues to be recognized.  
 The discovery of the relativism of the law, so acutely felt and accentuated by the 
aristocrats, produced an additional result. If a law was variable within a people and 
between peoples, ethics also lost its foundation that human beings considered 
indisputable. W.K.C. Guthrie describes this time as one when people  
 
. . . are entering a world in which not only sweet and bitter, hot and cold, exist 
merely in belief, or by convention, but also justice and injustice, right and wrong. 
Doubts about the order and stability of the physical world as a whole, and the 
dethronement of divinity in favour of chance and natural necessity as causes, were 
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seized upon by upholders of the relativity of ethical conceptions and became part 
of the base of their case. (59) 
 
To grapple this difficulty, the aristocracy elaborates the concept of ―unwritten laws,‖ 
which can be aristocratic laws of sacral origin as much as those laws valid for all people, 
founded on the universality of nature, as extended by the favored cosmopolitanism of the 
aristocracy. Untersteiner views this move against the relativism of the written laws as yet 
another attempt of the aristocracy to grasp on to conservative currents.  
The sophists retrieved and offered nuanced interpretations for this social problem 
formulated by an aristocracy attempting to save itself, as evidenced in the doctrines of 
Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and Antiphon. In particular, Untersteiner calls attention to 
the anxiety of a return to ―the ancestral constitution‖ (πάηπιορ πολιηεία or patrios 
politeia) welcomed by Thrasymachus and proclaimed as valid by virtue of the divine 
nature. The sophistic age, in its moments of spiritual return to the aristocratic world, 
translates the ancient idea of unwritten laws according to an antidemocratic socio-
political program. The relativism and the attempts to resolve it in a spiritual manifestation 
free of quarrels find their primordial schemes within the struggle of rearranging the 
aristocratic consciousness and ideals.  
 
The Aristocrats and the Problem of Teaching Virtue. 
The teachableness of virtue is among the most demanding social problems faced by the 
sophistic age. This question was also raised by the aristocracy in crisis. The possibility of 
teaching virtue is antithetical to the aristocratic idea that virtue be ―by nature,‖ as Pindar 
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often proclaims. Hippias offers an explicit polemic to this conception. Nevertheless, 
despite the deep conviction that natural abilities are decisive within the teaching of virtue, 
the recognition that bad company can bring to moral ruin and that instruction cannot 
make someone wise once again leads to the dispersion of educational values so dear to 
the aristocrats. The subversion of the value of social classes is such that the aristocrat 
began doubting the very foundation of απεηή (arête or virtue), placing, therefore, the 
problem of its teachableness in genuine dramatic turmoil, for admitting its possibility 
would place in question the very conception of aristocracy. 
The political drama of an entire segment of society becomes a challenging 
gnoseological problem in the thought of the sophists. However, Untersteiner reminds the 
reader that sophistic education, while based on the development of individual rather than 
inherited abilities, nonetheless applies primarily to the leaders of rather than the common 
people, so the former aristocratic problem returns in a new form, as, in general, the kind 
of education in vogue in the fifth century BCE was directed towards the life of the 
nobles. Catherine Osborne discusses this paradox, arguing that ―the Sophists offered an 
expensive private education, yet the market for it thrived best in a democratic culture; 
they presented themselves as great facilitators of democratic procedures, yet their effect 
was to secure advantages for the well-to-do‖ (113). The social pressure of the educational 
problem caused a clash between aristocratic education and a politico-democratic 
conception, one of the shaping causes of the nomos-physis controversy.  
The reaction to this controversy emerges as one of the most prominent 
contributions of the sophists, who according to Jaeger all taught political arête and were 
―the inventors of intellectual culture and of the art of education which aims at producing 
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it‖ (293). The role of the development of democracy once again emerges as crucial in the 
emergence of sophistry. The debates about whether virtue could be taught ―were 
implicitly debates about whether the upper classes should have to share political power 
with lower classes‖ (Rawson 218). The way to political power in a democracy was based 
on rhetorical abilities.  
 
The Aristocratic Crisis and Constitutional Conceptions of Sophistry. 
The stimuli provided by the social drama of the aristocracy within a politically won world 
are indeed numerous. The aristocracy supplied themes proposed not only by its social 
drama but also of thought already elaborated by a particular social, political, and 
philosophical experience of a former time. These influences emerge in Pythagoreanism, 
which was of sharply aristocratic politics. Thus, the contradictory presence of both 
oligarchic and democratic sophists loses its peculiarity. 
 Untersteiner considers the constitutional drama of the second half of the fifth 
century BCE to be fully driven by the power of the aristocratic political ethos, so 
sophistry suffers under the dichotomy tyranny (or aristocracy) versus democracy and 
especially the more recent sophists fluctuate between these two political conceptions.  
 
Sophistic Problems in the Political Struggles of the Fifth Century 
Untersteiner finds that the social and political themes were set by the aristocracy because 
it had to deal with the problem of granting citizens rights that did not flow logically from 
the traditions of their society. Original possibilities remain, influenced by new forms 
established on the unrest of the past. The problem of the individual was pressing at the 
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time of political struggles and revolutions, which stimulate the inventiveness ready to 
evolve fully, also because political choices call for analytical consideration to warrant an 
autonomous decision. Democracy favors θςμοόρ [thumos, emotional impulses, soul], 
which is the catalyst to independence, as Untersteiner finds in Hippocrates‘ De aere aquis 
et locis, which is often considered the earliest occurrence of the nomos/physis distinction. 
Untersteiner points once again to the problem of the individual, this time in 
relation to the state. The favored constitutional form is the one that benefits the most, and 
the criterion of utility may lead to indifference. Here Untersteiner finds the beginning of 
legal principles conceived as benefitting a particular self-interest so that it appears 
reduced to economy. Therefore, the constitutional problem is an effect of social life that 
concerns all citizens. The notion of constitution began defining itself in its potential types 
only with the democracy of Cleisthenes, who definitively determined the principle of 
ιζοννμία or isonomia. 
Isonomia denotes equality in front of the law. Wood and Wood identify this 
concept as ―the principle of political equality‖ (179). Josiah Ober calls it the ―political 
slogan of Cleisthenes‘ reform‖ (74). Possibly coined by Athenian aristocrats as an anti-
tyrannical catchphrase, the term denotes ―equality of participation in making decisions 
(laws) that will maintain and promote equality and that will bind all citizens equally‖ 
(75). Isonomia can be considered as the opposite of the political principle harmonia, 
which I defined above, and became the ―expressive symbol of a democratic constitution‖ 
(Wood and Wood 163—64).  
However, Untersteiner continues, these constitutional forms, though finally 
defined, did not immediately pose the specific problem of political programs and parties. 
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Sure enough, immediately after the Persian wars, the Athenian democracy was stirred 
once again by an unstable, agitated, and unequal trend until the second half of the fourth 
century. This situation presented the problem of the relativism of forms of government. 
The political struggles intensified. The contrast between political factions caused the need 
for political doctrines. Within their clashes, however, the problem of the best form of 
government found no solution, causing the perception of the practical insolubility 
regarding the best form of government. The concept of profit, utility, or usefulness 
thereby dissipated every theoretical essential inherent in any constitution.  
All the discussions that, starting at the time of the Peloponnesian war, were raised 
regarding the problem of the forms of constitutions, both in terms of their essence and in 
relation to their genesis, were imposed by social conditions. The sophists take on as 
unavoidable the study of the political event, the validity of law, and the meaning of 
constitutions because of the constitutional drama of Athens, which, after its victory over 
Persia, had amplified the play of forces that affected its fate. The incursion of new needs, 
such as maritime politics, works to create a particular type of government, almost as 
though it were a natural organization. The author of the Constitution of Athenians 
resolves a political circumstance when he discovers the coherence of democracy despite 
hating it, according to Untersteiner. Because it turns into a decisive factor urging on 
consciousness, sociality becomes a political phenomenon that solicits a practice as much 
as a theory. 
Untersteiner views not only the theorizing on the forms of governments but also 
their giving of contrasting answers of the sophists as implicit proof of the contradictory 
nature of reality. Otherwise, an identical intention would not have reached conflicting 
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conclusions. The play of political parties relativized the concept of truth and error. 
Untersteiner points towards Aristophanes and Euripides.  
 
War 
The problem of profit or utility clearly demonstrates the meaning of war, so that for the 
first time during the Peloponnesian war, the economy formed the generative force of this 
social phenomenon, which also brought the economy to a critical condition—a matter 
suffered by all and therefore to be interpreted. Sophistry, which carried out most of its 
activity during this dramatic historical period, noticed the action produced by social life 
in its pathological expression of an armed conflict. The problem attracted the sophists all 
the more because they were, usually, opposed to wars.   
 When induced by profit, human conduct will at some point become problematic 
due to the relativism that the concept entails and that occurs when seen in economic 
terms. However, profit is not the only element of the dissolution of values due to wars. 
The justness that, before the Persian wars, was founded on self-control and was therefore 
the consequence of individual temperament, began to lose that base that originated from 
the political spirituality of the aristocrats. As he mentions earlier, Untersteiner recalls the 
problematic of great political figures of the time who act according to criteria that shun 
traditional norms of right and wrong. Further, the war had laid the premises for an 
inversion of values, and the struggles between parties had become a power that behaved 
harshly both in internal politics and international relations. This play of interests ended up 
resulting in new ideas. The culmination of these contrasts occurred during the 
Peloponnesian war, especially in Attica, where the military operations caused a clash 
 138 
 
between the conservative people of the countryside and the progressive ones of the cities. 
Therefore, Untersteiner views the war as responsible for class spirit and party that led to 
opposite political theories, of which the sophists became the representatives.  
 Furthermore, the immediate, almost abstract, contrast among laws and among 
customs dramatized within a social reality in which antithesis appears as the fundamental 
norm, brought to an exacerbated obviousness by the narrow confines of the polis, an ideal 
location to pinpoint opposites and signal their incompatibility. With Pericles, the class 
war that had exploded fatally within aristocratic regimes had led to the triumph of the 
proletariat, which caused the most paradoxical reactions from the adversaries. In these 
conditions of high social tension and an unstable balance, theory appeared spontaneously 
until reaching the ideal of Antiphon, who wanted to see the class war to end, as well as 
the clash between lineages, such as the fatal one between Hellenics and barbarians. 
 Untersteiner views this universal anxiety that reached cosmopolitanism as 
emerging from the dramatic anguish of the Peloponnesian war. Cosmopolitanism—which 
is in the very nature of the sophistic mindset and that was theorized by Hippias and 
Antiphon—conveys a very complex moment for the Hellenics and their social needs, to 
the point that not all sophists were able to comprehend its importance. To support this 
view, Untersteiner points toward the Hellenic/barbarian antithesis that had originated 
under Darius with the founding of the Persian Empire and materialized with the Persian 
wars between 490 and 479 BCE. A political problem had emerged from this antithesis: 
the opposition between tyranny, which was subjugated by Persia, and Hellenic 
democracy. Untersteiner finds the issue of cosmopolitanism in Antiphon, who notes that 
the law did not correspond to the requirements of ιζοννμία or isonomia. Isonomia, which 
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Guthrie renders as ―equality before the law‖ (126), required contrasts to be surpassed 
without residuals. The sophist seems to say that the absolute value of isonomia rather 
than cause the Hellenic-barbarian opposition, which had in fact happened, had actually 
assuaged it. Isonomia became the abolishment of all law to restore the natural physis, in 
terms of human and universal sociality, and can thus be called cosmopolitanism.  
 The implications of Untersteiner‘s argument are still open to debate. While some 
scholars, such as Nestle, Havelock, and Guthrie, credit Antiphon with a full-blown theory 
of the unity, equality, and even brotherhood of all humankind, others stress the biological 
emphasis of Antiphon‘s argument and are unconvinced of its cosmopolitanism 
implications. Gerard Pendrick, however, finds the cosmopolitanism of Antiphon‘s 
argument hard to deny, for the argument ―affirms the natural similarity of all human 
beings, while simultaneously devaluing the importance of cultural differences among 
them‖ (355). Therefore, Pendrick deems Antiphon‘s Fragment 44 as ―evidence for an 
embryonic form of cosmopolitanism in the later fifth century‖ (355). Untersteiner also 
holds this view. 
 A particular situation evolved in the consciousness of the Hellenics, despite the 
concurrence of other social events,
2
 causing a social problem that reconnected to the 
cultural κοινή (koine: common or shared), due to the collaboration of Greeks and non-
Greeks in the age of rhapsodes and following until Darius. Κοινή refers to the cultural 
popular form of Greek that appeared in the fifth century BCE when Attic and Ionic 
started approximating each other and was not surprising given the power of Athens over 
the Ionians (Andrados 177). Untersteiner proposes that this κοινή, now relived as a 
                                                          
2
 See Translation ―The War‖ section. 
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question posed by social conditions caused by the Peloponnesian war—which intensified 
the class wars—aspired to internal, as well as external, peace, and established itself as a 
great idea that actualized only after Alexander.  
 However, Untersteiner views the Hellenic-barbarian antithesis as dramatic in the 
cultural and social world of the fifth century, even while patriotism caused an uproar that 
stifled contrary views. Cosmopolitanism amounted to a problem that occurred during the 
Persian wars and became a theoretical issue at the time of the sophists, who were 
determined by the social imperative of the class war. While celebrating the triumph of 
Hellenic patriotism, Aeschylus‘ The Persians also presents the unsolvable controversy of 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism, of the individual and the universal. 
 The class war entailed cosmopolitanism also in another way. The aristocrats 
refrained from attending the assembly, not wanting to participate in public life where the 
demos predominated, contributing to cosmopolitism by means of this abstentionism. 
Once again, the aristocratic turmoil contributes to a complex social circumstance. 
Untersteiner concludes that the problems brought on by the war and picked up by the 
sophists cause a critical dissolution of values which create universal social experiences.  
 
Problems Raised by Religion. 
The Persian wars unsettled traditional religion, making it utterly problematic. The 
religious organization of the polis faded when the wars made religion subordinate to the 
ideas of state so as to favor the freedom of the human spirit and fix the attention of the 
people on the physical world. Religion thus became a social issue, so, for example, the 
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Athenians used it in terms of their pan-Hellenic project. From the political point of view, 
religion becomes tinged with rationalism, beginning its dissolution. 
 The denial of the transcendent was the critical movement within religion that 1) 
does not concern itself with afterlife, 2) conceives divine forms in an aesthetic way, 3) 
faced with sudden mutations within historical events, does not see a safe divine line of 
action in the order of things, and 4) does not respond to the new needs that appeared after 
the collapse of the ancient social and political order. A true corruption of the sacred and, 
therefore, its outcome in the realm of relativism spread during the pentecontaetia. 
 Even internally, the religious phenomenon contradicts and dissolves itself. 
Untersteiner points to the double value of the sacred, which can certainly operate in both 
good and evil without making this twofold conclusion the foundation of the religious 
phenomenon. This lack of a standpoint toward religious values indicates a distinct 
moment in human knowledge. Gorgias‘ dramatic critique of knowledge starts in the 
antithetical ambiguity of reasons that are also sacred though transferred in the analytical 
sphere.  
 The circumstance of an unsolvable antithesis is characteristic of the sacred, but 
Untersteiner pursues it in what he considers to be an even more significant domain. The 
law is recognized as duplicitous: proclaimed as sacred and immutable on one hand, yet 
viewed as human or even secular on the other and therefore subject to change. These 
opposites were thus confounded in practice. This ambivalence, which forms the 
foundation of the concept‘s relativism, derives from the twofold meaning that both 
θεζμόρ (thesmos: institution) and νομόρ (nomos: law) can take of sacred and secular law. 
Drawing on Ostwald, Ian Morris elucidates that thesmos “implied ‗something imposed 
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by an external agency, conceived as standing apart and on a higher plane than the 
ordinary,‘ while the fifth-century word, nomos, implied something ‗motivated less by the 
authority of the agent who imposed it than by the fact that it is regarded and accepted as 
valid by those who live under it‘‖ (53). Untersteiner states the Greek experiences in 
general have always been sacred and secular in the past, illustrating with the account of 
Hellanicus, who identifies Physis with Adrasteia, the ancient pre-Hellenic goddess and 
mother, ordainer of the inflexible laws of existence. Sophistry took on the problematic 
nomos and physis that fluctuated within the social consciousness of the religious human 
being. 
 Particularly in the second half of the fifth century, another religious occurrence 
contributed in presenting urgent problems for sophistic thinking. Greek religion absorbed 
the foreign religions that percolated right after the Persian wars and which are welcomed 
by the masses while the upper classes were inclined to a more universal rationalization 
and elaboration. Both displayed dissatisfaction with old forms and a search for new 
resolution. Traditional values, however, due to this comparison of religious forms, 
suffered decisive blows, so the concepts of just, true, and others, once again proved 
problematic. Untersteiner finds the most direct reverberation of this religious movement, 
which could have easily slid into aberrant forms of superstition, in Antiphon‘s 
Interpretation of Dreams, which is an expression of a relativistic and rationalistic 
mindset, once again demonstrating the imperative that the sophists felt towards problems 
within social life. 
 Generally, Hellenic religion posed the problem of the individual in many ways. 
The Homeric human similar to a god soared high with his marvelous creations within a 
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free society. Because individual initiative is crucial in foreign beliefs, these convert to 
exultation of human beings and manifestations of intellectualism within Greek land. 
 The forms of religion, whose impassioned impetus created the antithesis to 
reason, to say the least favored the elaboration of rhetoric and sophistic gnoseology. 
Untersteiner asserts that rhetoric is indebted to sacred poetry in terms of the elaboration 
of its stylistic forms and rhetorical figures, transforming them within Hellenic religious 
society and transferring them into the supreme realm of art. Similarly, he attributes the 
pathetic impetus of eloquence of some sophists to the ecstatic passion of orgiastic cults.  
 Hellenic religion also suggested a gnoseological theme. Hellenics believed that 
every word could become a divinity, for language was viewed as the primordial 
revelation by means of the logos, which revealed the divine to humanity by giving 
humans the ability to express it. For the Hellenes, the logoi and the gods were many. The 
significance of logos thus developed in two ways: 1) the rationalistic way, which brought 
to the fore the contrast between unity and plurality implied by logos, so that its 
ambivalence became apparent; and 2) the naturalistic and metaphysical way, which made 
it the receptacle of the most radical reality of things. Here Greek philosophical-religious 
etymology, when considering the word physis, thinks it expresses essence, of which it 
claims to be the name, as seen in Heraclitus and Aeschylus. From the reflections of the 
multiple possibilities within the nature of logos, Untersteiner identifies two sophistic 
speculations. For one, the Gorgian doctrine of logos, in its ambivalence according to the 
developments in Helen and the treaty On Nature or On Non-Being, determined the 
persuasive effectiveness of logos in keeping with the irrational ways of religious 
experience. Scott Consigny addresses this very issue in Gorgias: Sophist and Artist, 
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stating that ―Gorgias repudiates the project of apprehending the truth in On Not-Being 
though the artificial categories of the Eleatics. Insofar as we accept these categories as 
real, we will remain separated from true experience, for every rational account of 
objective truth is false or deceptive‖ (46). Untersteiner‘s other example is the rationalistic 
close examination of Prodicus, which starting with the etymology of the word, its physis, 
turns logos into nomos, to be found in its every manifestation, read synonym. Schiappa 
develops this point, writing that ―Prodicus emphasized correct speech (orthoepeia)—a 
clear example of the new rationalistic approach to logos‖ (Protagoras 79). 
 Hellenic religiosity, then, exerted considerable influence on sophistry, also by 
way of tragedy, a social phenomenon in its origins as much as in its manifestation within 
high Attic poetry, which brought to the suffering of the tragic and the unsolvable 
dissension between human beings and the gods, since Dionysian religion displays the 
contradictions of the world. Swartz comments on this connection, stating that art 
―contributed to the spiritual and political life of the community,‖ an example of which is 
Greek tragedy, and that the purpose of catharsis was ―to purge the emotion of an audience 
of its socially unhealthy elements and to reconnect the audience to the human condition, 
as defined by the status quo of the community‖ (25). To Untersteiner, however, tragedy 
and its religious-popular origins gave the Hellenes a tragic sense of existence, an 
essentially sophistic problem, and he considers Gorgias‘ On Not-Being as the social 
experience of tragedy and of the poets in ontological and gnoseological terms. 
 Another social phenomenon with religious undertones is religion itself. As the 
interpreter of authority, religion aims to achieve obedience and discipline from the 
people. According to sophistic thought, the state, which had to have had a genesis, 
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presented itself as created by gods and demigods or heroes, representatives of the very 
first social revolutions but actually operated by human beings, as explained by Protagoras 
and Critias, who gives an unscrupulously explicit view of the religion, understood as a 
human intervention with the most contradictory consequences. Sophistry, then, has 
provided secular interpretations of religious phenomena derived from social life.  
 
The Problem of Techné 
The last issue that Untersteiner considers is the issue of techné, which exerted 
considerable influence on the speculative thought of the sophists. The widespread and 
certain spread of the technai had begun already in the sixth century BCE but that properly 
belongs to the sophistic age. At this time, workers were valued to the point that they 
could come forward and assert themselves as political men, as did Cleon and Hyperbolos, 
who are from the world of δημιοπγοί or demorgoi, which means craftsmen, or literally 
someone who works for the people, as indicated by its root demo-.  
 This event is a sign of a tacit social revolution, causing a gnoseological problem 
for those who stood astonished by this unprecedented occurrence. An assembly made up 
of shoemakers, carpenters, farmers, and the like, to the aristocrats appeared as completely 
incapable of judging political matters. Therefore, the question of the gnoseological value 
of the technai was raised, and in this domain the answers of sophistry are once again 
antithetical. Protagoras implies the devaluation of the technai by demolishing their 
theoretical foundation, at least in regards to personal experience. Similarly, in Antiphon, 
technai corresponds to the relativistic human world before absolute physis.  
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 On the other hand, the technai may have appeared so connected by a rational 
orderliness that they were judged the governing guidelines of life and a sign of progress; 
therefore, Prodicus renders the history of civilization as founded on the progressive 
discovery of the arts, Hippias follows in kind exalting them, and Critias concerns himself 
with knowing the origin of inventions. The social situation takes over the speculative zeal 
of the sophists, who see a theoretical problem and once again tackle it in different ways. 
 
Conclusion 
Untersteiner concludes that sophistry articulated the social conditions of its specific 
historical moment. While he acknowledges that the sophists offered contrasting 
interpretations, he considers them humanists and philosophers of their age, although their 
very humanism kept their way of thinking from becoming dialectic. Ultimately, he views 
the crisis of the aristocracy as most significant, offering the most fruitful site for sophistic 
thought. His closing sentence, in which he calls attention to the philosophical nature of 
the sophistic enterprise, is a distinct challenge to the early and middle—but not late—
Plato. In Phaedrus, Plato‘s last dialogue, Plato gives the sophists some credit, especially 
Isocrates, who is sometimes included among the sophists, stating that, ―There is 
something of philosophy in him.‖ Untersteiner is advancing the same argument. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
―Whoever does not study rhetoric will be a victim of it.‖  
Ancient Greek wall inscription. 
 
The general misrepresentation of the concept of sophistry and of the ideas undergirding 
the movement holds foreboding consequences for Western societies because they not 
only incorrectly represent the cultural and social role of sophistry but also do not 
acknowledge the power that sophistry and its main subject of instruction rhetoric provide 
to societies that deem themselves democratic. By definition, democracy calls on the 
people, the demos, to rule or at least contribute to ruling themselves through rhetorical 
participation. Not acknowledging the (proper) role of sophistry and the importance of 
rhetoric in contemporary social contexts denies citizens both the knowledge and the tools 
needed to participate actively within a democratic society. In this chapter I offer my view 
of sophistry in terms of its rhetorical and pedagogical value, including its implications for 
contemporary society, the university, and relevance to the composition classroom in 
particular. Untersteiner‘s ―new‖ chapter suggests that social conditions are a primary 
cause of human agency and the creation of social formations. Drawing on Untersteiner, I 
question current social conditions and the way in which contemporary rhetorical theory 
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and composition practice relate to these issues. Finally, I argue for a reintegration of 
selected sophistic practices in contemporary composition theory. In the process, I 
speculate upon the connections I see between sophistry and rhetoric and composition, 
positing the composition instructor as a potential modern-day sophist, or what remains 
possible after millennia of scorn begun by Plato.  
 
Pedagogical and Rhetorical Value of Sophistry 
The sophistic movement suggests numerous distinguishing characteristics although it was 
never a coherent and organized movement as such. Despite the numerous differences 
among individual sophists, the sophists shared a number of characteristics that allow a 
modern day definition to be elaborated. Naturally, a distinction between ―good‖ and 
―bad‖ sophists exists today as it did in antiquity. I address this differentiation before 
turning to the similarities that I deem valuable among the sophists.  
 Most human matters can be expressed and practiced in positive and negative 
ways. For example, drugs, food, knowledge, rhetoric, advertising, even water can be used 
or abused to produce positive or negative results. The work practiced by the sophists is no 
exception. Plato himself has Gorgias state, ―[i]t is not the teachers who are bad, nor does 
this mean that the art is responsible or bad, but rather, I think, those who use it 
incorrectly. The argument would be the same in the case of rhetoric‖ (Dillon 61). The 
sophists put their techné to positive and negative uses. Gorgias, for instance, persuaded 
Athens to help his hometown, Leontini in Sicily, against its belligerent neighbor 
Syracuse, leading to the war that eventually weakened Athens. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce 
Herzberg suggest that, ―Perhaps this linkage of Sophistic rhetoric with dangerous 
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statecraft helped to discredit it in the eyes of later thinkers such as Plato, Isocrates, and 
Aristotle, who lived amid the social and political turmoil that followed Athens‘s golden 
age, in which the sophists had dominated‖ (23). Aside from specifics, the sophists 
instructed anyone who could pay their high fees,
1
 thereby positioning themselves as not 
distinguishing between those who would put sophistic techné to good or bad use. In 
addition, their epistemological relativism may be read as disregard for good practice. 
Nevertheless, the sophists also shared qualities, principles, and goals that can hold great 
value for the composition classroom today.  
The sophists and sophistic rhetoric, as such, however, are neither formal nor 
definitive classifications. Then again, classifications in general are always somewhat 
suspect and often reconstructed upon reexamination. One scholar in particular has argued 
against the notion of sophistic rhetoric, calling it ―a mirage.‖ In this early argument, 
Edward Schiappa calls attention to the lack of unifying traits needed to form a sophistic 
coherent whole and the use of the word rhetoric as never having been used by the 
sophists, concluding that it is a ―fiction . . . we can do without‖ (Schiappa ―Oasis‖ 7—
16). Although well-argued, this view did not take account of the similarities between and 
the pioneering contributions of the sophists. Schiappa himself has revised his position 
since, now positing ―sophistic rhetorics‖ as a more useful and accurate denomination for 
the diversity of projects labeled sophistic (Enos 683). Andrea Greenbaum commends 
such ―creative imaginings [for] allow[ing] contemporary scholars to critique certain 
notions of disciplinarity, since the discursive nature of sophistic discourse makes it a 
                                                          
1
 Hakan Tell disputes this view in his recent article ―Wisdom for Sale?‖ and contends that ―factual details 
regarding fees and monetary rewards for instruction is very scant‖ (30).  
 150 
 
creative theoretical tool in which to redefine and explore the epistemological boundaries 
of disciplinary structures‖ (2). These ―creative imaginings‖ that are human categories, 
classifications, and constructs could all be called ―fictions‖ created by communities of 
like-minded peers. Most philosophers, Richard Rorty among them, however, agree that 
we are manipulated by phenomenological forces that are quite ―real.‖ For my purpose, I 
presuppose both human shared realities and a series of shared goals, qualities, and 
congruous objectives in the sophists‘ teachings. 
The most important issue for many sophists was their common goal of 
encouraging arête by sustaining certain practices and methods, which I explore below. 
Most scholars agree that the sophists created the conditions that may lead to virtuous 
results. The English rendition of this concept is virtue or excellence in political affairs. 
One of the primary requirements of political arête is rhetorical dexterity, by which I 
mean the ability to speak/write, think, and read critically, analytically, and evaluatively. 
Although the sophists did not use the word rhetoric to describe what they were teaching, 
they inevitably imparted rhetorical skills, regardless of the appellation used, for these are 
essential components of political arête. In order to be successful in political affairs, an 
individual must be skilled in arguing, have a sound understanding of, and think critically 
about political issues. The sophists teaching methods covered all these requirements, by 
focusing on helping students ―to analyze cases, to think on their feet, to ask probing 
questions, to speak eloquently, and to pose counterarguments to an opponent‘s case‖ 
(Herrick 37). All of these skills are part of rhetorical power. I use the word power 
deliberately to indicate the stakes that are at play in acquiring and having mastery of 
rhetoric, as I discuss below.  
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Other qualities shared by all sophists emerge clearly in numerous more accounts. 
These commonalities appear when one looks at those contributions that the sophists were 
the first to introduce. Werner Jaeger, in his seminal work on Greek paideia, for example, 
declares that sophists were the first to give ―wide publicity and influence to the claim that 
arête should be founded on knowledge‖ (Paideia, Vol I, 289). Furthermore, Jaeger calls 
Isocrates, one if not the greatest educator in Western humanism, a sophist, asserting that 
Isocrates ―defended sophistic education‖ and ―was really a genuine sophist: indeed, it 
was he who brought the sophistic movement in education to its culminating point‖ 
(Paideia, Vol. III, 48). The Cambridge Ancient History includes a section on sophistic 
rhetoric, further judging the lectures and declamations of the most prominent sophists ―as 
the most important single distinguishing mark of the Greek culture of this period‖ 
(Bowman et al 900). Even the authors of a traditional work as this one identify shared 
qualities among the sophists, identifying them as their status as public teachers, their fee-
charging, and their public declamations (900—01). Omar Swartz offers a useful list of 
the commonalities among the sophist, identifying the following six qualities as being 
shared by all the sophists: the teaching of arête, the emphasis on rhetoric, the charging 
for their services, the eristic tendency of their teaching, the tendency to engage in 
displays of epideictic oratory, and their ability to ability to perorate on any subject (68—
69). Apart from the charging for their services, these qualities are all necessary for a 
citizen to engage fully in the political life of a democratic society. As I see it, the sophists 
encouraged political arête through rhetorical practice, the great forerunners of Isocrates. 
The rhetorical value of sophistry is manifold but becomes of primary importance 
in a free society. A democracy entails free speech which requires rhetoric. That the 
 152 
 
sophists, as teachers of rhetoric, appeared at the same time that democracy developed is 
no surprise, for the driving force of democracy, at least in theory, is the inclusion of all 
people in the political process. In order to participate, people must have the skills 
necessary to understand rhetorical power, for whether anyone likes it or not, rhetoric is 
omnipresent and pervasive, affecting every aspect of human interaction, particularly 
those aspects that can control the means of access. I contend that no aspect of human life 
and interaction is free of rhetoric. Friedrich Nietzsche, in his On Rhetoric and Language, 
advocates this position, proffering that,  
 
[i]t is not difficult to prove that what is called ‗rhetorical,‘ as a means of 
conscious art, had been active as a means of unconscious art in language and its 
development. . . . There is obviously no unrhetorical ‗naturalness‘ of language to 
which one could appeal; language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The 
power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with 
respect to each thing . . . is, at the same time, the essence of language; the latter is 
based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of 
things. Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective 
impulse and its acceptance. (21) 
 
Rhetoric, then, is, consciously or unconsciously, a fact of human life, in which 
communication is in effect rhetoric. As Kenneth Burke has noted, rhetoric ―is rooted in 
an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is 
continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation 
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in beings that by nature respond to symbols‖ (Rhetoric 43). In a tyranny or any other 
form of repressive political system, rhetoric, while still existing, becomes subjected to 
coercive force.  
Every eligible individual began taking part in the political process when 
democracy emerged. To this end, G. B. Kerferd credits the sophists with―[producing] for 
the first time in history a theoretical basis for participatory democracy‖ (Kerferd 144). 
Several scholars consider democracy as a utopia, having never been realized, neither in 
its birthplace 2,500 years ago nor in the United States today, for now as then access to 
democracy restricts those who participate. Nevertheless, democracy is the current 
political organization of this country and does offer considerable opportunities, providing 
individuals with the possibility of self-determination, independence, and personal 
development. The challenge, then, lies in enabling individuals, particularly students, to 
recognize and employ these opportunities. Sophistry offers an approach for the 
epistemological—or gnoseological, to use Untersteiner‘s terminology—questioning that 
could lead to transformation and innovation needed to take advantage of democratic 
opportunities more fully. Untersteiner‘s essay addresses the continual questioning despite 
the different conclusions of the sophists on social issues as part of what makes them 
similar. 
Historically, the value of sophistry in terms of pedagogy lies in its universalizing 
of education and leveling of human ability. Education before the sophists did not go 
beyond what in today‘s terms would be primary school (Marrou 76). The sophists were 
the first to recognize the importance of higher education and human development, ―the 
great forerunners . . . the first teachers of advanced education, appearing at a time when 
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Greece had known nothing but sports-trainers, foremen, and, in the academic field, 
humble school masters‖ (79). In fact, Marrou believes that the only thing the sophists had 
in common was their profession as teachers, the ―first teachers of advanced education‖ 
(79). Jaeger goes as far as recognizing them as having founded pedagogy, indicating that 
―intellectual culture largely follows the path they marked out‖ (298). They did indeed 
revolutionize the way in which human beings in Western civilization viewed education 
by recognizing the power of each individual in shaping him/herself. ―La rivoluzione 
pedagogica,‖ in Daniele Vignali‘s words, ―del movimento sofistico, si origina quindi da 
una rivalutazione assoluta dell’educazione, a cui si riconoosce, per la prima volta nella 
storia del pensiero occidentale, la possibilitá di far nascere in individuo la virtù‖ (57). 
Vignali presents the sophistic movement as a pedagogical revolution that stems from the 
absolute revaluation of education, which recognizes, for the first time in the history of 
Western thought, the possibility of inducing virtue within individuals. Education and the 
fostering of arête, therefore, run parallel in the contributions of the sophists.  
Furthermore, their questioning of reality, which caused them to be maligned and 
calumniated by Plato and others with claims to absolute truth, resurface in postmodernist 
views of the last century or so. In terms of their ontological relativism, they were 
thousands of years ahead of their time. Two basic tenets of their thought, therefore, are 
the possibility of teaching arête and relativism. Even though the sophists conceived of 
arête as markedly political, as explicitly claimed by Protagoras, Vignali finds another 
equally important element in their education, asserting that while the majority of scholars 
agree in considering sophistic education to be almost exclusively political, he views it as 
having a twofold value: political and ethical (58—59). The ethical component of their 
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pedagogical practice relates to contemporary rhetorical and composition theory. Vignali 
and others make a cogent case for this added dimension to sophistic pedagogy. 
In terms of pedagogical practice, the sophists added essential and concrete 
modifications to the revolutionary novelty of the possibility of teaching arête. Vignali 
lists four subjects at the heart of sophistic education: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, and 
general culture (62). These subjects, however, do not comprise the entire educational 
system of the sophists. According to Luigi Gallinari, all the teachings of the sophists 
aimed at the formation of two main human types: 1) the successful individual, able to 
excel in society and reach elevated political positions, and 2) the new sophist (30). The 
sophists sought to form an individual constantly striving towards self-improvement and 
socio-political achievement, an individual able to determine, by way of his/her capacities, 
the course of his/her life through intellect and words—in Vignali‘s words, an individual 
―dotato di criticità di pensiero, antidogmatico, uno spirito libero abile nel parlare e 
quindi nel pensare e nell’agire‖ (75). In other words, the sophists sought to create an 
anti-dogmatic individual equipped with critical thinking, a free spirit skillful in thinking 
and taking action. To do so, they aimed to instill a critical awareness and a sense of 
radical doubt toward knowledge and traditional values, clearing the way for their 
pedagogical practice, by refuting the rooted and dogmatic beliefs of their students 
(Vignali 74). These practices have a clear political relevance and importance within a 
democratic system. To add ethical dimension to arête, Vignali maintains that the sophists 
believed in an exact correspondence existed between thought, speech, and action, based 
on the "Anonymous Iamblichi" (77). Lastly, these pedagogical goals can be reached only 
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if the student has some sort of natural predisposition and a passion toward learning. 
Therefore, the sophists had to be able to foster a desire for learning in the student. 
 Achieving these goals, however, remains challenging. Untersteiner‘s essay 
explores the social conditions that initiated sophistic inquiry in classical Greece. 
Untersteiner argues that the critical social conditions created issues and raised questions 
so pressing that they had to be addressed in order to be surpassed. These conditions were 
groundbreaking and unprecedented to the point that they sparked an innovative 
consciousness which introduced an inquisitive mindset. The social conditions in twenty-
first-century United States do not seem less urgent and pressing that did those in classical 
Athens. I now turn to the major issues that Untersteiner identifies during the 
pentecontaetia and how these may relate to current social conditions.  
 
Current Social Conditions and the (Sophistic) Composition Classroom 
One of the primary objectives of education in general and composition in particular 
should be to promote a questioning mindset within students—a kind of epistemological, 
gnoseological even, to use Untersteiner‘s term, self-reflexive turn. This kind of thinking 
enables individuals not only to question their social conditions but also to promote 
beneficial effects in terms of our multicultural postmodern condition. Bruce McComiskey 
speaks of Gorgias as an ―ontological skeptic‖ and an ―epistemological relativist‖ (34—
35). These gnoseological concepts may help students achieve a questioning outlook 
toward social conditions and by extension writing. In terms of education, a questioning 
mindset helps students become critical citizens who can participate in the political 
process and perhaps enact change. In terms of composition, such a mindset is necessary 
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for critical thinking and analytical writing. Of the sophists‘ primary contributions to 
Western thought and pedagogy, a speculative attitude toward knowledge and the existing 
state of affairs ranks among the most revolutionary and useful approaches in a global 
social reality of the 21
st
 century. One way of fostering a questioning mindset within 
students is to examine the basic premises of Western civilization as a means of 
understanding both the current social conditions and the import of rhetoric and 
composition.  
The ideas that appeared and circulated in Ancient Greece are by and large the 
bedrock of Western civilization, informing and characterizing their contemporary 
Western social manifestations in terms of science, politics, philosophy, literature, drama, 
art, and architecture. The achievements of our Greek progenitors continue to shape our 
Western world as paradigms we aspire to equal to this day. Although origins are 
inherently suspect, for they presuppose a particular view of the world, certain 
developments in Ancient Greece mark both a definite shift from former ways of viewing 
the world and the institution of the principles, values, and ideals still very much in place 
today. In line with this thinking, David Fleming states that teachers of composition 
―would do better to reconnect the word with its pedagogical past, where it referred to a 
complex and rewarding course of study whose end was the competent and sensitive 
rhetor‖ (173). Returning to these origins, therefore, can facilitate understanding and 
questioning of contemporary social situations while serving as a pedagogical tool within 
the composition classroom.  
The study of the origins of Western civilization fits naturally within the 
composition classroom curriculum. For one, composition can be considered the modern-
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day incarnation of rhetoric, which also originates as a systematic field of study in Ancient 
Greece. As with any field of study, revisiting the history of the subject helps the 
pedagogical process by contextualizing the present materialization of the subject. In 
particular, studying the inception of classical rhetoric serves the dual purpose of 1) 
exposing students to the historical events and circumstances that inaugurated Western 
civilization and 2) introducing the concept of rhetoric and its bearings upon human 
existence. That students are largely unaware of Greek history is to be expected; however, 
I find it curious, to say the least, that most students, and indeed most individuals, do not 
even know the basic meaning of the word rhetoric, except perhaps in a vague way and in 
its negative connotation, despite the intrinsic role of rhetoric within a democratic political 
system and the pervasiveness of rhetoric within human communities, particularly in those 
based on freedom of speech.  
Indeed, I believe that this very unawareness lies at the root of the lack of 
questioning and examination of the social. By exploring the beginning of Western 
civilization particularly in relation to rhetoric, students can discover the roots of current 
social conditions and the power of rhetoric within society. These roots can expose 
themselves as assumptions that underlie the present. The importance of historical 
knowledge for the understanding of the present hardly needs explanation. Exposing 
students to the historical events of Ancient Greece favors the understanding of not only 
the circumstances that gave rise to rhetoric and but also the conditions that initiated many 
of the values and aspirations in place today, such as individualism and political equality. 
More importantly, perhaps, revisiting the historical social conditions can play a role in 
determining what is at stake in knowing rhetoric and its power. In order to understand 
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and question their social conditions, individuals in general and students in particular must 
be aware of the derivation of the present social organization. Because the ideas that 
developed at this time influence current social dynamics, I believe that exploring these 
historical origins of Western civilization particularly in terms of rhetoric should be part of 
the composition curriculum. This historical introduction and basic premise of rhetorical 
education includes the sophists and the role ascribed to them in Untersteiner‘s ―Le 
origini‖ as questioners of social issues. Revisiting the social issues of Ancient Greece and 
the sophists‘ questioning of them may promote a similar approach to contemporary issues 
without inciting the common student resistance to composition.  
Student resistance to writing instruction is a well-known phenomenon. Karen 
Kopelson calls attention to this tendency, arguing that ―[a]s composition theorizing and 
teaching have evolved in more cultural-studies-based or ‗critical‘ directions, student 
resistance has evolved from a rudimentary resistance to the writing course per se into 
resistance to the writing course as ‗inappropriately‘ politicized‖ (116—117). 
Composition, more than any other course, she continues, ―is expected by students to be 
without content, to involve little more than impartial instruction in the transferable and 
neutral skill of writing ‗correctly‘‖ (117). A composition course without content, 
however, in addition to being unattainable since rhetoric necessarily includes content, is 
also ineffective in terms of encouraging the type of civic engagement, or political arête 
that I am proposing. Kopelson argues that ―overtly ‗critical‘ pedagogical approaches may 
be especially ineffective, and even counterproductive, for the teacher-subject who is 
immediately read by students as belonging to any . . .marginalized constituenc[y]‖ (118). 
Although Kopelson discusses student resistance particularly in terms of ―marginalized‖ 
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teachers, I extend her argument to include composition instructors calling for social 
questioning because many students consider instructors, especially composition ones, as 
bookish academics promoting their own liberal views.  
Kopelson theorizes ―an alternative critical pedagogy‖ that draws on the Ancient 
Greek ―concept of ‗cunning,‘ what the Greeks called mêtis‖ as a countermeasure for 
resistance (118, 130). This approach, which Kopelson labels the ―performance of 
neutrality,‖ can become ―a rhetorically savvy, politically responsive and responsible 
pedagogical tactic that . . . minimizes [student] resistance‖ (118). Drawing on classical 
rhetoric, its beginning in Ancient Greece, and the role of the sophists in questioning the 
state of affairs can serve as such a mêtis to advance student interest in contemporary 
issues and the thinking/writing process around these issues without inciting the common 
resistance students have toward composition. 
The social issues that captivated the sophists and are the subject of Untersteiner‘s 
essay may function as a pedagogical possibility for such questioning. Some of the social 
issues that Untersteiner describes are currently occurring in the United States. 
Untersteiner delineates several social events that took place during the pentecontaetia, 
positing them as stimulating the development of sophistry. More specifically, the falling 
of physical barriers between social groups, the expansion of commerce, and the incursion 
of metics or alien residents broadened the cultural milieu thereby generating new ideas as 
well as promoting new political and philosophical systems to address them. These social 
issues resemble many of the issues in the U.S. today: globalization and the World Wide 
Web not only dissolve barriers between cultures but also introduce new cross-cultural 
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ideas beyond physical borders. In Ancient Greece, however, they contributed to the 
dissolution, albeit partial and temporary, of the aristocracy. 
The decline of the aristocracy is one of Untersteiner‘s most important 
explanations for the development of sophistry. When the aristocracy ceased to control the 
way in which the public imagination viewed individuals, new areas of freedom arose. 
The aristocracy responded by grasping on to traditional values and eternal ideas, which 
provided fertile ground for sophistic interpretation. Untersteiner argues that the 
preeminence of the collective interest decreased individualism, due to the universal ideas 
that impeded any autonomous gesture. The antithesis community-individual was a 
momentous issue in the age democracy appeared. 
Jaeger underscores the importance of this issue, stating that ―the relation between 
a great intellectual personality and the community in which he lived‖ as ―the problem 
which ceaselessly exercised all philosophers until the city-state passed away,‖ a problem 
that appeared when ―the aristocracy of race had been displaced by the aristocracy of 
intellect‖ (289). This problem also receives extensive treatment in an outstanding study 
by Suzanne Keller on how a human community emerges. She posits the polis as the 
center of public life with the aim of attaining ―a just society able to reconcile the 
contradictory tensions between individual ambition and collective goals‖ (17). 
Furthermore, Keller continues: 
 
Not unlike two thousand years later, however, another prominent theme vied with 
the polis to create familiar and stressful contradictions: the theme of individual 
glory, as exemplified by the victors in athletic contests. These victors were a 
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source of pride, since they brought honor to the entire polis, and they were 
celebrated in song and story. Yet the contests also encouraged a self-
aggrandizement and self-centeredness inimical to the sense of community. 
Eventually, the ‗fierce competition for public honor and a raw, undisguised drive 
for riches scarcely ever again equaled in ancient times‘ came close to destroying 
the spiritual unity of the polis. (19) 
 
This tension, as Keller announces, survives to this day. According to Jaeger, however, 
―the individual and the community fight their last battle‖ in Plato‘s educational state 
(Paideia, Vol 1, xxvi). In Jaeger‘s discussion of education in the perfect state, ―[t]he 
ruling class is meant to serve the happiness of the whole community, and the happiness of 
the community can be ensured only if everyone does his own work and nothing else‖ 
(Paideia, Vol 2, 236). Individualism, in Plato, becomes ―a new disease of personality‖ 
(336). By addressing the issue of community versus individual in Ancient Greece, 
composition instructors can create an opportunity for analysis of the current state of this 
ancient problem. 
This analysis can be enacted in various ways. I turn to Kenneth Burke and his 
discussion in A Rhetoric of Motives regarding individuals being their own audience. He 
argues that,  
 
[s]uch considerations make us alert to the ingredient of rhetoric in all 
socialization, considered as moralizing process. The individual person, striving to 
form him[/her]self in accordance with the communicative norms that match the 
 163 
 
cooperative ways of his society, is by the same token concerned with the rhetoric 
of identification. To act upon him[/her]self persuasively, [s/]he must variously 
resort to images and ideas that are formative. Education (‗indoctrination‘) exerts 
such pressure upon him[/her] from without; [s/]he completes the process from 
within. If [s/]he does not somehow act to tell him[/her]self (as his[/her] own 
audience) what the various brands of rhetorician have told him, his persuasion is 
not complete. Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the 
language of a voice within. (39)  
 
I quote at length because this line of reasoning exemplifies the consequence of rhetoric 
within the community-individual antithesis. In order to succeed, rhetoric must consider 
audience. As a result, individuals must partake in self-persuasion in order for values, 
beliefs, and eternal ideas—such as those the aristocracy latched onto when its power was 
threatened—to operate successfully.  
Composition instructors can enable students to formulate correlations by turning 
to cultural studies. As discussed above, Vignali considers general culture as one of the 
four subjects of sophistic education. General culture is the object of analysis of cultural 
studies, which takes on every aspect of social conditions. Henry Giroux, as he extensively 
discusses in a number of books and articles, considers the media to be the strongest 
pedagogical force in our society, manipulating perception to maintain the current power 
structure. Students can analyze social matters such as the ones Untersteiner identifies as 
having generated sophistry. Individualism, community, and (current equivalents of) 
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aristocratic dynasties, among others, lend themselves to the kind of analysis composition 
asks of students. 
While the aristocracy may seem an entity of the past, mammoth income 
discrepancies exist in contemporary society. Untersteiner argues that despite the 
innovative democratic currents, the people remained inclined toward ancient traditions 
and recognized the superiority and ability of the aristocracy as guides for the people. 
Thus, the aristocracy retained its power as the heads of the democracy. As an instance of 
mêtis, exposing students to the discrepancies and contradictions in Ancient Greece may 
trigger a similar analysis of our current state of affairs. To carry out such analysis and 
seek possible correlations, students can turn to investigating current social dynamics. 
Even a cursory glance at the social dynamics currently in place reveals a kind of 
postmodern aristocracy. These days, as James Berlin points out, we ―speak of the income 
of the ‗bottom ninety percent‘ of the population‖ (122). This type of aristocracy, 
however, proves particularly insidious, as concealed if not more so as that identified by 
Untersteiner in Ancient Greece.  
Students can examine cultural industries to find representations of individualism 
and community and the role of the media in advancing cultural standards and democratic 
values. The role and purpose of the media within a democratic political system is 
paramount and an instance of general culture. The media are supposed to protect and 
advance democratic values. In a way, the media should pose questions regarding social 
conditions very much like the sophists did two and a half millennia ago. Michael 
McChesney has written extensively regarding the connection between democracy and the 
media, finding the media to be largely unsatisfactory. In The Problem of the Media, he 
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describes the current situation, stating that ―around the globe media systems are primarily 
controlled by a small number of wealthy firms or individuals, who use their power to 
advance their political agenda‖ (224). In discussing the political nature of the problem of 
the media in democratic societies, he elucidates that ―virtually all theories of self-
government are premised on having an informed citizenry, and the creation of such an 
informed citizenry is the media‘s province‖ (17). Without the possibility of non-
commercially interested platforms, such as would have been the agora in ancient Greece, 
the voices of groups of thinkers such as the sophists have no chance of being heard; 
therefore, although such opinions are definitely occurring in a number of subcultures, 
they are certainly not broadcast and therefore cannot compete with those circulated by the 
mass media in our society. Students can thus compare the issues dealt with by the 
sophists as expressed by Untersteiner in a contemporary context. 
I am arguing for a composition theory that takes account of current social 
conditions, that looks at our society critically, asking questions, as the sophists did, 
regarding the status of our social reality. By exploring the inconsistencies in our social 
condition and political situation, students develop an awareness that the media and a 
largely absent public sphere do not provide. This goal can be achieved in many ways, one 
of which is by analyzing historical circumstances and identifying the inconsistencies of 
the time to draw parallels to the present. Omar Swartz offers an example from the 
birthplace of our current political system:  
 
[s]erious contradictions existed in Ancient Athens between its self-image and its 
behaviors. . . . [T]he purpose of pointing out these contradictions is not to laugh at 
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the people of the past or to condemn them from our ‗superior‘ moral position. 
Rather, the point is to recognize that all societies have their contradictions and 
that our critical energies need to be spent on learning to recognize our own 
contradictions. We cannot go back and ‗improve‘ the Ancient Greek society, nor 
can we ameliorate the suffering of its victims. What we can do is to recognize that 
the contradictions between our own self-images and our behaviors contribute to 
our own legacy of suffering. By acknowledging this point, we can direct our 
critical actions toward reducing the suffering that we have some control over. 
(29—30) 
 
I interpret this passage as pointing to the ethnocentrism (and ethnologics) inherent in 
everyone. The most anyone can do is to be aware of his/her own ethnocentrism. I find 
paradoxical that the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle have survived in conjunction 
with democracy, for these philosophers were explicitly opposed to democracy. Marrou 
goes as far as calling Socrates ―the mouthpiece of the old aristocratic tradition‖ and at 
―the center of an anti-democratic clique‖ (91). These discrepancies can function as a 
springboard for students to question their own social conditions.  
Rather than espousing one pedagogical theory over another, I propose a pedagogy 
that deploys any of them according to the aim of discourse, as envisioned by James 
Kinneavy and others. Exploding the either/or binary, I argue for both/and approach to 
composition theory, whereby each composition theory becomes useful based on the 
purpose the student rhetor has. More specifically, composition theory of Peter Elbow and 
other expressionists, rather than be embraced or rejected, becomes useful for assignments 
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in which the aim is expression of feelings. Likewise, a cognitivist approach becomes 
useful when the aim is referential, to borrow Kinneavy‘s term, in technical or scientific 
discourse, while the various socio-epistemic and rhetorical theories aid the invention of a 
persuasive aim.  
 
Composition Teachers as Sophists 
The university, the humanities, English studies, and particularly rhetorical subjects such 
as composition and writing remain some of the few places in which individuals can 
practice and learn the rhetorical abilities necessary for them to be active members in a 
democratic society. The United States today not only considers itself the ultimate 
incarnation of democracy but also claims to wish this form of government among the 
purportedly less fortunate non-democratic nations, as made clear within the primary 
foreign policy interests of the U.S. However, as Omar Swartz argues,  
 
If democracy has any rationale at all, it is that the more people who contribute to 
the logos, the richer our understanding will be of our political realities. This is one 
of the reasons why, functionally speaking, we cannot really characterize the 
United States as a ‗democracy,‘ as there is not much of a commitment to 
competing logos. (Swartz 67)  
 
I argue that the United States is not fulfilling most democratic ideals, and as modern-day 
sophists, composition instructors are among the few voices that can encourage students to 
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examine and question the existing state of affairs, both as a rhetorical/composition 
exercise and as an ethical/civic responsibility. 
Critical literacy requires this type of questioning, for a society that ceases to be 
interrogative becomes passive to the representations presented by powerful media 
conglomerates. Ideas such as those of the sophists should be a central part of a democracy 
through the media. However, as the work of Robert McChesney reveals, the major role 
which the media should play within the realization of a democratic society remains 
extremely lacking. In ancient Athens, citizens would argue and persuade one another in 
favor of certain routes of action over others; in the U.S. today that role remains outside of 
the daily life of the vast majority of people. In ancient Athens, when ―reality‖ came to be 
questioned, new answers emerged; in the U.S. today, ―reality‖ is rarely questioned 
beyond the inner circles and conversations of academics and underground subcultures. 
The type of speculative discourse offered by the sophists is exactly what lacks in our 
democratic society today, particularly in the U.S., although other industrialized countries 
share this feature. The sophists can be viewed as public intellectuals and compared both 
to modern day university scholars and composition instructors. I argue for the importance 
of reestablishing the role of the public intellectual, both in the composition classroom and 
the society at large.   
The sophists carried out myriad types of social questioning. Catherine Osborne 
maintains that the sophists ―ask society to question its raison d'être, its political beliefs, 
its moral values, its religious beliefs, its educational system, its legal codes, and its codes 
of etiquette‖ (131). Untersteiner considers all these issues in his germinal essay, 
presenting them as the impetus behind the development of the sophistic movement. As 
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the originators of Western paideia and rhetoric, the goals of the sophists should coincide 
with those of composition teachers. Sharon Crowley discusses the similarities and 
differences between the sophists and teachers of writing:  
 
Sophistic pedagogy bore one striking similarity to that of contemporary writing 
teachers in that the Sophists instructed their students in discursive practice rather 
than focusing on the pursuit of abstract knowledge for its own sake. . . . But the 
educational practices of the Sophists were markedly different from our own in one 
important respect: Modern teachers do not often think of themselves as 
professional participants in political or social issues. (―Plea‖ 330) 
 
She argues, rather, that ―those who are engaged in teaching discursive practice are always 
engaged in Sophistry; and, because of this, that they cannot escape the public aspect of 
their work‖ (330). Composition teachers in particular, as well as more generally teachers 
of English, should embrace this objective.  
I agree with Berlin that English Studies ―has a special role in the democratic 
educational mission‖ (54). A major way of enacting democratic principles necessarily 
falls in the hands of Rhetoric and Composition scholars and instructors as modern-day 
rhetoricians and sophists. Already in the mid-nineties, James Berlin noted that 
―Postmodernism in the academy has led to challenges in our understanding of the subject, 
language, epistemology, history, and the relations of all these to each other‖ (47—48). 
The shift he identifies is very similar to the one that occurred in classical Greece and 
which is discussed in Untersteiner‘s essay in terms of the issues he identifies such as 
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individualism, gnoseology, and constitutional crises. Berlin goes further by discussing 
knowledge from a democratic political perspective:  
 
knowledge is a good that ought to serve the interest of the larger community as 
well as individuals. . . . It must be situated, however, in relation to larger 
economic, social, political and cultural considerations. Students must learn to 
locate the beneficiaries and the victims of knowledge, exerting their rights as 
citizens in a democracy to criticize freely those in power. (52) 
 
Similarly, Henry Giroux echoes this opinion, for him the goal of education in a 
democratic society is to impart ―critical literacy‖ in our students. He argues that ―[i]n a 
world marked by increasing poverty, unemployment, and diminished social opportunities, 
educators must vindicate the crucial connection between culture and politics in defending 
public and higher education as sites of democratic learning and struggle‖ (37). These 
issues increasingly continue to affect our students. Pedagogy, rhetoric, and democracy are 
interrelated concepts that comprise the current historical condition of the composition 
teacher and his/her work preparing students.  
Henry Giroux argues that providing the knowledge, skills, and values to address 
the most pressing questions of our time is a vital element of this mission, corroborating 
the role of the sophists. He believes that in order to educate for ―critical citizenship and 
civic courage,‖ the role of academics as engaged public intellectuals be reformulated 
(37). Similarly, Untersteiner considers the philosophy of the sophists as a ―speculative 
mirror of the social forms of the human spirit‖ (552), arguing that the philosophical and 
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rationalist idea of community constitutes the fundamental problem for Protagoras and 
many other sophists. One way to achieve this modification in the role of composition 
instructors is to add sophistic rhetorics to traditional Aristotelian rhetoric. According to 
Jane Sutton ―Aristotle reformulates rhetoric and renders it the art for preserving ‗what 
is‘‖ adding that Aristotle‘s On Rhetoric ―perpetuates and maintains the established order‖ 
(153). The sophists‘ rhetoric, she continues, ―is a complex way of thinking that integrates 
metaphor-possible-individualistic-generative-radical into rhetoric‖ which can lead to ―the 
actualization of human potential‖ (153—54). As teachers of rhetoric, composition 
instructors should embrace this element of their sophistic ancestry. 
The resemblance between the sophists and composition instructors today also lies 
in the place they occupy in society. Much in the same way that Plato and his followers 
attempted, successfully albeit, to soil the importance of rhetoric and its primary 
supporters, the sophists, the media in modern day U.S. do nothing to encourage citizen 
rhetorical education and participation in democratic practice. While many composition 
theorists argue that the composition classroom is not the place for politics, I contend that 
even though the composition classroom may not be an ideal site, it is one of the only sites 
for students to be exposed and instructed in this kind of necessary rhetorical preparation. 
Further, politics is always already present, whether it is acknowledged or not. As James 
Berlin persuasively argues in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College 
English Studies, ―given the democratic political commitments of the United States, it is as 
impossible for us to separate literary and rhetorical texts from political life as it was for 
the citizens of ancient Athens‖ (xiii). Democratic states should not merely pay lip service 
to the words ―freedom‖ and ―liberty‖ but rather should ―conceptualize these words in a 
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concrete freedom, one based in a mutual respect between human beings. In a democratic 
society, there is no room for racism, sexism, homophobia, a state religion, and a material 
inequality among social classes‖ (Swartz 30). Gerard Hauser adds that ―Scholars and 
teachers of rhetoric can, indeed must, reclaim their birthright by reasserting the centrality 
of rhetoric to democratic life in the twenty-first century‖ (13). The composition instructor 
ought to promote the conditions of such political and civic engagement because of the 
role that rhetoric plays in the democratic system.  
The goal for composition instructors is to recover, discuss, and encourage a sense 
of arête in a postmodern sense. For David Fleming, the aim of rhetorical training is ―to 
become a certain kind of person, one who has internalized the art of rhetoric,‖ 
incorporating theory and practice but ―subordinating both to the moral and intellectual 
development of the student, who is seen primarily as a future citizen in a community of 
free and equal citizens‖ (178—79). In this view, rhetoric is ―inextricably involved in the 
character-forming project of education‖ (178). By encouraging students to be 
gnoseologically critical, composition instructors as sophists can contribute to promoting a 
postmodern arête. Being gnoseologically critical does not deny the existence of truth; 
rather, in McComiskey‘s words, it calls attention to the ―historical and empirical 
contingency of truth‖ (59). As most Sophists would argue, knowledge and truth mutate 
according to context and times.  
Untersteiner‘s contribution, like all others, may be questioned and superseded, 
revisited and appreciated, misunderstood and reinterpreted. Despite everything it may 
undergo, one constant remains, and that is that social conditions create truth/s. Everything 
changes, yet nothing changes. This apparent and inherent paradox encloses within itself 
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and discloses a truth that the sophists held dear. My main point is that what the sophists 
taught, rhetoric, is not in itself good or evil. Much like food, drugs, television, and any 
other substance or practice that can be abused, rhetoric comes to life and can be put to 
good or bad use. In itself rhetoric is nothing and everything: nothing for, as Socrates 
makes Gorgias admit in the Gorgias, it does not have a conventional subject of study; and 
everything for it covers every subject which one can discuss when using it, as well as its 
own theoretical underpinning. Undeniably, humans use rhetoric every day, for it is what 
drives human identity and community. The pedagogy I have sketched and the role of 
composition instructors as sophists aim to help students go from being unaware rhetors, 
understood as those who practice rhetoric, to being conscious rhetoricians, as in those 
who study and know rhetoric, so as to not be victims of it, for undeniably, those who 
know rhetoric in Western democracies, such as attorneys, advertisers, and 
politicians/speech writers, are rhetoricians who hold disproportionate power over those 
who do not know it. David Fleming argues that ―[t]o revitalize rhetorical education, we 
need to recapture this focus on the language user as citizen‖ (184). I believe that the 
sophists and composition instructors as the sophists‘ postmodern counterparts can and 
should take on this challenge. 
By translating a treatise about the social origins of sophistry, I make a case for the 
reinsertion of this ancient profession and its primary principles into the composition 
classroom. Rhetoric and Composition scholars have a hefty mission in their hands, for 
not only do we teach young students who have many other concerns but also we teach a 
subject that has fallen into disregard and is not considered valuable by most students. 
Whatever one what may say about sophistry, whether one agrees with its tenets or not, a 
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form of thought or group of thinkers that challenges, educates, and most of all, perhaps, 
questions the current state of affairs is not only beneficial but absolutely necessary for a 
democratic society that fulfils even only the most basic elements of democracy. I hope 
that this dissertation will make not merely another contribution but a call for the revival 
of such thought in our composition classrooms and society.  
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